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Abstract 
  
Purpose-This study examines the social disclosure by Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. By 
viewing it through the lenses of the legitimacy and stakeholder perspective, the study explores the 
commitment of Islamic banks towards wider stakeholders in 7 dimensions (Shariah/Social 
Internal/Social External/Environmental/Shariah Governance/Governance/Ethics) and 20 themes. 
Known as the two most advanced countries with distinct models of Islamic banking, Malaysia and 
Bahrain are an ideal two-country sample to be explored. It is important to learn how Malaysia’s 
moderate approach and Bahrain’s conservative attitude may contribute to differences in their Shariah, 
Social, Environmental, Governance & Ethics (SEGE) disclosure. Furthermore, this thesis introduces the 
‘Islamic Accountability Theory Model’ and ‘SEGE Disclosure Framework’ for Islamic banks to the 
literature to be further explored and enhanced. 
Design/methodology/approach- The approach taken uses an in-depth 3-Stages content analysis 
(Volume Measurement/ Ordinary Index/ 3-Level Score) of 18 Malaysian and 16 Bahraini Islamic banks’ 
annual reports for a period of 5 years (2010-2014). This ‘triple method’ was made possible using the 
Microsoft Excel sheet (Ordinary Index), special design manual sheet (Quality Score & Volume) and 
Nvivo software (Recording Method & Analysis). Furthermore, the 3-level score was later estimated 
using the STATA software to further support the results in chapter 6 and test the relationship between 
the variables of interest (Religiosity & Regulatory quality) towards SEGE Quality disclosure. 
Findings- The overall findings show an interesting differentiation between the two models of Islamic 
banking. The top 5 performing Islamic banks in disclosure quality were dominated by Malaysian Islamic 
banks. Furthermore, the top 10 performing Islamic banks ranking in disclosure movement from 
ordinary (index) to quality (3-level score) were much steadier in Malaysia while they were more 
unstable in Bahrain. In addition, religiosity and regulatory quality seem to have influenced SEGE 
disclosure. In short, the Islamic banks that operate in environments with supportive governing bodies, 
collaborative institutions, sustainable talent management systems and moderate values tend to 
perform comparatively better in their SEGE disclosure. 
Practical Implication- This research may draw attention to regulators and non-governmental 
organisations to produce a set of SEGE disclosure standards for Islamic financial institutions. Moreover, 
the SEGE disclosure framework may be used as a part of training material for practitioners in the 
industry. Furthermore, this research might help managers, Board of Directors, and Shariah Supervisory 
Boards to have a greater view on the role of Islamic banks in social reporting initiatives. 
Originality/value- The study fills gaps in Islamic accounting literature by having an in-depth 
examination of the Malaysian and Bahraini model of Islamic banking. It goes beyond previous 
literature in Islamic accounting literature by enhancing the method and suggesting a theoretical 
foundation and disclosure framework for the Islamic finance industry, particularly in Islamic banks.  
Keywords: SEGE (Shariah, Social, Environment, Governance & Ethic), Social Reporting, Islamic Accounting, 
Legitimacy, Stakeholder, Islamic Accountability, Islamic Bank Disclosure Framework. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 Preamble 
 
Traditionally, the role of religion in finance and banking transaction has been central to religious 
conviction. For instance, the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) have received more 
or less the same teachings and messages with regards to usury in their holy scriptures and books 
(Warde, 2010). In all the Abrahamic religions, only Islam associates itself with, and has embedded its 
name within, the banking system. Based on religious values, Islamic society has great expectations for 
Islamic banks to perform well in their social duties and ethical conduct (Kamla and Rammal, 2013, 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007, Belal et al., 2014). However, due to the nature of financial business, it is 
necessary to appraise the corporate values that most of the times are prone to a business and profit 
orientation which is not necessarily socially and ethically responsive. 
Therefore, the emerging market for Islamic banking has made research into social reporting by Islamic 
banks interesting and has sparked the motivation for pursuing it. The expansion of the Islamic banking 
industry in the last twenty years has been remarkable (Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous, 2013) in terms of 
business growth. Moreover, the Islamic banking industry has proven its expansion with a growth rate 
within the double digits in the past 7 years, with an average of 16.02% according to DiVanna (2013). 
Parallel to Islamic banking business growth, the awareness on social expectation has also proliferated. 
Ramanathan (1976) argues that social reporting is as important as financial reporting; therefore, social 
reporting based on Islamic accounting values are supposed to be central to Islamic banks. This idea is 
supported by Lewis (2001) where he argues that accounting and accountability are central to Islam, 
where Muslims are accountable to God and the community in all aspects of their life, including banking. 
Therefore, the research for Islamic social reporting and its application need to be sustained and 
propelled further to keep the awareness growing. 
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Furthermore, Islamic banking is one small branch under the umbrella of Islamic teaching that has its 
roots in muamalat (commercial transactions and civil dealings between humans) and is governed by 
Islamic jurisprudence in dealing with its technicalities (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). The design of the 
modern Islamic banking system is a mix of western banking and the essence of Islamic jurisprudence, 
and this has been indicated by the translation by Demetriades and Tyser (1980) on the code of law in 
the business transactions of the last Ottoman Empire. This code of law provides a comprehensive law 
in the business transactions of sale, hire, transfer of debt, pledges, and trust and trusteeship based on 
the Hanafi1 school of thought.  
Particularly, looking at the various branches of the human activity that have a relationship with the 
Islamic economy, Islamic banking in the modern world was created mainly to avoid usurious business 
transactions which were prohibited by the Quran in the verse “ ‘…Trade is [just] like interest. But God 
permitted trade and forbidden interest…’ 2:275” (Ali, 2009). Based on this source of belief, modern 
Islamic banks emerged in the 1970s and have grown, until today, side by side with older conventional 
banks in countries such as Malaysia and Bahrain. 
Therefore, it is clear that Islamic teachings cover all aspects of Muslim  life as advocated by Lewis 
(2001), covering worship, commercial, civil, criminal, and familial activities among other things. 
Therefore, Islamic banking is one such organisation that has been established in the industry based on 
the above principle. Moreover, in relation to this thesis, the thesis is in accord with Aribi and Gao 
(2010) assumption that Islam is an important factor that should inspire social disclosure by Islamic 
banks. 
In summary, the preamble section not only serves as the fundamental basis of the motivation and 
inspiration for the research but also provides important information in the understanding and 
calibrating between social reporting and Islamic banks. 
                                                        
1 The Hanafi school of thought is one of the four main schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence. The other 
three are the Maliki, Shafie, and Hanbali school of thought.  
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 Research Aims 
 
The research aim is to examine the social reporting practices by Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. 
This is by way of the Malaysian and Bahraini systems as a proxy model. This research will examine how 
and to what extent Islamic banks in these two models disclose social information to be utilised in 
signalling their accountability to society. Moreover, this will be accomplished through social disclosure 
evidence in the available official annual report documents between 2010 until 2014. Islamic banks 
should act in a manner which promotes sound social disclosure practices in order to establish societal 
belief in their system as the foundation of Islamic banks is tied closely with their religious positioning. 
The research thus attempts to explain the Shariah, Social, Environment, Governance and ethics (SEGE) 
disclosure framework for Islamic banks based on the legitimacy and stakeholder theories as a main 
theory and signalling, social norms and accountability theory as other supporting theories. 
Furthermore, the theories will be linked to research findings extracted from the empirical analysis. 
This study will provide literature with further extensions of social disclosure by Islamic banks in these 
two models. 
 Key Research Questions  
The research questions below have been formulated in consideration of the above-mentioned 
research aim and objectives: - 
1) What are the disclosure practices of the two models of Islamic banks, namely the Malaysian 
and Bahraini Model. How do their practices differ? Why? 
2) Are there any differences in the ordinary2 and quality3 disclosure of social reporting by Islamic 
banks in these two countries? Is it related to symbolic disclosure and surface legitimacy? Why? 
3) Will the regulatory quality and religiosity influence social disclosure? 
                                                        
2 Ordinary disclosure measure by the index. For a further discussion see chapter 5. 
3 Quality disclosure measure by the 3 level score. For a further discussion see chapter 5. 
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4) Are there any differences between the individual bank’s practices in ordinary and quality 
disclosure? Is it related to wider stakeholder involvement or is it just a means of legitimacy? 
Why? 
 Research Scope and Approach 
 
The thesis takes the objectivist approach of philosophical assumption while adopting a realist position 
in ontology. Furthermore, it assumes the positivist position in epistemology and determinism 
concerning the assumption of human nature. The thesis investigates Malaysia and Bahrain as the 
target samples due to their rich and strong characteristics in operation and development history in 
the Islamic banking industry. The thesis employs a ‘3 stages’ content analysis (Volume 
measurement/Ordinary index & 3-Level Score) to explore the SEGE disclosure in these two countries 
that represent the two models of Islamic banking through the lenses of legitimacy, stakeholder, and 
signalling theory with a hint of social norms theory and Islamic accountability. 
 Proposed Research Contribution to the body of Knowledge 
 
This thesis’ originality and contributions to the body of knowledge are constructed to the best of the 
author’s knowledge based on a review of the literature as outlined below: - 
1) The extension on information content ‘quality’ by the innovations of ‘three Level disclosure 
coding scheme’ that differentiate the disclosure commitment and theories entrance 4  is 
inspired by the studies of Botosan (1997) and Beck et al. (2010). 
2) The introduction of the ‘SEGE Disclosure Framework for Islamic Banks’ to the literature. 
3) The enhancement of the content analysis technique by having a ‘3 Stages’ content analysis in 
one single study, which is the ‘volume measurement, ordinary index and quality score’, 
                                                        
4 Theory entrance is the assumption in the 3 level disclosure where narrative disclosure signals legitimacy 
theory while (statistical/graphics/policy) disclosure may suggest stakeholder theory. 
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where normally only one of the techniques is employed at a time in one particular research 
or study. 
4) The harmonisation of themes and checklists by Maali et al. (2006), Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) 
and Belal et al. (2014) with the relevant standards of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Equator Principle, 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI), and Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB). 
5) The segregation of graphic and narrative disclosure results into separate results so that Islamic 
banks can appreciate the use of graphics in disclosing social information. 
6) The recognition of the disclosure performance by the Islamic bank’s model on top of countries 
and individual banks. 
The next section will describe the thesis structure and conclude chapter 1. 
 
 Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of four parts and seven main chapters with each chapter consisting of its own 
sections and sub-sections accordingly. It is recommended that the ‘process flow’ located before each 
introduction of each chapters be read together for ease of understanding of the flow of a particular 
chapter. 
Chapter 1 provides the introductory information of the thesis background along with the principal 
motivation behind the thesis. Furthermore, chapter one addresses the research objectives and the 
core research question followed by some brief, preliminary information of the methodology used by 
the thesis. Moreover, chapter one also describes the background of the thesis’ main scope of study 
(Malaysia & Bahrain) and justifies the pursuit of the study by emphasising the thesis’ contribution to 
the body of knowledge. 
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Chapter 2 describes the environment of the institutional and regulatory bodies and progress of the 
two countries in order to understand the framework and the work culture and commitment signalled 
by both countries’ governments, regulators and Islamic bank professionals as well the society’s socio-
environment. These factors are important to be explored and explained in order understand the 
differences in Malaysia and Bahrain’s Islamic banking industry. Moreover, this will also help in 
connecting the differences between the two countries in the findings chapters. 
Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature pertinent to the research objectives and research 
questions, specifically Islamic social reporting as well as social reporting in general. The chapter traces 
the evolution of social reporting literature and its historical development in terms of theory 
applicability and the methods employed as well as the coverage. The chapter then highlights the 
scarcity of literature on Islamic social reporting, particularly in the Islamic banking industry, as the 
banking sector is assumed to be the source of funds for other companies which are the ideal to be 
observed within the lenses of social disclosure. The chapter concludes by highlighting the possible 
reason and gaps that the previous literature may have failed to address. 
Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical foundation of the study from the definition, differentiation to 
application of the theories involved. Furthermore, chapter 4 introduces the SEGE disclosure 
framework that involves a theoretical application on disclosure. Moreover, the chapter provides a 
detailed discussion on the proposed theoretical foundation and the disclosure framework. All of these 
will provide the foundation of the study’s construction as well as a guide to interpretations of the 
results and findings. 
Chapter 5 describes the research design of the thesis which consists of the methodology and methods 
employed and implemented in the thesis. It commences by positioning the thesis’ philosophical 
ideology and methodological viewpoint towards the research stand, thus verifying the method, 
strategy and technique employed by the thesis. Furthermore, chapter 5 describes the detailed 
processes and formula in deriving the ordinary index and rules in the 3-level score as well as the 
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quantitative research method. Moreover, the heptagonal dimensions and icosagonal themes involved 
will be described and explained in addition to the data collection and significance of the sample of the 
study. 
Chapter 6 constitutes the main findings of the thesis, aiming to explore and compare the SEGE 
disclosure commitment between the two countries and as a whole for a wider understanding. 
Moreover, this will be achieved by presenting the countries’ differences in ordinary-quality disclosure, 
highlighting the top performers, comparing the 7 dimensions and 20 themes disclosure commitment, 
and exploring the disclosure thread for both countries. Furthermore, this chapter provides various and 
rich statistical evidence throughout the chapters as well as the subjective aspect of interesting quotes 
in the annual reports to provide a unique element that may explain the disclosure commitment of the 
Islamic banks in the two countries. 
Chapter 7 provides further support for the main findings in chapter 6 by investigating whether the 
religiosity and regulatory quality have influenced SEGE disclosure, thus potentially explaining the 
differences of disclosure between Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic banks in one spectrum. This is 
because the thesis argues that the Islamic banks that operate in an environment that the stakeholders 
influence and are shaped by the values in a particular geographical area might react differently in their 
disclosure. The reason for this is that the thesis argues that the society that is shaped by certain values 
will bring the values, either as external stakeholders or as internal stakeholders, to Islamic banks. In 
both ways, the organisation, or in this case Islamic banks, are inevitably influenced by stakeholder 
values. 
Chapter 8 offers a valuable discussion and conclusion in reasoning the rich findings in chapter 6 and 
results in chapter 7. The discussions weave together the findings with theories and the literature in 
highlighting the thesis’ conclusions. The chapter also sheds light on the study of managerial implication 
and its limitation, as well as offering suggestions and recommendations for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND OF MALAYSIA AND BAHRAIN 
ENVIRONMENT AND FRAMEWORK 
 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides insight into the regulatory environment and an overview of institutions and 
events that have emerged in both the Malaysia and Bahrain Islamic banking landscape, including the 
legislative and educational development. Furthermore, it provides an understanding on how 
important are the two countries specifically to the thesis as the scope of study and in the literature in 
general.  
Furthermore, this chapter will summarise the regulatory framework, institutional effort, regulations 
and standards by both countries. Moreover, this chapter provides the discussion to shape the thesis 
argument and standpoint with regards to Malaysia and Bahrain as samples of the study. This is 
because Malaysia and Bahrain are selected as the study sample due to their unique model and 
distribution of Islamic banking which represent the majority of the world’s Islamic banking system. 
Moreover, even though in the social reporting literature of Islamic banks the sample chosen varies 
between a large and small number of banks, this thesis argues that the study of the two countries can 
better represent the Islamic banking industry. This is because the government, society and the 
institutions that have been developed in these two countries have supported the movement and 
progress of Islamic banking. Even though there are still big differences in the way that Islamic banking 
has developed in the two countries (Malaysia: Top to Bottom Approach/Bahrain: Bottom to Top 
Approach), the fact remains that, as compared to other Islamic countries in the world, these two 
countries are well ahead in terms of the development and progress of the Islamic banking industry. 
In summary, this chapter provides vital information on the Islamic banking landscape in Malaysia and 
Bahrain, where it is fundamental to understand the two countries’ background and banking 
architecture.  
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 Regulatory Overview & Achievement of the Islamic Finance 
Industry in Malaysia & Bahrain 
 
In order for a commercial or business entity to operate smoothly in a sovereign country, the legislative 
framework is very important in determining the operation of the entity. Malaysia, as one of the sample 
countries, has a unique legal system  which is a combination of the common law (as part of the effect 
of colonialism) and shariah law (due to the Muslim majority population). The civil court is governed by 
the common law while shariah law principles are applied in the shariah court. Furthermore, major 
differences between the common law and shariah law can be seen within their application through 
the respective courts. The shariah court governs Islamic family and inheritance cases while civil courts 
cover all other issues. Therefore, Islamic banking legal issues are treated directly under the civil court’s 
jurisdiction with the distinctive treatment of the Special High Court in the Commercial Division which 
only hears Islamic banking cases. 
The legislative environment for Islamic financial institutions, at the moment, can be divided into three 
segments: (1) Introductory, (2) Advancement, (3) Strengthening. The first segment is the formation 
of the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and Takaful Act 1984 a year later, which began the formation of the 
first Islamic commercial bank, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad  (Nakagawa, 2009). Moving further to the 
second segment, in 1993 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), with parliament’s endorsement, introduced 
an interest-free scheme where conventional banks could offer an interest-free product as part of their 
banking activities, popularly known as an ‘Islamic Window’. In addition, in the second segment, the 
Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) was established in 1997 to become the highest authority to decide on 
Islamic financial service matters. Furthermore, the Shariah Governance Framework was introduced by 
the central bank of Malaysia in 2010 to strengthen the industry’s shariah governance agenda.  
Twenty years from 1993, in 2013, Malaysia once again embarked on another advanced step in Islamic 
finance by introducing the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 to the Islamic banking industry, which 
repealed the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and the Takaful Act 1984. Furthermore, IFSA 2013 was the most 
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comprehensive legal ruling for Islamic banks in Malaysia which provided a clear and comprehensive 
legal framework that was consistent in all shariah aspects within the regulatory and supervisory 
framework which included matters of licensing to winding-up an Islamic bank (Central Bank of 
Malaysia, 2013)  . 
All in all, it took 10 years for the first segment to build from 1983 to 1992, and it took 20 years for the 
second phase to end from 1993 to 2012 before entering into the new segment. Now it has been 
several years after Malaysia first embarked into the third segment of the advancement of the 
regulatory framework in 2013 where the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA 2013) was first 
introduced. Above all, this approach can be classified as a ‘proactive movement’ compared to other 
countries which are also players in the Islamic finance industry.  
The focus of the discussion now to moves to Bahrain, even though there is less development 
compared to Malaysia. Bahrain established its first Islamic bank earlier than Malaysia in 1979 
(Malaysia established its first Islamic bank in 1983). Moving further, in 2002, the International Islamic 
Financial Market (IIFM) was established under a collective collaboration and effort from several 
Islamic countries like Brunei, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia.  
However, internally, the Islamic bank in Bahrain only depended on Rule book 2 from the Bahrain 
central bank without any major legislation being passed by their parliament. Moreover, Bahrain has 
developed the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), the only one of its kind, that provides an 
independent assessment for Islamic principles, mainly in the capital market. In addition, one of the 
biggest names and most well-known organisations was established in Bahrain in 1991, the Accounting 
and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI). Overall, Bahrain’s development 
can be described as a ‘moderate movement’.  
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 Supportive Institutions and Talent Management 
Islamic banking industries have become a very rapidly growing movement in many Muslim majority 
countries. This includes Malaysia and Bahrain, which are the two most aggressive and proactive 
countries in developing and moving forward the Islamic banking and finance industry compared to 
other countries. The industry of Islamic banks experienced a remarkable growth rate during the period 
2000-2009 (Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous (2013), which we can call the advancement period. During this 
period, many institutions were developed and re-branded to support the growth needs of the industry. 
For Malaysia, the most important body was the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM), which became the 
backbone of other supportive institutions such as the International Centre for Education in Islamic 
Finance (INCEIF), International Shariah Research Academy (ISRA), Islamic Banking and Finance 
Institute Malaysia (IBFIM), Shariah Advisory Council (SAC), and Islamic Finance Services Board (IFSB). 
The second most important institution in the movement of Islamic banking and finance in Malaysia 
was the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM). In the early stages of its establishment, 
the IBFIM provided important and essential advisory and training services for the practicing bankers 
in the industry. These ranged from providing a basic Shariah understanding to more advanced, 
technical issues pertaining to Islamic banking services.  
Furthermore, after the ‘advancement period’ of 1993-2012, IBFIM introduced their new 
comprehensive accreditation on professional qualifications to practitioners and academics in the 
‘strengthening period’, which showed a more advanced, value-added professional certification called 
the Chartered Qualification in Islamic Finance (CQIF) (IBFIM, 2013). Moving further, the International 
Shariah Research Academy (ISRA), as part of a research division in the Islamic banking and finance 
industry in Malaysia, aimed to produce an applied research that could be useful to the Islamic banking 
industry in the areas of Shariah and Islamic finance (ISRA, 2016). In addition, apart from the research, 
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ISRA was responsible for managing a repository centre for Shariah rulings and views (fatwas) in the 
Islamic banking and finance field in Malaysia. 
Besides the research, training and certification bodies, Malaysia was home to the international 
standard-setting body known as the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). Its roles include serving 
the international community in Islamic finance by providing sound standards for regulatory and 
supervisory needs throughout the Islamic finance industry. In addition, the IFSB has been granted 
special privileges and immunities by member countries to help it perform its mandate and 
responsibilities. This is done through the Islamic Financial Services Act 2002 enacted by the Malaysian 
government (IFSB, 2010). The supply of talent management for the Islamic finance industry is 
important to maintain. Thus, the Malaysian government, through the Central Bank of Malaysia, has 
tried to close the gap between the industry demand for talent and the supply of talent. This initiative 
has been realised with the establishment of the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance 
(INCEIF) in 2005 which inspired other public universities to offer courses in Islamic finance-related 
subjects.  
As compared to Bahrain, only CIBAFI seems to lead in comprehensive education while local 
universities also provide education channels for the supply of professionals to the market. Moreover, 
CIBAFI also acts as the training-hand for the officers in the Islamic banking industry in Bahrain, for 
instance by providing specialist certificates and training programmes that stretch from several hours 
to several days (CIBAFI, 2017).  
Furthermore, Bahrain is home to the International Islamic rating agency (IIRA), one of the supportive 
institutions absent in Malaysia. In addition, Bahrain also promotes itself as the Islamic financial hub by 
having an International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) competing with the Malaysian Islamic Finance 
Marketplace. However, this can be seen as two sections of a market where Bahrain is for the Middle 
East and Malaysia is for the far eastern financial market. Overall, the two countries have shaped their 
supportive institutions for their Islamic banking industries based on the social norms in the countries, 
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and this might be the influence of the top government’s management initiative and the societal norms 
factor. 
 Regulatory Comparison of Malaysian, Bahrain & International 
Standards on Social and Environmental Initiative 
 
Source of Disclosure Initiative Disclosure Criteria 
Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) 
Malaysia — (No Initiatives) 
Nothing involving Social Initiatives to the Community, 
Environment & Business Ethics 
Concentrate more on Governance & Risk Issues on Banking 
Prudential Regulation  
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
Malaysia — (No Initiatives) 
Nothing involving Social Initiatives to the Community, 
Environment & Business Ethics 
Concentrate more on Governance & Risk Issues on Banking 
Prudential Regulation 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) 
Malaysia — (No Initiatives) 
Nothing involving Social Initiatives to the Community, 
Environment & Business Ethics 
Only informs of the Relationship Between the Company and 
Shareholder in Principle 8 
Accounting Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Institution (AAOIFI) 
Bahrain — International  
(Intermediate Level of Initiatives) 
Corporate Social Responsibility conduct & Disclosure for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (No.7) 
1) Policy on Employee Welfare 5/2/4 
2) Reduction Adverse Impact on Environment 5/3/2 
3) Social Development & Environmental Investment 
Quotas 5/3/3 
4) Micro Finance, Small Business & Social Saving policy 
5/3/4 
5) Policy for Charitable Activities 5/3/6 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
International — 
(High Level of Initiatives) 
1) Environmental Disclosure Requirement (G4-EN) 
2) Labour Practice & Decent Work Disclosure 
Requirement (G4-LA) 
3) Human Right Disclosure Requirement (G4-HR) 
4) Society Disclosure Requirement (G4-SO) 
5) Ethics & Integrity (G4-56-58) 
Equator Principle 
International — 
(Intermediate Level of Initiatives) 
1) Principle 2: Environmental & Social Assessment 
2) Principle 3: Applicable Environmental & social 
standards 
3) Principle 4: Environmental & Social Management 
System 
Table 2.1: Malaysia VS Bahrain VS International Standard (Author) 
Given the information detailed in the above table, it is surprising that, given such a progressive Islamic 
banking industry movement in Malaysia compared to other countries in the world, Malaysia has a lack 
of the values and standards for voluntary disclosure of the social and environmental assessment. The 
Malaysian government, especially the central bank, concentrates more on the issues of financial 
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stability, risk management, governance and banking prudential issues. Indeed, a sound financial 
system is important as a base to move forward into a more comprehensive and sustainable reporting. 
However, no initiatives have yet been introduced by any financial regulatory bodies in Malaysia on 
any social and environmental standards to portray the moral-obligation of Islamic banks. 
These findings are gaps in the Islamic banking regulatory environment in Malaysia. In addition, the 
conventional banking sector that was established in Malaysia much earlier has no evidence of any 
initiatives either for developing social and environmental disclosure standards locally or for adopting 
any internationally-renowned standards. However, the social, environmental, and ethics-based 
disclosure standards have not yet been initiated and or have not been made a mainstream agenda 
parallel to the Islamic finance growth all over the world.  
The central bank of Malaysia is the main source of initiatives for Islamic banking growth in Malaysia. 
Hence, it is not a surprise that the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance (MICG) and Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) have not produced 
any standards or principles related to social and environmental disclosure. In contrast to its 
counterpart, the Bahrain government has moved ahead via their Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Finance (AAOIFI) corporate social responsibility standards even though these 
are not freely available as compared to the western social and environmental principles and standards. 
The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Finance (AAOIFI)  has been publishing their 
standard since 1993 (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2016), and the standards have been updated from time to 
time by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Finance (AAOIFI) where the latest update 
was in 2017. 
In comparison between the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Finance (AAOIFI) and 
their western counterparts in terms of the comprehensiveness of standards and principles, western 
bodies such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Equator Principle are much more advanced and 
mature in categorising each dimension of the social and environmental segment. Moreover, their 
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standards are more specialised on the social and environmental dimensions rather than mixing them 
with accounting and governance standards like the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Finance (AAOIFI). Islamic countries need to learn from the western system in these particular issues. 
Malaysia needs to start making social and environmental standards for disclosure in Islamic banks as 
comprehensive as their governance, risk and prudential standards in the Islamic banking sector to 
make them on par with international competitors. This is important to Malaysia in order to progress 
further and to maintain its leading performance in the Islamic banking industry, not just in banking 
activities but also in social and environmental issues. 
As for Bahrain, even though there are not many initiatives and institutions being set-up to promote 
the well-being of the Islamic banking industry, there is at least one organisation, AAOIFI, which sets a 
standard for corporate social reporting. This is in comparison to Malaysia where nothing is mentioned 
on social responsibility. Based on this, the research will later present the findings to see whether the 
availability of a specific standard makes any difference in the two countries SEGE disclosure. In general, 
there is no standardisation of the Islamic banking system (Karbhari et al., 2004). Moreover, social and 
environmental standards are at minimum if not absent. 
Furthermore, Bahrain, as compared to other Middle East countries, is far more advanced in regulatory, 
institutional, market and Islamic banking institutions. However, despite this advancement, Bahrain 
still falls short behind Malaysia in terms of progress while having its own strengths. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to investigate the SEGE5 disclosure by these countries. 
Overall, this background section advocates that Malaysia and Bahrain are ideal and practical sample 
countries to be considered when studying Islamic banking-related issues due to their rich operational 
and historical backgrounds.   
                                                        
5 SEGE are the Shariah, Shariah Governance, Social External, Social Internal, Environment, Ethics & Governance 
dimensions of disclosure. 
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 Conclusion 
 
This chapter try to provide argument and layout of the differences in the regulatory setting, 
institutional environment and country overview about the development of the Islamic banking 
industry, which will give implications on the thesis’ findings. This is because Malaysia and Bahrain are 
the countries with the most Islamic banks, with Malaysia in the first rank and Bahrain as the second 
largest host for Islamic banks from around the world (Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous, 2013). 
To further distinguish Bahrain and Malaysia in terms of shariah governance, Malaysia has its own 
shariah governance standards issued by its central bank while Bahrain utilises the general governance 
guidelines and rule book 2 issued by its central bank and the Bahrain institute of banking and finance. 
Furthermore, between the two countries, only Malaysia provides licences for international Islamic 
banks to operate in the country. Moreover, for corporate social responsibility, Bahrain leads the way 
by having a small guideline in the AAOIFI standard on social responsibility while Malaysia has nothing 
specific on the same matter. 
Overall, this chapter serves as a representation of the unique context in comparing both the Malaysia 
and Bahraini Islamic banking background as the two samples for the study. Moreover, the differences 
between the two countries found in this chapter provide the motivation and avenue to further 
understand the context of the two countries during the study. Furthermore, it helps in setting the 
study scope, direction and connections with other chapters in the thesis. Even though some features 
of the two countries, in terms of environment, governance and social responsibility are better than 
one another, this will later help in answering the research questions when pairing the narrative 
information and the statistical results of the study in chapter 6 and 7. 
Next, the literature review chapter will further the discussion.  
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CHAPTER 3 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 Introduction 
 
Social reporting, usually linked to corporate social responsibility and environmental disclosure, has 
been a topical interest in scholarly research since the early 1970s. However, the social responsiveness 
values that shape today’s alertness of social responsibility towards society and the environment can 
be traced back to the ancient times of Egypt, Babylon, Greece and China where, for instance, 
structured work procedures considered workers’ rights and benefits, something which was 
documented in manuscripts (Anderson, 1989). 
In the modern world, various theoretical backgrounds in the body of literature have established that 
social and environmental disclosure are considerably important to organisations (Gray, 2001), and this 
may be influenced by a variety of explanatory variables. Prior research has shown a dedicated effort 
towards exploring the extent and nature of corporate social and environmental disclosure within the 
annual report, recently also involving official websites as well as the latest medium of the 
organisation’s social media (Capriotti and Moreno, 2007, Kim et al., 2010). However, due to the nature 
of the annual report that is not easily perishable, it is maintained to be the main official document for 
scholarly work on social and environmental reporting. 
Furthermore, having understood the underpinning variances in the theoretical foundations and 
various explanatory causes for social reporting described in the last paragraph, the thesis chose to 
take the complementary path of legitimacy and stakeholder theory as lenses to investigate and explain 
social reporting by Islamic banks. In the literature, there have been many other explanations and 
explorations through other theories; however, the closest theory resembling the values for the Islamic 
religion that represent Islamic banks is stakeholder theory. Nonetheless, legitimacy theory shares 
some of stakeholder theory’s traits in that it also demonstrates Islamic values within society’s social 
contract environment. Therefore, this thesis will concentrate on the discussion in social reporting 
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literature that relates to legitimacy and stakeholder theory, and it will later narrow the discussion 
down to social reporting in the banking and Islamic banking sector.  
 Social Reporting and the Need to be Legitimate 
 
Social reporting is supposed to be central to any organisation. Moreover, the study of social disclosure 
is an important area of business ethics and social accounting literature that will be relevant for many 
years to come. Craig Deegan (2002) strongly indicates that social reporting research has been an area 
of interest for decades. Corporate failures such as Enron have triggered measures that are far more 
responsible and have embedded societal values into corporate activities (Clarke, 2005). Furthermore, 
Adams and Zutshi (2004) argue that social responsibility disclosure appears to be motivated by moral 
responsibility and business interest. Since moral responsibility and business interest are drivers for 
social responsibility disclosure, social disclosure can be one of the measurements that evaluate how 
well companies react and address their social contract with society (Ramanathan, 1976). 
As highlighted by Ramanathan (1976), social accounting is the bigger picture of the system to evaluate 
firm social performance. Hence, social disclosure by the firm itself is a tool used to inform the society 
of the firm’s commitment towards their expectations, and this can be used to reduce the legitimacy 
gap (Sethi, 1979). By having this socially responsible disclosure, the long-term objectives of surviving 
in the industry by the firms will be established (Adams and Zutshi, 2004). In general, those firms that 
are involved in an industry that fall under the ‘sensitive-label’ will be bound more tightly to the social 
contract (O’Donovan, 2002) rather than those firms which are not particularly visible to the public 
(Slack and Shrives, 2008). Guthrie and Parker (1989), Deegan et al. (2002) and O’Donovan (2002) are 
previous studies which have involved sensitive-label industries that are highly visible to society due to 
their nature of being in the mining, chemical, petroleum, production and paper businesses. 
Furthermore, Islamic banks, which fall in the financial sector, will also be considered a sensitive 
industry for the recent financial crisis in 2007-2009. This will motivate Islamic banks to strengthen 
their legitimacy by adhering to the societal social contract and thus fill the legitimacy gap. Therefore, 
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legitimacy is an inevitable factor for organisational social reporting in order to gain legitimacy from 
the societal social contract. 
3.2.1. Role of Legitimacy in Social Reporting 
It is widely agreed upon that legitimacy is one of the factors that contributes to corporate social 
reporting initiatives and disclosure by organisations (Chan et al., 2014, Mahadeo et al., 2011, Archel 
et al., 2009, Slack and Shrives, 2008, Deegan et al., 2002, Craig Deegan, 2002, Campbell, 2000, Clarke 
and Gibson-Sweet, 1999, Adams et al., 1998). This is despite the surrounding debate and argument on 
other possible aspects and influences on how and why organisations make such social disclosure in 
their annual report as part of their corporate social reporting initiative.  
The mission of gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy is essential to an organisation (O’Donovan, 
2002). However, O’Donovan (2002) argues that gaining and repairing legitimacy seems harder 
compared to maintaining legitimacy; thus, Deegan and Unerman (2011) suggest that maintaining 
legitimacy is able to be achieved by anticipating changes in the community’s perceptions regarding 
certain issues. Deegan and Unerman (2011) indicate that companies need to be up to date on 
important information and carefully understand the trends of a highly informed society in order to 
maintain legitimacy during a particular time. This will help companies make sound decisions on their 
social reporting. In this thesis’ case, Islamic banks need to be vigilant to society’s expectations, for 
instance in matters related to reputational risk that can jeopardise the trust of society. 
Furthermore, equally important is the “topical” conception that is consistent with the argument by 
Campbell (2000) who found that organisations disclose environmental reporting when a natural and 
environmental concern becomes a significant subject observed by society. Hence, this clarifies the 
organisation’s need to propel the legitimacy initiative as a particular society becomes more educated 
and advances through time with sensitive issues. In relation to the Islamic banking industry, that by 
nature is a sensitive industry (as it relates to religion as a basis where society may expect certain 
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disclosure to be reported), Islamic banks from a business point of view are the same as conventional 
banks. 
It is important to note that cultural differences, in the case of this thesis religious orientation and the 
values of the country, may affect the social reporting of the Islamic banks. Sidney (1988) argues that 
national systems are determined by the cultural and environmental factor of a country; thus, Malaysia 
and Bahrain might differ in their commitment to social reporting because of their differences in 
national values. 
3.2.2. Legitimacy Theory in Social Reporting Literature 
 
Environmental issues have been one of the pioneering factors which have driven social reporting due 
to the nature of their variable perception across national and corporate contexts (Mahadeo et al., 
2011). Apart from environment, the area of social reporting covering social responsibility, corporate, 
and risk governance is portrayed by organisations in various mediums of publication such as annual 
reports, websites and separate social environmental reports (Slack and Shrives, 2010). These various 
mediums of communicating social reporting are one of the factors that have contributed to the 
increase in social reporting practices by companies.  
In reflecting back on the literature, many researchers agree that social and environmental reporting 
started becoming relevant around the 1970s and much research during that period was empirically 
descriptive, working together with normative model building for disclosure, as explained by Owen et 
al. (2008) and advocated by Slack and Shrives (2010). However, social reporting research moved 
further in the 1980s and 1990s to slightly more theoretical stages where theories were used to explain 
social reporting initiatives, with legitimacy theory becoming one of the more prominent theories in 
explaining social reporting by companies (Lindblom, 1993).  
In the 21st century, social reporting research has become much more complex with new theories 
being applied within the social reporting area and the use of sophisticated methods and rigorous 
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analytical tools (Owen et al., 2008). In addition to the new input for social reporting research, 
legitimacy reasoning still dominates in explaining social and environmental reporting. Even though 
stakeholder, political economy, and accountability perspectives were also pragmatic in the field, many 
scholars attest to the dominance of legitimacy (Craig Deegan, 2002, Deegan and Unerman, 2011, 
Archel et al., 2009, Slack and Shrives, 2008, Cho and Patten, 2007, O’Donovan, 2002, Deegan et al., 
2002, Campbell, 2000, Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999, Adams et al., 1998, Suchman, 1995, Lindblom, 
1993, Patten, 1992, Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). In addition, social theories such as stakeholder, 
legitimacy, political economy, and accountability share several similarities and disparities but what 
makes them distinctive to one another is the viewpoint from which the theory is perceived and tested 
(O’Donovan, 2002). 
Regarding the influence of legitimacy in social reporting’s relationship with the social contract 
between companies and its surrounding society, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) argue that social 
contracts between businesses and society which supply legitimacy to companies materialise due to 
businesses needing to use social resources and the need to retain entrusted licenses to actively survive 
the corporate world (Craig Deegan, 2002). The consequences of not adhering to social norms or social 
contracts tends to invite survival challenges to companies (Lindblom, 1993). However, in light of 
survival, it is becoming a concern that legitimacy strategies could be used as a tool for “less performing 
banks” to become hypocrites towards the concerns of society by mirroring a good image in their social 
disclosure initiative. Moreover, this hypocrisy associated with corporate social reporting has been 
argued in a study by Cho et al. (2015) which is derived from the earlier work of Brunsson (1989), even 
though the work been labelled as inconsistent throughout the 25 years of its establishment (Arjaliès 
(2013). Nevertheless, the argument is there to be debated and discussed. In relation to Islamic banks, 
the social contract between the societies where the banks operate is inevitable since the value of 
Islamic banks is in its religious belief of the different approach towards banking products. However, 
society looks forward to other social obligations that sometimes go beyond the banking business. 
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Overall, it is important to mention at this stage that this thesis uses legitimacy theory reasoning to find 
evidence of whether Islamic banks disclose information on their SEGE (Social, Shariah, Environment, 
Governance and Ethics) initiatives to portray their effort in becoming legitimate and maintaining 
legitimacy in the eyes of society as a whole. Furthermore, by investigating the disclosure level on SEGE 
information, it will concurrently answer part of the question of how important SEGE disclosure is to 
Islamic bank legitimacy. The more they disclose, the more they signal their enthusiasm towards 
becoming legitimate. Indeed, SEGE disclosure level and quality may explain how significant the 
disclosure is to Islamic banks. Furthermore, Malaysia and Bahrain might have different approaches 
towards social reporting, and this will be determined in the findings and discussed in the discussion 
chapter. 
Legitimacy cannot be avoided as, in order for organisations such as Islamic banks to move further in 
advancing into the stakeholders’ circle, Islamic banks need to ensure legitimacy is adequate by 
adhering to the basic societal social contract before moving on to more complex stakeholder demands 
and concerns. Therefore, the managerial and ethical stakeholder approach needs to be applied and 
Islamic banks need to convey, through the annual report, issues related to management and the 
ethical spectrum of stakeholders (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
Moreover, having understood the importance of legitimacy in social reporting, the next section will 
review and critically discuss the stakeholder viewpoint in the literature of corporate social reporting 
to see the development and the trend of research which will be significant to this thesis. The concept 
of “important parties” will be refined in the stakeholder theory section in order to further understand 
and appreciate the concept.  
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 Stakeholders and Social Reporting 
 
The stakeholder concept plays an important role in explaining various organisational functions and 
roles within the corporate social reporting area (Deegan and Unerman (2011). The stakeholder 
perspective has been the second most dominant theory in explaining corporate social reporting 
initiatives in accounting literature (Chiu and Wang, 2015, Williams and Adams, 2013, Orij, 2010, Huang 
and Kung, 2010, Belal and Roberts, 2010, Kaler, 2009, Arenas et al., 2009, Jamali, 2008, Greenwood, 
2007, Cooper and Owen, 2007, Knox et al., 2005, Dawkins and Lewis, 2003, Jensen, 2001, Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995, Roberts, 1992). In addition, the variety of research designs and interpretations of 
stakeholder theory’s application in corporate social responsibility research has allowed the idea of 
stakeholder theory to contend and conflict with legitimacy theory, and this has been critically 
discussed in the last section. 
However, it is a strong position within this thesis, which is consistent with the argument of Gray et al. 
(1995b), that stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory overlap and complement each other. 
Furthermore, as advocated by Deegan and Unerman (2011), stakeholder theory provides a more 
refined resolution by segregating stakeholders into several particular groups within society, compared 
to the more general definition of society in legitimacy theory in accounting literature. 
In the next section, the stakeholder theory principle will be concisely discussed in order to point out 
the basic essence of the branches of stakeholder theory and further understand and appreciate the 
importance of the theory’s application and its difference to legitimacy theory in accounting research. 
In the later section, the trend and application of stakeholder theory in corporate social reporting 
research will be deliberately and critically discussed to illustrate how important the theory is to this 
research field and this thesis. 
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In summary, the significance of the whole stakeholder theory discussion section is to seek, prove and 
understand the reviewed literature, including specific research that is undertaken from the lens of 
stakeholder theory ranging from relevant earlier literature to newer and up to date research in the 
corporate social reporting area. All of these features will influence the understanding of the thesis and 
its approach to corporate social reporting research. 
3.3.3. Understanding Stakeholder Approach 
 
Firstly, it is wise to discuss the two branches of stakeholder theory before moving further. There are 
two divisions known as the normative and positive division of stakeholder theory, both distinct to each 
other on how they contribute to the theory (Deegan et al., 2007). The normative is also recognised as 
the ethical or moral branch while the positive branch is known as the managerial or empirical branch 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2011). The need to understand the normative and empirical-based theory’s 
motivation is crucial as these two approaches have different uses and motives. The first one is the 
ethical branch, where the normative task explains “what ideally should be done” with some underlying 
ethical, moral, principle and philosophical themes (Donaldson and Preston (1995). The ethical branch 
of stakeholders should be the underlying objective before considering the managerial part of 
stakeholders. Furthermore, Deegan and Unerman (2011) advise that in the normative perspective, 
advocators need to understand that organisations may not necessarily act like what is expected in 
principle.  
In contrast, the managerial branch typically advocates the idea of the “managing specific group” 
expectation, and this normally refers to the powerful stakeholder (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). The 
powerful stakeholder can be any group that the organisation perceives to be important or powerful, 
for instance the government or regulator. To be successful, organisations need to satisfy demands and 
resolve their conflicts with various “powerful” stakeholders (Ullmann, 1985). In short, Deegan and 
Unerman (2011) managerial perspective of stakeholder theory is in line with Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) instrumental perspective of stakeholder theory. Furthermore, Gray et al. (1996b) argues that 
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the managerial division of the stakeholder perspective seems to be more organisation-centred. 
Therefore, the probability of the organisation’s management manipulating stakeholders rather than 
managing them honestly is inevitable. 
This thesis argues that the ethical division of stakeholders should be the underlying principle behind 
addressing numerous stakeholder groups. Moving further, the managerial division of stakeholders can 
be treated on the basis of the “prioritise stakeholder” scheme, as suggested by Knox et al. (2005). By 
combining the essence of the ethical and managerial approach, this may help to balance between the 
“powerful” stakeholder and the “ethically concerned” stakeholder. 
As has been mentioned before, stakeholder theory suggests that a more refined group of stakeholders 
would be more beneficial and practical to define for each of the groups, as the need of each 
stakeholder group can be identified and prioritised accordingly to minimise conflict between society 
and the organisation (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, Knox et al., 2005). On another note, Roberts (1992) 
argues that the organisation needs to satisfy its own economic performance before considering the 
social demands, and this is definitely true as the company needs to be sustainable and make a profit 
before contributing to the various stakeholders. However, the process of making a profit will need to 
be in agreement with the ethical and moral principles discussed before. This ethical and moral 
performance can be defined through the social contract determined between the “current” society 
and the organisation’s understanding of social obligation and responsibility. 
The behaviour of Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain towards the SEGE initiative may be influenced 
by the sensitive and high influence stakeholders. Moreover, how the Islamic banks in the two countries 
react depends on the orientation of the stakeholders; if the high influence stakeholders are not 
concerned with propelling the social and ethical issues, the Islamic banks might not be interested or 
be pressured enough to implement such activities and make disclosure of such activities. However, 
sensitive stakeholders can influence and pressure the Islamic banks to commit into activities 
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concerning SEGE dimensions. The type and style of stakeholders in Malaysia and Bahrain might be 
different and may therefore respond and commit to social disclosure differently. 
3.3.4. The important of stakeholders in social reporting 
Stakeholders are complex individual units that resemble organisations, society, individuals, groups, 
etc. which have their own traits and strengths (influential/non-influential) that can affect how 
organisations operate. In social reporting, the stakeholder theory framework is one prominent 
explanation (Chiu and Wang, 2015). 
Stakeholders play an important role in an organisation’s operation. An influential stakeholder can 
influence company standards of disclosure, for instance with regard to the social responsibility 
requirement (Belal and Roberts, 2010). In a situation where a company senses pressure from relevant 
stakeholders such as the regulator, it will engage in various activities to tame the pressure from said 
stakeholder (Huang and Kung, 2010).  
Furthermore, in relation to Islamic banks, the pressure from the central bank on certain Shariah 
governance standards may influence the Islamic banks to disclose such information. In addition, other 
stakeholders like the non-governmental organisation that works closely with employee’s rights may 
also influence Islamic banks to act and disclose on employee related issues. Since Islamic banks, by 
their very nature, have a greater coverage of responsibility towards stakeholders (Belal et al. (2014) 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), the stakeholder theory regime seems to be the best and nearest to Islamic 
banking’s foundation. 
Despite the fact that generally (as stated in the literature) the bigger the company size the better they 
disclose information on social performance (Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999), Islamic banks, whether 
big or small, inevitably address stakeholders in their social reporting because of their religious roots 
as well as due to societal expectations. However, in the context of Islamic teachings, the concept of 
stakeholders is closer to Islamic banking principles and has its own particular explanation. For instance, 
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as vicegerents in the world, Islamic banks have a wider group of stakeholders (Lewis, 2001). This will 
even include nature and wild life (Rizk, 2014). Therefore, this thesis advocates that the stakeholder 
concept be close to social and environmental reporting due to its variation. 
Overall, the stakeholder perspective normally discusses stakeholder groups such as employees, 
regulators, the government and the extent to which they should be managed. Nonetheless, 
stakeholder theory demonstrates the importance of organisations behaving in a particular manner to 
satisfy the demands and expectations of a group of particular stakeholders and society according to 
ethical principles and priority in order to create the best possible outcome and a win-win situation. 
Another important piece of information on stakeholders based on social reporting literature is the 
significance of prioritising and grouping stakeholders as this will help to achieve the maximum 
distribution of ethical principles embedded in the normative division of stakeholders and administrate 
the priority stakeholders fairly from managerial stakeholder perspectives. 
To complete this section on stakeholder theory-based literature, it is important to emphasise how this 
thesis will use stakeholder theory as one of the lenses to explain SEGE disclosure in Islamic banks. 
Instead of grouping the stakeholder into one society in general, such as in the definition of legitimacy 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2011), stakeholder theory approaches various stakeholders by dividing them 
into more refined groups. This will enable them to carefully arrange the groups according to their need 
(Knox et al., 2005). The stakeholder perspective coincides with the Islamic concept of guardianship 
(vicegerent) which promotes fair and just treatment to many significant stakeholder groups, for 
instance society, the environment, animals and the earth (Rizk, 2014). Since stakeholders perceive the 
treatment of the social and economic role of Islamic banks to be equal to each other (Maali et al., 
2006), it will influence the Islamic bank to approach the stakeholder theory from both the ethical and 
the managerial branch of the stakeholder perspective. Once again, since the Islamic bank is labelled 
under the ethical and religious banner, they need to take care of their business to survive the business 
world and at the same time observe the various stakeholders who have various needs and concerns 
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towards Islamic bank activities. Therefore, stakeholder theory will help this thesis to explain and 
identify to what extent SEGE disclosure by Islamic banks addresses various stakeholders.  
 Banking Industry and Social Reporting 
3.4.1. Banks and Visibility 
The wide coverage of the “sensitive label industry”, such as the chemical, oil, gas, and paper industries 
in which the nature of business is quite vulnerable to environmental and other nature-related 
concerns, has been given extensive attention in corporate social reporting literature (O’Donovan 
(2002). However, the banking industry is often forgotten even though it plays an important role in the 
society. Nevertheless, in social reporting literature, the coverage for the banking industry is still limited 
and therefore the enthusiasm to explore it is inevitable (Scholtens, 2009, Linsley, 2008, Humphreys 
and Brown, 2008, Manuel Castelo and Lúcia Lima, 2006, Simpson and Kohers, 2002, Eric, 1998).  
Generally, banking industries act as financial intermediaries to “sensitive industries” which are 
exposed directly to social and environmental issues. As such, this makes the banking sector 
intermingle indirectly with the issues of sustainable development (Scholtens, 2009). Therefore, it is 
critical that social reporting by banks be studied as it is the essence by which every other company 
receives the funds to propel their business, be it a “green business” which is socially pleasant or a “red 
business” which is socially improper. Companies’ essential relationships with the financial services 
industry makes socially responsible banking a notion that is crucial to be observed in the financial 
services system (Scholtens, 2009). That is why in this thesis banking industries will be the target sample 
of the study, having realised the importance of banking and its potential role for a “socially responsible 
model” in giving financing to companies.  
Moreover, banks can be seen as a facilitator from which commercial and industrial activity, which may 
cause environmental damage, originates (Thompson and Cowton, 2004). Thus, banks should be 
closely monitored and be urged to create a better “Social and Environmental Screening” process for 
its clients. In addition, Campbell and Slack (2011) point out that banks play a central role in providing 
43 
 
the source of finance towards the economic sector. This fact makes banks more accountable and 
responsible in selecting their customer portfolios. Furthermore, the type of “ethical banks” are 
relatively very small in number compared to normal flag banks (Cowton and Thompson, 2000). Thus, 
this provides a challenge to make great changes in the bank’s lending and screening process 
throughout the world. Even though many banks from developed countries adhere to the United 
Nation Environment Programme (UNEP), Thompson and Cowton (2004) nevertheless argue that many 
banks’ businesses would be affected if they became more thorough in screening the environmental 
impact of their potential clients. However, even though UNEP signatory banks perform better than 
non-signatories in terms of considering the environment in their lending, the differences are not 
extensive (Cowton and Thompson, 2000).  
Furthermore “visibility” is an important argument in determining corporate image as mentioned by 
Manuel Castelo and Lúcia Lima (2006) in their study of corporate social responsibility in Portuguese 
banks. This ‘‘visibility’’ is a mirror to the thesis’ sample of Islamic banks. Even though Islamic banks are 
not huge in size, their “visibility” makes SEGE disclosure an important element for them to consider. 
The religious and ethical banner that they constitute makes their “visibility” inevitable to the Muslim 
community and an ethical and morally concerned society. Since conventional banks, like the example 
of the Co-operative Bank and other ‘ethical banks’ which operate in the western system, appreciate 
and consider moral and ethical value in providing financing (Thompson and Cowton, 2004), Islamic 
banks may need to put more effort to be at par with, if not supersede, the lending screening standard 
of those ethical and morally-based banks in the western system. Significantly, if this were to be 
achieved, Islamic banks will have an enhanced position to legitimate their existence in society. 
Moving further, Campbell and Slack (2011) find that banks do not really care about the environment 
when providing lending as part of their assessment. However, if Islamic banks really want to uphold 
their religious banner, the environment needs to be considered in financing a project or a company. 
This is important as the value of religion embedded in Islamic banks makes their existence as financing 
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providers close to a believer’s heart. In addition, if the trust is not taken into consideration carefully, 
it will result in the customer’s negative perception, similar to what happened to Northern Rock where 
the stakeholder perception towards the bank was reduced (Linsley and Slack, 2013). 
Even though a bank’s management acts socially responsible, portrays itself as such in its annual report, 
and is well-known by society, it does not necessarily protect the bank from bankruptcy (Fassin and 
Gosselin, 2011). In reference to Fassin and Gosselin (2011), Islamic banks should not just strive to be 
champions in the SEGE initiative, they should also at the same time manage their business to survive 
upcoming economic turbulence. Since Islamic banks originate from a majority of the 3rd world 
countries and developing countries, it is wise to follow some of the positive examples shown by the 
majority of western banks on environmental risk assessment in providing financing, as advocated by 
Scholtens (2009), where the majority of them provide a sustainability report. In addition, this thesis 
suggests that Islamic banks can progress further by assessing the “humanitarian-performance” of the 
client before providing financing. The “humanitarian-performance” can be, for example, questions of 
“Whether the company is involved in business that is prone to labour oppression?”, “Does the 
company reward their workers in an acceptable standard?”, “Are the company’s working hours for 
employees acceptable?”, and “Does the company provide a standard benefit programme for 
employees?”. If this can be achieved, it will further progress ethical banking to the next step. 
Islamic banks need to learn a lot in terms of ethical and responsible banking from the western system. 
This can be realised by incorporating the ethical concept from the cooperative bank, as discussed by 
Harvey (1995). For instance, in matters concerning animal experimentation, the fur trade, tobacco, 
breaches of human rights by the government, and blood sports. Even though tobacco, pornography, 
and arms dealing activities are not supported and financed by Islamic banks, more progress needs to 
be made to be on par with the cooperative bank model. Moreover, the transparency of the 
cooperative bank model is way beyond the Islamic banks’ current state. However, this is due to their 
long history that traces its origin back to 1830 (Harvey, 1995). In addition, when all the important 
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ethical and responsible criteria have been satisfied, the second stage is to ensure that the ethical and 
responsible measures have been carried out sincerely without the “perfunctory ethical function” as 
advocated by Campbell and Slack (2011).  
3.4.2. Social Reporting in Banking Institutions 
 
Banking systems are central to any economic entity in their role as financiers to businesses and other 
economic units (Campbell and Slack, 2011). Moreover, for example, banks act as organisers to 
payment systems, financial intermediaries for economic units, and agents in business and investment 
dealings. As such, by having various important roles and responsibilities in the economy, banks 
certainly have a great impact on society (Scholtens, 2009). Therefore, banks need to take into 
consideration the impact that the banks may facilitate by providing financing to non-performing firms 
or projects in terms of social and environmental concerns. The fact that the banking system is widely 
known within the modern world means the majority of human beings that construct a modern living 
society will be using the services provided by the bank. Not to mention the fact that every society in 
the first and third world economies are attached to banking services from their salary account to their 
investment account. Consequently, the study on the social reporting of banks is important as banks 
are at the heart of the economy in which most of the society lives. 
In the area of social and environmental accounting literature, inadequate attention has been given to 
the banking sector (Campbell and Slack, 2011) due to the nature of their camouflage compared to 
other firms which operate within the sensitive-label sector. However, in the western world (Europe & 
North America), many banks have in place the policy of social and environmental assessment for their 
corporate lending policies (Scholtens, 2009). For example, in the United Kingdom, 60% of banks have 
formal corporate lending policies which cover social and environmental valuations (Thompson and 
Cowton, 2004). This case, however, is in contrast with the majority of developing countries where the 
vast majority of them do not have formal lending policies or corporate client impact screening on 
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social and environmental concerns. Despite this, some banks in developing countries, such as Brazilian 
banks, have become more structured in their social responsibility reporting (Ventura, 2007). 
In establishing social and environmental policies in banks, it will take the collaboration of the local 
government and the top management of the banks to make this a reality. However, the screening and 
formal lending policies implemented for the social and environmental pursuit can be a perfunctory 
function (Campbell and Slack, 2011) rather than a pure sustainability strategy for society and the 
environment (Thompson and Cowton, 2004). This is because studies have found that the management, 
particularly the social responsibility team, struggle in instilling the values of social responsibility to 
their employees as their employees are not really concerned about it (Humphreys and Brown, 2008). 
Moreover, Campbell and Slack (2011) found that banks do not really care for environmental risk in 
bank lending while Thompson and Cowton (2004) found that the majority of banks take environmental 
criteria for reasons of compliance and to mitigate environmental liabilities. These issues are important 
to be addressed as banks need to be socially responsible not just in the technical-procedural side, but, 
most importantly, in the spirit of upholding the ethical dimension of the bank’s role. This can be 
revised by the banking sector by looking back at the history of the cooperative bank’s establishment 
and learning from their values and the foundations of their ethical bases (Harvey, 1995). 
Because of the variety of strategic roles of banking that affect society, social responsibility initiatives 
are an inevitable reality of banks. On another note, most significantly, banking with integrity, with a 
combination of religious values, happens to be more visible to society, and this means there is a higher 
expectation placed upon them by a concerned society. The moral obligation by Islamic banks is a 
reputation, which then translates into reputational risk. Moreover, Islamic banks are expected to 
address all the social responsibility issues better than conventional banking because of their moral 
and ethical identity (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). In the next section, the literature on Islamic bank 
social reporting will be briefly discussed.  
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 Social Reporting in Islamic Banking Institutions 
 
Overall, in the literature, social accounting research in the Islamic circle, particularly in Islamic banks, 
can be divided into three main aspects. Firstly there is the conceptual, theoretical and philosophical 
understanding of Islamic accounting (Kamla, 2009, Kamla et al., 2006, Lewis, 2001, Gambling and 
Karim, 1986). Secondly, there is the technicality of accounting processes where the research argues 
that Islamic social reporting should have certain information (Baydoun and Willett, 2000). However, 
in this area, less is able to be explored as the majority of conventional accounting procedures are not 
very contradictory with Islamic values. For example, the phenomenon where the recording and double 
entry system, balance sheet, and income statement will be altered according to Islamic teachings if 
there are any disputes has been well discussed by Lewis (2001) with regards to how social reporting 
in Islamic organisations adapt and modify accounting procedures from their conventional 
counterparts.  
Furthermore, the moral and legal obligation in which Islamic banks are bound to all stakeholders has 
shaped two criteria which Islamic banks need to uphold. First is the principle of full disclosure to all, 
and the second is accountability to all (Lewis, 2001, Baydoun and Willett, 2000). Islamic banks are 
accountable not just to a select few stakeholder but to a wider stakeholder which includes the 
environment (Kamla et al., 2006, Rizk, 2014). Kamla et al. (2006) argues that, in terms of 
environmental concerns, Islam and western environmental accounting principles are parallel. This fact 
has made the integration of international initiatives and standards on environmental practices easily 
adopted, but they have not yet been seen in the standard-setting bodies of the Islamic banking 
industry, such as in the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
and the Islamic Finance Services Board (IFSB). 
The third area of Islamic accounting research coverage is the empirical research on the social reporting 
of Islamic organisations, particularly in the Islamic banking sector (Ali Aribi and Arun, 2015, Mallin et 
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al., 2014, Belal et al., 2014, Aribi and Gao, 2010, Kamla, 2009, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007, Maali et al., 
2006). These previous studies are important for the evaluation of the actual practices of Islamic banks 
on their social and ethical commitment towards various stakeholders. However, much of this research 
has found unsatisfactory results in Islamic bank social and ethical performance. In light of 
improvement, the empirical and critical discussion literature complement each other in reiterating the 
importance of social accounting in adhering to its content, motivation and main drives via facts and 
debates gathered in empirical and critical Islamic accounting research. 
All of these areas of research are well discussed in the current literature; however, they are still 
inadequate compared to the vast coverage on their western counterparts. More research needs to be 
done empirically and critically to suggest the theoretical foundation for the combination of a 
framework for Islamic banks to follow in their disclosure practices. However, the thesis findings in 
chapter 8 will be based on the lenses of stakeholder and legitimacy theory as the primary explanation 
alongside social norms theory as the key to societal values.  
In the next section, there is a more comprehensive discussion on social reporting literature. 
3.5.3. Early Stage of Social Reporting in the Islamic Banking Literature 
 
Baydoun and Willett (2000) conducted one of the earliest studies in the social reporting of Islamic 
bank research on the ideal Islamic corporate report for Islamic banks to adopt. The study found two 
important criteria, namely the form of social accountability and the importance of full disclosure by 
Islamic business entities. On the other hand, the study suggests that Islamic banks should include extra 
value-added statements as a format in Islamic corporate reports. 
In another argument, Baydoun and Willett (2000) stress that the difference between conventional and 
Islamic corporate reports is with regards to full disclosure and not measurement issues. This is because 
Islamic accounting is more concerned with the information disclosed, in line with the spirit of full 
disclosure (Lewis, 2001).  
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Moreover, the technicality of the conventional accounting system has been adapted by the Islamic 
accounting model rather than having replaced it, mostly in places where it is not contradictory with 
Islamic teachings. This is in line with the argument by Lewis (2001) where there are two approaches 
to Islamic accounting theory and practices. The first approach is to start with Islamic teachings and 
then establish objectives and procedures in relation to the conventional accounting stream. The 
second approach starts with what has been done in the contemporary accounting stream, comparing 
them to Islamic values, and accepting them if they are in line with Islamic teachings and rejecting those 
that contradict with Islamic values.  
In another argument, Baydoun and Willett (2000) critically discuss the need for Islamic banks to supply 
extra value-added statements and current value balance sheets in addition to historical cost balance 
sheets. This focused on accounting technicalities. However, Kamla et al. (2006) touched upon the 
notion of how the environment relates to Islamic accounting and this relates to the inner values of 
Islamic principles that relate to environmental accounting.  
In the study of Kamla et al. (2006), many verses from the Quran were discussed as proof of Islam’s 
appreciation of nature and the environment. One of these verses was, “Will they not regard the camels, 
how they are created? And the heaven, how it is raised? And the hills, how they are set up? And the 
earth, how it is spread” (Ali, 2009). This verse was discussed in (Kamla et al., 2006) to demonstrate 
Islam’s appreciation of nature as a motivation for Muslims to look after the environment as trustees 
in this world. It is argued that Islam has a deeply rooted and holistic concern towards the environment 
(Kamla et al., 2006), which is in line with the principle of environmental accounting in the western 
perspective.  
However, in Islam, these principles were mentioned and explained some 1400 years ago in the Quran. 
Moreover, this is in reviewing the literature in conjunction with verses in the Quran that relate Islam 
and accounting. Lewis (2001) defined the word “hesab” as “account”, the root word for accountability, 
where in the Quran the word “hesab” or account relates to one’s responsibility towards God in relation 
50 
 
to all matters from human endeavour to nature, where every Muslim is accountable for their deeds. 
Moreover, debt recording has also been taught in the Quran as one of the verses mentions, “Believers, 
when you contract a debt for a fixed period, put it in writing. Let a scribe write it down fairly…and let 
the debtor dictate, not diminishing the sum he owes…”(Ali, 2009).  
On the other hand, Lewis (2001) has also discussed other concepts in accounting such as full disclosure, 
records, reliability, periodicity, assets and liability in the Quran as a basis to link Islam and accounting. 
All of these have created a strong foundation for Islamic accounting research and have instilled the 
motivation to pursue it. Next, the empirical research with regards to Islamic banking social reporting 
will be explained. 
3.5.4. Advancement of Social Reporting Research in Islamic Bank 
 
In terms of the empirical research in Islamic accounting, a study by Maali et al. (2006) was the first 
one to explore the social reporting of Islamic banks empirically, with a sample of 29 Islamic banks 
across 16 countries. They employed a content analysis as their research method. The study found that 
Islamic banks in their sample fell significantly short in their social disclosure, where the banks disclosed 
more when the bank paid zakat (Islamic levy on business).  
Early literature has mainly discussed the search for ideal concepts and philosophical ideas for the 
Islamic accounting area, such as in Baydoun and Willett (2000) and Lewis (2001). However, as time 
progressed, Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) came out with the advanced research of an ethical index 
containing 78 items compared to the disclosure index of Maali et al. (2006) which contained only 30 
items. The study concentrated on the Gulf region compared to the more diversified sample in Maali 
et al. (2006). The use of the normal “disclosure index” compared to the “ethical index” name in Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2007) also portrayed and signalled more moral value for the research. Since Maali et al. 
(2006) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) introduced an index to the literature, the majority of later 
research has made references and has built indexes based on that foundation. 
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On top of that, critical accounting research (Kamla, 2009, Kamla, 2007) has complimented the 
empirical research and again reiterated the importance of social accounting in adhering to its content, 
motivation and main drives. It is argued that social accounting and reporting by Islamic banks, in most 
situations, concentrates on the “telling of the good news and countering the bad news” (Kamla, 2007), 
and this is in line with the findings of Maali et al. (2006) where Islamic banks will normally not disclose 
information which will attract criticism towards the bank and jeopardise the bank’s reputation. 
Furthermore, studies on social disclosure in the Islamic banking area move further by having more 
sophisticated analysis with a large number of Islamic banks involved, for instance in Mallin et al. (2014). 
Moreover, in terms of time frame, Belal et al. (2014) set a record by deeply analysing the Islamic banks’ 
social disclosure over 28 years. Both of these are important and significant contributions to the 
literature and both have their own unique criteria of research. Belal et al. (2014) constructed a massive 
disclosure index containing 149 items across 16 categories. However, only one Islamic bank was 
involved. In addition, even though Mallin et al. (2014) involved a number of Islamic banks, there were 
only 84 items in the index compared to the 149 items in (Belal et al., 2014). Furthermore, this thesis 
will differ by addressing 7 dimensions and 20 themes with 155 items from the literature and prominent 
bodies while considering two prominent models of Islamic banks in the world as a sample. In the next 
section, the summary of the important literature in Islamic accounting will be presented. 
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 Prior Research that Employ Content Analyses 
 
Content analysis has been a common tool in the research area of Islamic bank social disclosure. In the 
literature of Islamic banking and Islamic social reporting, Belal et al. (2014) used a content analysis in 
their research with 149 indexes. On the other hand, Mallin et al. (2014) combined a content analysis 
with Maali et al. (2006) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) indexes pairing them with a regression analysis. 
In another study done by Amalina Wan Abdullah et al. (2013), with a focus on Indonesia and Malaysia, 
Islamic banks also used the content analysis to analyse the Shariah disclosure of Islamic banks. 
Meanwhile, Kamla and Rammal (2013) used the content analysis with a critical theory and critique, 
where the style deviated from other studies.  
Content analysis is much more dominant in the conventional social and environmental reporting 
literature, for instance in Abbott and Monsen (1979) in the 1970s. In addition, a few prominent 
authors that utilise the content analysis like Deegan and Shelly (2014), Campbell (2000), Beck et al. 
(2010), Adams Carol and Whelan Glen (2009), Beattie et al. (2004), Milne and Adler (1999), Marston 
and Shrives (1991), and Wiseman (1982) have vastly contributed to the literature on business ethics 
and the sustainability of social and environmental issues. Furthermore, the dominant role of the 
content analysis in the area of social reporting has been advocated by Gray et al. (1995a). 
Moving on, the importance of graphic related disclosure in the content analysis has been highlighted 
by the conventional literature as an important aspect of content analysis (Yin, 2005, Beattie and Jones, 
2002, Preston et al., 1996). However, no literature in Islamic social reporting makes separate findings 
for graphic disclosure and highlights the importance of graphic properties findings as a distinct 
element in the disclosure (choosing instead to combine these with narrative disclosure instead). 
Nevertheless, there is research that specifically studies images disclosed in the annual report, such as 
in Kamla and Roberts (2010). However, this study was not related to Islamic banks but was related to 
companies that operate in the environment of Islamic countries. In being critical, Kamla and Roberts 
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(2010) made close readings on the visual images published in the annual report and found that images 
do portray the Islamic values of a company. Apart from that, there are a number of studies that include 
images. Researchers of social reporting in Islamic banks, for instance in Maali et al. (2006) and Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2007), have studied narratives and graphics in their content analyses without segregation 
of the two elements. However, none of the studies above have detached the graphics and provided 
separate statistics in their findings. 
Furthermore, most of the research does not separate the outcome of the image disclosure. Rather, 
they include it as part of the whole value of the disclosure. Moreover, the use of graphics has not been 
integrated with the “3 level coding”, which will be done in this thesis. Therefore, this opens the 
opportunity for this thesis to study the images and graphic disclosure concentrating on Islamic banks 
in order to see how graphics have been utilised as a tool for portraying Islamic values and other social 
disclosure-related themes in this thesis.  
The above discussion is supported by Kamla and Roberts (2010) where Islamic images of prayer houses 
and Islamic art demonstrate the company’s wisdom and show their concern towards religious and 
Islamic ideology. Islamic finance institutions have created a distinct character and have strengthened 
their Islamic identity (Khan, 2010), and this is a significant motivation for the Islamic bank’s tendency 
to use Islamic motifs and graphics to portray their Islamic business values. This segregation can be a 
potential extension towards current literature in Islamic accounting research. 
Having understood the discussion of some important literature that utilises the content analysis, it is 
important to discuss further the literature gap specifically related to Islamic banking social reporting 
to appreciate the scarcity of the literature source.  
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 Literature Gap Specific to the Islamic Social Reporting Area 
 
 
The table above provides a summary of the specific literature of social reporting in the Islamic 
accounting and banking literature. This thesis fills the gap in the literature by having investigated two 
prominent models of Islamic banks, which are the Malaysian and Bahraini model (Mohd. Yusof and 
Bahlous, 2013). Furthermore, this study evaluates the SEGE disclosure through 7 dimensions and 20 
themes using an ordinary and 3 level disclosure. Moreover, this thesis conducted the disclosure study 
in 5 years within the stable economic period (2010-2014) as advocated by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (2010).  In summary, the table above provides a distinct differentiation between 
the thesis’ study and the pertinent literature to the best of its knowledge following the approach of 
Mallin et al. (2014). 
Figure 3.1: Main Literature in Islamic Accounting Gap with the Thesis 
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 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a review of the appropriate literature concerning social, environmental, and 
ethical reporting, particularly involving the element of legitimacy and stakeholder as the anchor theory 
and explanation. The chapter later implies the importance of banks in the role of social responsibility 
both in action and in reporting, as banks are the source of funding for the majority of vulnerable 
industries. Therefore, the chapter reviews the social reporting literature related to the banking 
industry, which has many direct and indirect stakeholders that require responses to the unspoken 
societal-contract. 
Furthermore, the chapter narrows further the scope by discussing the Islamic banking literature 
related to Islamic accounting that is connected to social reporting to prove the scarcity and shortage 
of literature and scholarly work on the area. The chapter highlights the gaps in the literature in section 
3.7 by quickly summarising the important differentiation of the thesis’ study and other prominent 
studies in the area of Islamic accounting. 
In addition, the chapter would like to highlight the possible reason for the failure of prior work in the 
literature to establish a consistent and conclusive agreement for the Islamic social reporting area. 
Furthermore, there is no official and workable theoretical foundation for the Islamic accountability 
model that relates to stakeholders in the literature, except the basic model and argument in Gambling 
and Karim (1986) and Lewis (2001). Moreover, the literature might fail to address the specific 
disclosure framework for Islamic banking, which will also be addressed in the next chapter in section 
4.3. SEGE Disclosure framework for Islamic banking. Overall, this thesis may provide a new avenue for 
Islamic accounting literature’s advancement by pushing the boundaries of knowledge through the 
above-mentioned possible gaps. Next, chapter 4 will provide an insight into the theoretical foundation 
and the disclosure framework of the research. 
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Chapter 4 
 
(Theoretical Foundation & Disclosure Framework) 
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CHAPTER 4 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND DISCLOSURE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 Introduction 
Islamic banking is a system that consists of the values of Islamic teachings and the programme of 
banking structures, where both elements have their own theoretical foundations. Thus, pairing the 
two elements together is crucial for explaining how the elements mix with each other harmoniously. 
Furthermore, Islamic social reporting, which is part of the activities of Islamic banking, also shares its 
theoretical foundations with the system. 
In the literature, the treatment of theories seems to be competitive rather than complimentary, and 
Gray et al. (1995b) argues that this is incorrect. Thus in this research, the complimentary approach for 
each theory is set as a theoretical foundation for the study. In reality, Islamic banks disclose their social 
information by incorporating business and corporate principles while upholding the spirit of Islamic 
values. The thesis argues that the core underlying theories for Islamic social reporting are Islamic 
accountability theory in an ideal situation, which harmonises with signalling theory as the motivation 
and medium of communicating their accountability; a wider and broader stakeholder theory definition; 
and lastly the need to become legitimate and acceptable in the Muslim and Non-Muslim societies 
where Islamic banks operate. 
However, even though Islamic accountability theory is the ideal theory to explain the disclosure for 
the Islamic banks, the theory has not been fully developed and limited time for the study to develop 
a comprehensive theory. Therefore, the underlying theories in explaining the social disclosure by 
Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain in this thesis are stakeholder and legitimacy theory as the main 
theories to explain the study, paired with signalling and social norms theory as the supportive 
theories to further explain the findings. 
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 Theoretical Foundation of the Study 
4.2.1. Definition, Differentiation and Application of Theories 
Before narrowing the theories discussion into the theories that are applied in the thesis, it is better to 
explain agency and institutional theory as these two theories are also prominent theories in 
accounting research. Generally, agency theory discusses agency cost and the opportunistic behaviour 
of the manager as the agent to the organisation shareholder (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). However, 
due to information failure in between the parties involved, the objective of the financial performance 
of the company is open to risk (Merkl-Davies, 2007). This is why it is important to understand agency 
theory as the survival of the company depends on how the economic and financial resources of the 
company are well managed by the manager. Furthermore, the accounting research using agency 
theory as an explanation usually relates to the economic incentives view point Campbell (2000). On 
the other hand, this thesis looks beyond the economic incentives of financial reporting but towards 
social reporting that involves various stakeholders and societal contracts (Suchman, 1995, Deegan et 
al., 2002, Cho and Patten, 2007). 
 It is argued that institutional theory focuses more on environmental and social performance of an 
organisation and will conform to institutional norms (Merkl-Davies, 2007). The theory also has been 
widely adapted by accounting scholars (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, Deegan et al., 2007). Even though 
the theory has helped to gain an understanding of how an organisation chooses its reporting standard 
and disclosure technique (Adams et al., 2016), the legitimacy of an organisation is a key idea and 
notion to institutional theory (Duff, 2017). Moreover, legitimacy has an influence on institutional 
theory and other organisational theories (Haridan et al., 2018, Deegan and Unerman, 2011). Therefore, 
Suchman (1995) observes legitimacy theory as an anchor to a variety of theoretical expansion. 
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In this study, two main theories (legitimacy and stakeholder) will be used as lenses to explain social 
disclosure by Islamic banks. A brief definition of the theories will be given and also how the theories 
are perceived in this study will be explained below. 
The first theory is legitimacy. Legitimacy theory is important to this study as it is the backbone of a 
company’s objectives to maintain its operation within the boundaries and rules of the society in which 
it operates (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). In relation to Islamic banks, it is important for Islamic banks 
to observe these boundaries and rules to legitimately operate and label themselves as Islamic banks. 
According to Lindblom (1993) (p.2), the definition of legitimacy is “when a disparity, actual or potential, 
exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity's legitimacy”. In addition, 
‘legitimacy’ is a resource that organisations rely on for survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, O’Donovan, 
2002). Hence, Islamic banks need to adhere to the values and rules embedded in their operating 
environments to manage legitimacy threats and to continue their operations. In managing legitimacy, 
the information disclosed to the public is an important factor that establishes corporate legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995). Hence, Islamic banks need to strategize effectively their social disclosure towards 
the public to retain and maintain a good level of legitimacy. 
The second theory is stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory provides a more refined definition of the 
various groups and numerous social contracts within stakeholder groups (Craig Deegan, 2002). As a 
result of having numerous groups, there will be a disparity between the powers of each stakeholder 
group that will shape company behaviour (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). Consequently, the “high-
impact6” stakeholder which has more power compared to the “low-impact7” stakeholder will have 
more opportunities to influence company behaviour. On another note, even though stakeholder 
theory seems to overlap with legitimacy theory, its distinctive features are how the company 
approaches and interacts with a particular stakeholder (O’Donovan, 2002). In the application of Islamic 
                                                        
6 Stakeholders that have more power and influence. 
7 Stakeholders that have less influence or less power. 
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banks, since the Islamic bank is obliged to adhere to ‘legal-accountability8’ and ‘moral accountability9’ 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2016), the stakeholder approach might explain the difference between the 
treatments of ‘compliance-based 10 ’ disclosure and ‘spirit-based 11 ’ disclosure. Obviously, if the 
disclosure is more ‘compliance-based’, it signals that Islamic bank disclosure focuses more on 
legitimising itself to regulators. On the other hand, if the disclosure expands to be ‘spirit-based’, it 
signals that Islamic banks are committed to wider stakeholder expectations. 
In conclusion, in terms of the explanation of the disclosure, the theoretical perspective of these two 
theories (legitimacy and stakeholder) is expected to enrich the understanding of social disclosure 
(Gray et al., 1995b). In this case, the social disclosure of Islamic banks may benefit from the lenses of 
the two theories. 
4.2.2. Stakeholders & Islamic banking Social Contract Relationship 
 
In discussing the social responsibility of an organisation, the relationship between the organisation 
and the various stakeholders is important to understand. Mainly, the relationship established is based 
on a social contract embedded in a particular societal value setting (Suchman, 1995, Craig Deegan, 
2002). As for Islamic banks, the social contract with stakeholders should ideally respond with a 
reasonable balance for all stakeholders. This is despite the social contract being hard to define (Deegan 
and Unerman, 2011). However, for Islamic banks, the Shariah rules are defined precisely from the 
requirements of a strict restriction on prohibited activities by banks (such as interest bearing 
mechanisms) to the encouragement of good and positive engagement with wider stakeholders (such 
as the environment and employees). By right, Islamic banks should take all the requirements from 
Shariah rules, be they “compliance-based” or ”spirit-based”, to satisfy the social contract established 
                                                        
8 Accountability that satisfies the rule of law. 
9 Accountability that goes beyond the normal legal aspect. 
10 Disclosure merely for compliance reasons. 
11 Disclosure that incorporates the spirit behind social, Shariah, ethics, environment and governance or in 
other words goes beyond compliance. 
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between Islamic banks and stakeholders.  However, in the literature, less attention is given to the 
“spirit-based” social contract, such as in environmental disclosure as advocated by Rizk (2014). 
Generally, Islamic banks have various stakeholders, for instance customers, the community, 
employees, the environment, the government, non-governmental organisations, etc. Islamic banks as 
part of a religiously-oriented banking system need to take into account their commitment to all 
stakeholders. The social and obligatory commitment of Islamic banks to all stakeholders mirrors the 
accountability of Islamic banks to the ultimate stakeholder, God. This is because in Islamic principles, 
everything originates from God almighty where the ultimate accountability is towards God, the 
creator of the whole universe (Lewis, 2001). In addition to the adherence to Shariah rules and the 
encouragement of a positive interaction with “low-impact” stakeholders such as the environment, 
communities and wildlife, Islamic banks are obliged to adhere to “high-impact” stakeholders such as 
regulators and the government, which are the creators of the standards and acts implemented in a 
particular region where Islamic banks operate. 
In this study, there are two distinctive features in viewing stakeholder concepts from the Islamic bank 
perspective. First, this research treats Shariah Rules as an additional stakeholder. This is simply 
because Islamic banks need to be compliant with Shariah rules to claim to be Islamic banks. In addition, 
Islamic banks need to disclose information that belong to “compliance-based” and “spirit-based” 
categories to be perceived as ideal Islamic banks. Secondly, this study advocates that Islamic banks 
have an additional responsibility towards all stakeholders. By having “moral-accountability” and 
“legal-accountability” embedded in Shariah rules, Islamic banks are expected to respond and disclose 
better in their annual reports by taking into account all of the stakeholders’ expectations with a 
disclosure balanced between the themes and dimensions that represent each stakeholder.  
To explain further, “legal-accountability” is associated with “compliance-based” disclosure while 
“moral-accountability” is represented by “spirit-based” disclosure. Furthermore, in relation to 
legitimacy and stakeholder theories. This study assumes that Islamic banks that disclose more on 
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“compliance-based” disclosure are signalling their legitimacy towards “high-impact” stakeholders 
while Islamic banks that disclose more on “spirit-based” disclosure are signalling their commitment 
towards “low-impact” stakeholders. From an ideal perspective, there should be a balance between 
the disclosure commitment towards low and high impact stakeholders.  
Having understood the concept of the social contract that Islamic banks need to address, the next step 
is to recognise the legitimacy-gap between Islamic banks and societies. Obviously, the legitimacy-gap 
comes from the disparity between the actions and expectations of the social contract between the 
organisation and society (Deegan et al., 2002). In the next section, the legitimacy-gap will be defined 
and explained in light of the Islamic bank environment. 
 
4.2.3. Legitimacy Gap in the Practices of Islamic Bank 
 
In the real world, underperforming social disclosure often causes legitimacy-gaps. This occurs because 
of the ‘expectancy gap12’ between an organisation’s actions and society’s expectations (Sethi, 1979). 
In the case of Islamic banks, society believes Islamic banks are more ethically-oriented rather than 
business-oriented (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). On the other hand, the Islamic bank’s managerial 
actions and activities are geared more towards a substantial profit-making aspiration (Belal et al., 
2014). As a result, a legitimacy-gap is inevitable, but this can be managed and reduced by having 
certain communication strategies which are often taken for granted by Islamic banks. This is despite 
the fact that legitimacy strategies and approaches can be one of the way to address and subsequently 
reduce legitimacy-gaps (O’Donovan, 2002). However, this needs to be taken responsibly into 
consideration by the management in planning communication tactics as part of managing their 
                                                        
12 The gap of the stakeholders or part of stakeholders’ assumptions or expectations on how Islamic banks 
should disclose. 
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company legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). This is because the level of ethical communication 
via social disclosure in an Islamic bank’s annual report depends on the management of the banks.  
Referring to the legitimacy-gap discussed in the previous page, the ‘triple E13’ disclosure dimensions 
(Environments, Employees, Ethics) in Islamic banks are the bottom three lowest disclosure results for 
the current sample, which agrees with previous literature (Rizk, 2014, Belal et al., 2014, Kamla and 
Rammal, 2013, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007, Kamla et al., 2006). Since Islamic banks promote shariah-
based business, which is usually done by promoting the social and ethical identity of the society 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007), Islamic banks need to consider reducing the discrepancy of the legitimacy-
gap or otherwise the legitimacy-gap will grow as time goes on (Islam and Deegan (2008). This situation 
can be avoided by enhancing the strategies and tactics used to disclose more information and balance 
out the expectation of society towards Islamic banks. 
However, Islamic banks are also business entities that should aim for profit to sustain their business 
environment in order to serve society. In doing so, profit should be seen as a reward for doing business 
activities while at the same time engaging with vital activities that serve social interests (Ali et al., 
2013). The societal expectation needs to be addressed via the social disclosure communication of 
Islamic banks to tame their expectations towards Islamic banks. The duty to balance the disclosure 
that satisfies the requirements of the regulators and the needs of society depends solely on the top 
management of the banks carefully managing ‘compliance-based’ disclosure and ‘spirit-based’ 
disclosure as this thesis argues that both are important to be disclosed for an informed society. 
Consequently, if these two (spirit and compliance-based) disclosures are well balanced and blended 
in their legitimacy strategies, the legitimacy-gap will no doubt reduce. Subsequently, Islamic banks will 
be seen by society not just as business entities but also caring entities. 
                                                        
13 The Main Themes that are less covered in disclosure by Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain (Environment, 
Ethic & Employee). 
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Having understood the legitimacy-gap discussed in the last three paragraphs, specifically how 
important the legitimacy strategy is to Islamic banks in order to reduce the legitimacy-gap, it is crucial 
that Islamic banks’ actions are parallel to societal expectations and that they disclose information 
according to societal norms to maintain legitimacy and become relevant over time. In the next section, 
the supportive theory that will be used as the secondary theory in explaining the disclosure in Islamic 
banks. 
4.2.4. Signalling Theory 
 
Signalling theory is an important theory and concept in social reporting as it is a medium of responding 
and signalling for Islamic banks. Organisation like Islamic banks will signal their concern on issues 
related to stakeholders in reducing the legitimacy gap by addressing the values embedded in a 
particular social contract within society. Signalling theory has been employed as a potential 
explanation on disclosure practices and was first introduced by Spence (1973). 
Moreover, signalling theory has laid the foundation that positive and healthy organisations are likely 
to disclose more information as compared to negative or unhealthy companies (Ross, 1979). In 
relation to the thesis, an assumption can be made that Islamic banks that disclose more information 
are likely to be banks that perform well as compared to those with less disclosure. 
However, when the information does not cost anything to the signaller, the manager would most likely 
disclose performant and less performant information to the stakeholder as stakeholders usually 
interpret non-disclosure as a negative assumption (Grossman, 1981). In other circumstances, 
companies might disclose both good and bad news as good news may signal the quality of the 
company while bad news is signalled to reduce the effect of reputational cost for non-disclosure in a 
designated time (Skinner, 1994). Nevertheless, the management of the company is free to choose a 
non-disclosure strategy. In application to this thesis, it is assumed that Islamic banks will signal their 
commitment to society through SEGE disclosure according to specific themes. Therefore, the 
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commitment of Islamic banks towards specific themes and dimensions can be measured by observing 
the disclosure it signals in the annual report. 
4.2.5. Social Norms as the Basis of the underpinning Disclosure Commitments 
 
Administrations and organisations have a majority of the work force consisting of people influenced 
by the same set of social norms. They may prefer to act and conform to the social norms of the group 
(Kohlberg, 1984) and, in this thesis’ case, the particular countries’ social norms. These social norms 
spread and are strengthened by the way they are instilled, which is normally through the learning and 
transmission of values through a hands-on or heuristic approach (Reno et al., 1993). In this thesis, 
religiosity is regarded as a social norm that influences the Islamic bank’s social disclosure, coinciding 
with the role of Islamic banking as a religious-based banking system. The disclosure is predicted and 
assumed to be influenced by the country’s religious approach apart from the regulatory quality that 
will also affect the disclosure, as regulatory quality is shaped closely by social norms that are moulded 
through society’s administrative system. 
Moreover, Brammer et al. (2007) argues that ethical decisions depend on the embedded values of the 
corporation and this further supports the idea of the workforce or the personnel that work in the 
Islamic banks that are already shaped by the values of the social norms where the Islamic banks 
operate. This may motivate the reaction and response to the social disclosure commitment as it is the 
same motivation based on the ethical and religious ideology that is shaped by the social norms of the 
society which the employees and managers belong to. Therefore, this thesis argues that the society’s 
social norms (religiosity-regulatory commitment) play an important role in shaping the commitment 
of the social reporting in an Islamic bank. 
The countries under investigation have geographical and cultural differences even though both are 
Islamic countries and recognise Islamic banking. However, the two have completely different models 
of Islamic banks and approaches (Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous, 2013). These differences may be driven 
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by differences in the particular society’s social norms that contribute to how the Islamic banks 
approach social reporting, which is managed by the manager and other personnel in the Islamic bank. 
The society outside the banks, the stakeholders, is also moulded by the social norms in the area where 
they belong. Therefore, whether they are high influence and sensitive stakeholders or not, the values 
are likely to influence the social reporting practices. 
Furthermore, the values of the whole country (that are constructed from the religious orientation, 
social construct and regulatory-administrative quality) are linked to the social norms that are 
dominant in a particular area or a country. This discussion will be elaborated upon further in chapter 
8 in figure 8.1: Malaysia & Bahrain Context.  
The next section will discuss the Islamic Bank SEGE Disclosure Framework. This includes suggesting 
the ideal process for how Islamic banks should disclose their social disclosure and how the legitimacy 
and stakeholder theory fit in with different approaches to the disclosure initiative. The process will 
further explain the approach that needs to be considered by Islamic bank management to provide 
sound social disclosure to all levels of society. 
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 SEGE Disclosure Framework for Islamic Bank 
 
The SEGE disclosure framework is another contribution of the thesis to the body of literature as no 
framework has been introduced by the literature specifically for Islamic banking social reporting (see 
appendix 1: SEGE Disclosure Framework). The SEGE Disclosure Framework provides insight into how 
human resources, as the starting point of disclosure, go all the way to theory classification to the 
strategy of disclosure and how the cycle of the framework goes back to the board of directors through 
a sensitive society’s feedback. 
A good and sound process flow is important to any strategic activity that involves and affects many 
entities. In addition, while Shariah rules encourage better responses to other stakeholder needs, clear 
motives and processes need to be clearly informed to the executive-managerial level who are involved 
in the disclosure production of annual reports or any other means of disclosure such as websites and 
newspaper releases. Moving further, this section will explain in detail how this thesis will use the 
theories involved. Initially, the social disclosure that is disclosed by Islamic banks will be decided by 
the Islamic bank’s manager. Ideally, the manager would take into consideration a balanced mixture of 
Shariah, Social, Ethics, Governance and Environment (SEGE) themes for a disclosure to be considered 
decent. Furthermore, having considered the SEGE themes, banks, as operators, need to disclose 
information that satisfy the “operator-regulator 14 ” and the “operator-creation 15 ” relationship. 
Moreover, by fulfilling these two criteria, in an ideal world, Islamic banks will satisfy all stakeholders 
and thus publish a balanced disclosure with all the SEGE themes. As a result, Islamic banks will disclose 
good social disclosure through various channels of the disclosure medium.  
Preferably, the managers in Islamic banks should be accountable to the organisation and to the public, 
and this constitutes managerial accountability and public accountability. Furthermore, with the two 
accountabilities in place, the manager of Islamic banks will have to comply with the shariah-principle 
                                                        
14 The disclosure that merely satisfies the relationship between Islamic banks and its regulator. 
15 The disclosure that considers the other stakeholders (God’s other creations). 
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and the shariah-spirit in order to produce a balanced disclosure to the public. In fact, when all these 
criteria have been fully met, Islamic banks may produce a disclosure which will signal their 
commitment towards all ‘high-impact’ and ‘low-impact’ stakeholders. A balanced mixture of 
‘compliance-based’ and ‘spirit-based’ disclosure is important to be disclosed in mainstream and non-
mainstream channels of disclosure to ensure that ‘sensitive societies’ are aware and are able to 
provide responses negatively or positively to Islamic bank managers for them to improve and progress 
further. However, it is recommended that Islamic banks disclose more in their annual report as 
compared to other easy perishable channels as it is an official document that publishes consistently 
(Gray et al. (1995a) and is used by many researchers in Islamic banking literature as a basis for the 
evaluation of social responsibility disclosure (Ali Aribi and Arun, 2015, Mallin et al., 2014, Belal et al., 
2014, Amalina Wan Abdullah et al., 2013, Kamla and Roberts, 2010, Aribi and Gao, 2010, Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007, Maali et al., 2006). 
However, in contrast to the ideal world, the situation may be different from what is expected. This has 
been proven by the findings of the social disclosure in the findings part of the thesis. These findings 
are different compared to the ideal expectation. The Islamic banks concentrate more on ‘compliance-
based’ disclosure, which may be explained by the managerial-branch of the stakeholder theory lens. 
The details of the findings are illustrated within “chapter 6 and 7” in the later chapter. This process 
flow promotes an understanding of Islamic bank management in terms of theories of understanding 
and the initial concept of applied accountability to all stakeholders. As a result of this understanding 
and the implementation of a sound disclosure framework, there is no doubt that the disclosure for 
Islamic banks will better respond to and balance all stakeholder needs.  
The disclosure also needs to be strategised using the proper medium at the right time, where the 
medium can be classified as a ‘perishable medium16’ or ‘non-perishable medium’17. Normally, the 
                                                        
16 Disclosure mediums that easily fade in time and are easily altered, e.g. websites and social media postings. 
17 Disclosure mediums that last for a long time and are not easily altered, e.g. hard and soft copy annual 
reports and newspaper releases. 
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perishable medium has the luxury of having more and better coverage like website and social media 
tools while non-perishable mediums of disclosure normally have less coverage and are normally 
popular among researchers, investors and shareholders. Islamic banks need to use the channels of 
disclosure as effectively and as efficiently as possible to deliver the right information in the right 
channels and time. For instance, information or disclosure that needs faster and greater coverage can 
be published through websites and social media tools while information and disclosure that the 
Islamic banks want to hold the value against time could be published in the annual report. 
Furthermore, it is possible that this disclosure framework and process flow can be used as a guideline 
for training in the Islamic banking sector. This social disclosure training is best used for covering 
different units of the bank such as the board of directors, corporate communications department, 
public relations department, and the annual report production units which are attached to the bank 
or as a consultant company to the Islamic bank. By promoting this framework and process flow, it is 
hoped that Islamic banks will achieve positive and balanced legal and moral obligation disclosure as a 
business and ethical entity. 
In the disclosure framework for Islamic banks, there is an accountability value known as ‘managerial 
accountability’ and ‘public accountability’. This thesis is trying to explore the accountability framework 
and accountability theory for Islamic banks specifically as the accountability for Islamic banks is quite 
different from conventional accountability. In the accountability concept in Islam, God is the ultimate 
goal for accountability.  
Moreover, it is important to discuss the theory involved in the proposed Islamic banking disclosure 
framework. The first theory that enters the framework is that accountability is shaped by the Islamic 
concept, as informed in the last paragraph. Human resources will bring the idea of SEGE disclosure in 
their screening of Islamic accountability values. Ideally, the combination of ‘shariah-principle18’ and 
                                                        
18 Act that only satisfies the rules and guidelines of procedure in Islamic law. 
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‘shariah-spirit19’ will bring disclosure into an ethical stakeholder theory point of view and this unified 
disclosure theme will later be signalled to the stakeholders using various strategies and mediums 
ranging from greater coverage to lower exposure. 
Furthermore, the society then will decide and respond towards information from the various channels 
with positive20 and negative21 modes of responses to the human resources of the banks at a different 
level. Again, the process will circulate as in the SEGE Disclosure framework (see appendix 1) and the 
outcome of the disclosure will be different according to the approaches taken by the human resources 
in the Islamic bank. 
Therefore, it is ideal that Islamic banks embed this disclosure framework into its practice and portray 
its commitment towards social disclosure practice. Furthermore, the framework will help the 
disclosure process and identify opportunities and threats to be managed accordingly.  
 
 Conclusion  
 
The discussion of theories in this chapter will give a direction on how the theories affect the study. 
Furthermore, the theories help to plan and forecast the possible explanation of the findings outcome 
of the thesis. Based on the discussion on all of the sections that relate to legitimacy and stakeholder 
theory in chapter 4, it can be concluded that legitimacy theory’s nature of survival, which in this thesis 
is classified as “legitimacy survival”, is integrated with the “important interested party” in the 
stakeholder theory regime. Consequently, this makes these two theories a necessity to any 
                                                        
19 Act that takes into consideration the deeper objective of Islamic law and obliges kindness to a wider 
stakeholder. 
20 Feedback/Signals/Inform/Responses 
21 Complaints/criticisms/Whistle blowers 
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organisation before the organisation progresses further into theories of other branches of societal and 
ethical values such as stakeholder-accountability theory.  
Moreover, in general, the typical motive of a capitalist company or organisation is to maximise 
shareholder value. Therefore, in order to achieve that objective, the company management needs to 
observe and pay attention to the “important interested party”. For example, these include laws and 
legal regulators, policy makers, non-governmental organisations, and related sensitive parties. The 
Islamic bank, however, needs to seek agreement with the “important interested party” , for instance 
the central bank, in order to achieve “legitimacy survival” to accomplish the company’s objectives.  
Furthermore, after satisfying legitimacy by adhering to or fulfilling the best of societal contracts among 
powerful stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996a), Islamic banks as organisations subsequently need to 
address the expectations and issues concerning a wider community of stakeholders in a fair manner 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2011). This is despite some assumptions on social responsibility initiatives as 
being a form of prearranged socialism that takes a company’s wealth for the stakeholder via social 
responsibility initiatives (Jensen, 2001). Nevertheless, greater social initiatives through social 
reporting will always be an instrument to balance the capitalist pyramid structure. The importance of 
the ethical and managerial branch of stakeholders is inevitable to be practiced by Islamic banks in their 
disclosure and to be further put into practice. Moreover, if the disclosure findings are later found to 
be more on ethics, environmental and social, the theoretical explanation may focus more on 
stakeholder theory.  
In summary, for the theoretical foundation and SEGE disclosure framework chapter, there are four 
important discussions. Firstly, this thesis uses the lenses of stakeholder, legitimacy and signalling 
theory to explain the social reporting of Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. Secondly, the study 
introduces the framework for Islamic banking disclosure that can be applied in the academic field and 
at the industry level. Lastly, this chapter provides insight into how the theories work together in 
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enlightening the social reporting by playing their individual roles in describing the different reasoning 
and some matching and similar approaches between each theory, despite some differences in position.  
Overall, this thesis advocates that, in light of the two main theories of legitimacy and stakeholder 
theory, Islamic banks need to satisfy and address influential and dominant stakeholders to maintain 
legitimacy in order to serve and treat other less powerful stakeholders fairly, properly and objectively. 
Thus, when Islamic bank disclosure has a greater volume and is better in quality, it is a signal that the 
Islamic banks have entered into, and have made initiatives on, the ethical and managerial stakeholder 
branch objectively. One important thing to note is whether Islamic banks disclose to signal their 
legitimacy or signal their accountability towards wider stakeholders will depend on the values and 
social norms of the geographical area in which the Islamic banks operate, whether they be 
conservative or progressive (Elster, 2000). 
The quality of the disclosure might be subjective and questionable as to whether it is purely or simply 
green washing or window dressing (Mahoney et al., 2013). Nevertheless, when a bank or organisation 
reports its social initiative in its annual reporting disclosure, the bank’s management at least needs to 
generate activity that will in one way or another contribute to the social and environmental cause in 
its circle of operation and within the social-contract context of the banks and the society in which it 
operates. This would be a good starting point for a more open and transparent social reporting 
initiative for Islamic bank.  
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH DESIGN: METHODOLOGY & METHOD 
 
 Introduction 
 
The research design chapter serves as the foundation of the mechanism for how the research is 
properly conducted. Furthermore, reviewing the relevant literature and outlining the methodological 
framework for the thesis assists in making proper decisions in understanding the methodology and 
constructing feasible methods appropriate to the research design. Built on legitimacy and stakeholder 
theory, the main objective of this study is to empirically investigate and compare the social disclosure 
of Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. 
This chapter outlines and explains in detail the methodological aspect employed by the thesis in order 
to address the research objective and answer the research question. Moreover, it starts with an 
explanation of the research philosophy and the methodological standpoint of the research. In addition, 
this viewpoint will further determine and verify the method employed to extract information, which 
is then used for investigations and analysis according to the research objectives. Furthermore, after 
identifying the philosophical assumption and standpoint, the research design then provides a 
description of the research method employed. 
This chapter will then explain in detail the architecture of the hybrid content analysis and the 7 
dimensions and 20 themes involved in the content analysis. Moreover, the ordinary and quality 
content analysis score will be explained in detail. This chapter will provide a systematic process of the 
procedure employed in the thesis. These include the information and the calculation of the checklist 
in the ordinary disclosure index and the 3 level coding for the quality disclosure score.  
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 Research Philosophy 
The methodology section will explain the philosophical research stance of the thesis on how the thesis 
is organised in observing the worldview on the social science paradigm. This is important to make sure 
that the researcher understands the position and viewpoint of the research area and to make sure 
that the method that will be used in the procedure fits the social paradigm. 
5.2.1. Philosophical Assumption & Methodological of Social Science Nature 
 
Figure 5.1: A scheme of analysing assumptions about the nature of social science (Develop from Burrell & Morgan 1979 
pg.3) 
The information inside the figure above is important to this research in understanding the research 
stance from the philosophical aspect. Moving further, referring to the figure above, the philosophical 
assumption of the social sciences is generally divided into two main streams, namely the objectivist 
and subjectivist streams. Moreover, the subjectivist or objectivist approach of the research will be 
determined based on the four assumptions of social science. In addition, under each main stream the 
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researcher should understand the standpoint of the worldview through the ontology (realism vs 
Idealism), epistemology (positivism vs anti-positivism), human nature (determinism vs voluntarism), 
and methodology (nomothetic vs ideographic) aspects as advocated by Burrell and Morgan (1979) and 
later Morgan and Smircich (1980). A detailed discussion and how it relates and applies to this thesis 
will be provided in the specific section of each classification of the assumption on the nature of social 
science. For example, such as in the thesis’ identification of a suitable methodology through the 
research philosophy and its relation to the application of the thesis’ theoretical framework. 
5.2.2. Ontology 
 
As introduced by Burrell and Morgan (1979), there are two different values in the ontological 
perspective in positioning the ontology aspect, namely realism and nominalism. This thesis advocates 
the objectivist approach, which employs the understanding of the realist ontological assumption. This 
is because this study employs a structured scientific method that is based on the belief of physical 
realism and that human beings exist independently from reality as explained by Chua (1988).  
Furthermore, to comprehend the standpoint, realism is what researchers sense in reality and is the 
view that the social world is made up of real and tangible structures (Saunders Mark et al., 2011). 
However, distinct to realism, nominalism advocates that there is no real structure to the real world 
are they are merely concepts residing in one’s mind (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This study focuses on 
the Islamic bank that is governed by law and the central bank and involves the annual report, all of 
which are structured and tangible entities that shape an understanding of reality. Moreover, the 
content analysis method is done through a tangible process that includes examining documents, 
manuscripts, newspapers and other such items that are shaped by the real, structured world. 
In summary, for the ontological aspect, this thesis follows the realist approach of ontology in 
understanding the social world. From looking at the literature, much mainstream accounting research 
is dominated by the positivist paradigm (Locke and Lowe, 2008). However, even though this research 
and much mainstream accounting research is based on the positivist paradigm, the spirit of paradigm 
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debates nevertheless needs to be kept alive to foster and promote open scholarship and multi-
dimensional strings of thought as argued by Lukka (2010). 
 
5.2.3. Epistemology 
 
Moving further, epistemology fundamentally questions how knowledge can be acquired while some 
have defined epistemology as the assumption of what establishes the knowledge of social reality 
(Blaikie, 2007). Simply put, it can be described as the theory and concept of knowledge (Marsh and 
Stoker, 2002). However, this thesis explores epistemology through the lenses of Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) position through a positivist approach rather than an anti-positivist approach. Furthermore, 
this thesis acquires knowledge by means of secondary data (positivist approach), for instance through 
information from the annual report rather than through knowledge that needs to be personally 
experienced (anti-positivist), for instance experiencing being the annual report preparer’s manager. 
Furthermore, the positivist approach seeks to grasp explanations and forecasts happenings in the 
social world through an exploration of the uniformities and underlying relations between its 
constituent components (Burrell and Morgan, 1992). Furthermore, theories are important in 
developing examinable hypotheses for the research. Moreover, the hypotheses are then tested using 
the chosen deductive approach. Accordingly, the role of the research is to test and explain the theories 
and further develop these theories if possible (Saunders Mark et al., 2011). In this thesis, the research 
will be based on, and be explained by, the relevant theories (stakeholder and legitimacy). 
Overall, for epistemology, this thesis is still consistent in the objectivist approach under the objective 
dimension under the assumption scheme of social science and stands under the positivist position. 
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5.2.4. Methodological Approach 
 
Methodology under the assumption of social science introduced by Burrell and Morgan (1979) is 
concerned with the methods employed to investigate and study the social world through two distinct 
methodological lenses which are, namely, the nomothetic and ideographic perspective. The 
nomothetic is concerned with and emphasises on a systematic protocol, approach and technique in 
conducting research while the ideographic supports the idea that knowledge or information should 
be obtained first hand (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Relating to this research, methodologically, this 
thesis adopts the nomothetic standpoint where a systematic content analysis is employed and 
involves hypothetical-deductive approach estimations to test hypotheses. 
The decision in choosing a methodology is directly related to the researcher’s ontological, 
epistemological and human nature assumptions. Referring to the figure on the nature of social science 
by Burrell and Morgan (1979), the philosophical assumption of social science discussed previously is 
prone to the objectivist position and approach. Furthermore, the inclination of the trend of ontology, 
epistemology and human nature towards objectivism signals that this thesis prospectively employs a 
nomothetic methodology. However, in determining the research paradigm, this thesis positions itself 
into one paradigm that will be explained further in the next paragraph based on the figure in the next 
page. 
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Figure 5.2: Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Science (Developed from Burrel & Morgan 1979 pg.29) 
Having discussed the four dimensions with regards to the nature of social science, there are two more 
important concepts and assumptions in the nature of society. Namely, the ‘radical change’ that 
assumes how organisations should be conducted through a critical perspective and ‘regulation’ that 
explains how organisations are regulated while being less critical and judgemental (Saunders Mark et 
al., 2011). Based on these assumptions, the paradigm of the research can be determined based on the 
objective and subjective dimension combined with the assumption of society. Therefore, after 
considering the previous discussions, the research stands on the functionalist paradigm. As advocated 
by Burrell and Morgan (1979), the functionalist paradigm tries to find a rational explanation for social 
affairs. Furthermore, in relation to this thesis, the researcher tries to find rational explanations for 
social disclosure by Islamic banks based on the theory’s assumption with a practical method to explain 
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a practical problem in a an objectivist environment. In the next section, the research onion will simplify 
the process of understanding the research philosophy and the research design. 
5.2.5. Application of Research Onion to the Research 
 
Figure 5.3: Research Onion (Source: Saunders and Tosey 2012, pg. 108) 
The figure above provides a summary of the research design layer from philosophical assumption to 
data collection and analysis in a simple visual representation. Saunders and Tosey (2012) research 
onion above is an updated version of the one in Saunders Mark et al. (2011) that is much more 
accurate. In relation to this thesis, the ‘research philosophy’ adopts the realism approach and applies 
the ‘mono-method’. Moreover, the ‘strategy’ employed is a content analysis with statistical analysis. 
The research ‘time horizon’ is a panel with a longitudinal year and various banks, and the ‘data 
collection & data analysis’ uses conventional content analysis data recording tools (Microsoft Word-
Thematic Sheet, Microsoft Excel-Thematic Checklist), qualitative tools (NVivo), and a Statistical 
Package (Stata). The result is then presented and discussed in the findings of the thesis. 
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 Research Method  
Having understood the philosophical context behind the methodology and having recognised the 
position of the paradigm through the methodological aspect of the research in the methodology 
section, the research method will then discuss the technical aspect of the method that will be utilised 
in extracting and analysing the information by this thesis. The research method section will heavily 
discuss the content analysis as part of the dominant technique as it is argued to be suitable for social 
accounting and corporate social responsibility research (Gray et al., 1995a). 
5.3.1. Overview to Hybrid Content Analysis 
 
In this research, a mono-method is employed to extract data from the annual report through content 
analysis techniques. However, the multi-recording tools used to extract information from annual 
reports include a Microsoft word thematic sheet, Microsoft excel thematic checklist, and qualitative 
tool software (NVivo). This research argues that multi-recording tools make a hybrid content analysis. 
Conventionally, researchers have only utilised one recording tool when undertaking the content 
analysis. For example a checklist sheet that then turns into an index or a thematic recording sheet to 
get information for qualitative purposes. Nevertheless, this thesis employs the multi-recording 
method to obtain several outcomes that will be explained later. 
Furthermore, the content analysis has been widely utilised by researchers with regards to social 
reporting research, and this is not only limited to Islamic banks but to other organisations as well. For 
instance, Mallin et al. (2014) used a content analysis combined with a regression analysis in their study 
of the disclosure of Islamic banks while Linsley and Shrives (2006) used a content analysis in analysing 
risk reporting in UK companies.  
Moreover, many studies related to Islamic bank disclosure often employ content analyses (Belal et al., 
2014, Kamla and Rammal, 2013, Amalina Wan Abdullah et al., 2013, Farook et al., 2011, Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007, Maali et al., 2006). Such studies have employed content analyses as one of their 
methods and this strengthens the position of the thesis’ research method stance.   
82 
 
5.3.2. The Architecture of Hybrid Content Analysis 
 
The hybrid method consists of three main recording tools, namely ‘Microsoft word-thematic sheet’, 
‘Microsoft excel thematic checklist’ and ‘qualitative tool software (NVivo)’. These three mediums are 
used to record the data extraction from the annual report at the same time parallel to each other. The 
mechanisms will be elaborated upon in detail in the next few paragraphs. 
Firstly, this research uses a manual Word sheet with the ‘3 level coding’ inspired by Botosan (1997) 
and later extended by Beck et al. (2010). However, this thesis extends the idea with the added value 
of a graphic with a greater spectrum based on 7 dimensions and 20 themes, which provides a greater 
extension to the previous literature (see appendix 2). Moreover, the different coding spectrum 
procedures make this thesis distinct to the previous literature while maintaining the same essence of 
the differentiation by three categories (see appendix 3). Furthermore, the format of the ‘3 Level 
Working Sheet’ will assist future research to use and develop their own working sheets suitable to 
their research objective. 
Moving further, the ‘3 Level Coding’ procedure will produce both volume and percentage results for 
each bank per year, which then turns into the average score for five years and a combination of certain 
banks will produce results for countries. The ‘3 level coding percentage’ also constitutes the Quality 
disclosure score which is presented in the findings and analysis chapter 6. The formula for the quality 
score derived from the ‘3 Level Coding’ process is explained in section 5.3.6, Quality Content Analysis 
Score. These scores are later compared to the ordinary score which is derived from the ‘Microsoft 
excel thematic checklist’ that will be elaborated upon in the next paragraph. 
Secondly, this thesis extends the checklist inspired and derived from Belal et al. (2014), Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2007), and Maali et al. (2006). Moreover, some checklist items are derived from the Global 
Reporting Initiative standard G4; however, this standard has been updated to a different format 
consisting of the GRI 300 Environment Standard (2016) and the GRI 400 Social Standard (2016). 
Furthermore, social responsibility guidelines in the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
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Financial Institutions (AAOIFI, 2010), Centre for Social and Environmental Research (CSEAR 1991), 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2011), Equator Principle 2013 and 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB 2006) are among the guidelines incorporated by the decision 
rules of the checklist items. 
Overall, there are 155-checklist items derived from reputable literature and bodies. These checklist 
items are later formatted into an excel sheet (see appendix 6) and the annual report is scored using 
the ‘Microsoft excel thematic checklist’ to get the index score by bank per year and to later transform 
this into the average for countries and years. The index produced in this process is classified as an 
Ordinary disclosure index as the score approaches a binary of (1) for disclosure and (0) for non-
disclosure. Likewise, the score will be presented on its own and will be compared to the quality score 
which is gathered using the 3-Level scoring method explained before and this will be further detailed 
in section ‘5.3.6 Quality content analysis score’. 
 The third and the last is the use of the qualitative tool software (NVivo) software to help with the data 
recording and the data management of the content analysis. The NVivo software is a reputable 
software in qualitative research; however, the software is scarce in the social reporting literature as a 
tool in methodology. In this research, NVivo is utilised to achieve the maximum result that can be 
processed by NVivo as there are certain packages of analysis tools that are only available in NVivo that 
are beneficial to be utilised and presented in the findings chapters, for instance see section 6.4.9. 
Similarity of Disclosure between Islamic Banks (Malaysia Vs Bahrain). Nevertheless, many others 
findings are well analysed and presented using Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Word, and Stata. 
The usefulness of the combination of these extraction mediums and tools is that they ensure that the 
data collection is properly and structurally extracted from the annual report. These results can then 
be crosschecked and compared to each other to ensure the coding work has been done properly and 
procedurally. Each medium serves the same purpose of analysing objectives but has different ways of 
doing it. All the three mediums share the same dimension and themes. 
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Furthermore, the use of these different mediums of recording will help reach the research objectives 
but in different spectrums. What this means is that with the ‘3 level coding’, the analysis will be able 
to obtain a deeper interpretation (Quality & commitment) while these results can then be compared 
to the extended checklist (Ordinary score). The question that then can be asked is “Do Islamic banks 
that commit in their disclosure via the extended checklist method also perform in their disclosure in 
the ‘3 level coding’ method? If there is, why?” This type of finding is presented and discussed in section 
“6.3.3. Top 10 Performer of Ordinary SEGE and Quality SEGE” and in section “6.4.4. Country’s Top 10 
Performing Bank in Ordinary & Quality SEGE Disclosure”. Moreover, the segregation of the ‘graphic’ 
property of the disclosure will be one of the distinctive features in this unique content analysis 
architecture and these findings are presented and discussed in section “6.4.5. Graphic Utilisation by 
the Countries”. 
Moreover, the introduction of this double-backed content analysis (Excel Sheet & Words Sheet) is to 
provide the literature with an extended view on the methodology chosen in content analysis research. 
This is because, normally, the content analysis is paired with other types of methods. For instance with 
an interview in Belal et al. (2014) and a quantitative method in Mallin et al. (2014). However, in this 
analysis, a content analysis is paired with another form of content analysis. In addition, this double-
backed content analysis can also serve as the highest form of reliability assessment, which is “accuracy 
level” as advocated by Krippendorff (2012). As for this thesis, the official reliability assessment for this 
thesis is currently under “replicability level”, as discussed further in the next subsection, “5.3.3. 
Reliability Assurance in Content Analysis” 
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5.3.3. Reliability Assurance in Content Analysis 
 
As discussed previously, content analysis is about the organised and systematic reading of texts, 
symbols and images (Krippendorff, 2012). The content analysis is a tool that has been widely used in 
social accounting studies (Gray, 2001, Abbott and Monsen, 1979). Nevertheless, the content analysis 
needs to be consistent and reliable throughout the process. Furthermore, the reliability is important 
in conducting a content analysis to ensure that the coding system is systematic and can be replicated 
by other researchers.  
This thesis employs four measures to ensure the reliability, replicability and the consistency of the 
content analysis. In ensuring this, firstly, the content analysis checklist (Microsoft-excel) and the three-
level structure sheet (Microsoft Word) was used by the researcher to code one annual report twice at 
different dates at the initial stage. This is to ensure that the researcher understands the process and 
the procedure of the coding.  
Secondly, the test for inter-coder reliability is conducted by having another coder, with the same 
academic background and experience in content analysis, conduct a content analysis on a one-year 
annual report, which is then compared to the researcher’s result. Moreover, to test and enhance inter-
coder reliability, the same content analysis checklist and the three-level structure is given to another 
coder who is not from an academic background and has no experience in content analysis to conduct 
the content analysis. This is done to see whether the instructions are clear and communicable.  
However, the coder was given a one-day training session with the researcher prior to the analysis. The 
coder information was kept anonymous due to the confidentiality of information and only general 
information was provided. The result of the replicability assessment of the content analysis method is 
as described in the table on the next page. 
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The first coder had a 100 % similarity 
rate. However, the deficiency in the second coder’s rating was mainly due to miss-view (lack of 
concentration) and not from a misunderstanding of the structure and instruction of the checklist 
provided. The deficiency was then discussed with the second coder and the coder then completely 
understood the process structure and the checklist although they had missed it due to a lack of 
concentration. 
The method employed in this thesis has gone through the reliability assessment and satisfies the three 
conditions underlined by Krippendorff (2012) below:-   
1) Employ a clear, formulated and workable transmittable instruction.  
2) Employ transmittable criteria in the selection of individual coders from a similarly capable 
individual that is available for training and is able to reproduce the procedure in a different 
place. 
3) Participants that generate the reliability documents must work independently from each 
other. 
Thirdly, the reliability assessment was determined through a ‘pilot-measurement’ conducted on fifty 
annual reports from ten banks from the year 2010-2014 (10 banks x 5 years). These ten banks were 
later coded again at different dates and the slight differences were adjusted, which showed that the 
method was replicable.  
# Information Attributes Similarity  
1 Name: Classified 
Gender: Male 
Occupation: Senior Lecturer at Public 
University  
Education Level: PhD 
1)Training provided 
2)Has Experience 
100% 
2 Name: Classified 
Gender: Female 
Occupation: Medical Doctor 
Education Level: Master Degree 
1)Training Provided 
2) No Experience 
98.6% 
Table 5.1: Coder Information 
87 
 
Fourthly, after finishing all the annual report scoring, the entire scoring sheet (Microsoft Excel and 
Word) will go through the same process again to check whether any scores are missing or have been 
erroneously scored, and this is adjusted later. Based on this method, the annual report will undergo a 
second checking process. However, the drawback of this reliability technique is that it is time 
consuming and requires concentration. Even though it is time consuming, it is, nevertheless, worth 
the repetition to get the best possible result from the content analysis. 
One important issue that this thesis tries to highlight to the literature is the subjectivity of the human 
in the form of stamina, which has not been highlighted by previous literature. This thesis defines 
stamina in terms of energy for the concentration required in conducting a content analysis. To ensure 
concentration, the coding process is only done when the researcher is in a good state of mind and is 
not in a rush. However, this technique is time consuming and needs proper planning, and time and 
mind-set management.  
This thesis advocates that concentration is one important factor for reliability as intense conditions 
might affect work quality and accuracy (Green, 2001). Even though Krippendorff (2012) mentions the 
cognitive ability of the coders, he does not mention concentration specifically. For example, the coder 
might skip important information if less concentration is given during the scoring process. Moreover, 
body and mind concentration is important for the body to work well, thus producing quality work 
(Harris, 1982). 
Overall, for the reliability assurance of the thesis’ content analysis, this thesis has set four measures 
to ensure the best possible reliability as explained previously. The thesis also satisfies the three 
conditions for the reliability assessment as suggested by Krippendorff (2012). 
In the next section, the extended dimensions and themes will be elaborated upon and explained 
further.  
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5.3.4. Extended Dimensions and Themes  
5.3.4.1. Research Dimensions and Themes 
The dimensions and themes are an important category in the content analysis process structure as it 
helps with the classification and grouping of data and analysis of information to allow its results and 
findings to be interpreted in a more meaningful manner. This has been proven by many researchers 
in Islamic bank studies in terms of the dimensions and themes in the areas of Islamic social disclosure. 
Maali et al. (2006) was the first to introduce the index comprising themes and the checklist in the 
study that involved Islamic banks while the second initiative was by Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) and 
the third one was by Belal et al. (2014), the largest and most comprehensive one.  
The majority of research in this area has adopted Maali et al. (2006) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) 
index. For instance, in the studies of Mallin et al. (2014), Amalina Wan Abdullah et al. (2013), and 
Hassan and Harahap (2010). This research especially will bring together the relevant checklist of Maali 
et al. (2006), Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) and Belal et al. (2014). Moreover, the checklist also comprises 
standards from notable standard-setting bodies from conventional and Islamic backgrounds. For 
instance, these include the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Equator Principle, Centre for Social and 
Environmental Research (CSEAR), Organisation for Economic co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI). Furthermore, a majority of developing countries do not apply international 
standards such as GRI (Das et al., 2015) and therefore this thesis tries to address the issues by 
incorporating such standards. 
Overall, the ‘7 dimensions’ and ‘20 themes’ are gathered and decided accordingly by means of 
referencing them to previous literature and well-known standard-setting bodies in the area of social 
disclosure, regardless of whether they are Islamic or conventional literature or are Islamic or 
conventional standard-setting bodies. The details of the 7 dimensions and 20 themes are explained in 
the following subsections. 
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5.3.4.2. 7 Layer of  Dimensions 
The seven dimensions have been formed to capture the best possible dimension of social reporting 
by Islamic banks (refer appendix 10). It is designed to fit the objective of the research which includes 
the Social, Shariah, Environmental Governance and ethics disclosure dimensions. First, the top priority 
for Islamic banks is the ‘Shariah’, where the source and motivation of the establishment of Islamic 
banks comes from. This is considered to be ‘rule and value’ division. Furthermore, in division 2, ‘Two 
layer governance’ is the core governance structure intended for the best practices of the Islamic bank. 
Lastly, division 3, ‘moral and social’, is when the Islamic banks have at satisfied ‘rule and value’ and ‘2 
layer governance’ and is where the moral and social aspect of other stakeholders can be well taken 
care of and managed. Thus, this thesis argues that the social reporting and disclosure structure for an 
Islamic bank should ideally be comprised of these three divisions which include the Shariah, Shariah 
Governance, Social External, Social Internal, Environment, Ethics and governance dimensions. These 
seven dimensions are further divided into twenty themes explained in the next section. 
5.3.4.3. 20 Themes 
 
The twenty themes that are employed to assess the Islamic bank’s annual report are created based  
on the seven dimension objectives. To further visualise the segregation see appendix 11. This 
segregation will give a detailed result on a particular dimension that discloses more themes from the 
seven dimensions. The themes give greater focus on, and are more accurate in respect of, each 
dimension. For instance, under the environmental dimension score, the thesis can further investigate 
which theme contributes more towards the environmental dimension, whether it is the nature, wild 
life and animal rights, or recycling theme.  
Furthermore, the thesis can appreciate the results and findings of the interpretation by having a 
general dimension and concentrating on the themes depending on the spectrum of objectives that 
the elaboration might need. In the next subsection, the SEGE disclosure of 7 dimensions and 20 
themes is visualised in table 5.2 with reference to the literature and notable bodies explained earlier.
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5.3.4.4.  (SEGE) Disclosure Dimensions & Themes  
 
 
 
 
Islamic Banking SEGE Disclosure 
Dimension & Themes (Social, Shariah, 
Ethics, Governance & Environment) 
REFERENCES 
SHARIAH – Dimension 1  
1-Shariah Compliance on Banking 
Transaction 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); Maali et al.(2006); Belal et al (2014) 
2-Shariah Awareness AAOIFI; Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); Belal et al (2014) 
3-Zakat Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); Maali et al.(2006)-Belal et al (2014) 
4-Benevolent Loan / Qard Hassan Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); Maali et al.(2006)-Belal et al (2014) 
5-Islamic Commitment 
Kamla, R. and C. Roberts (2010); Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); Belal et 
al (2014) 
SOCIAL EXTERNAL – Dimension 2  
6-Community Involvement 
G4-SO1-GRI(Global Reporting Initiative); OECD(2011); Equator 
Principle(2013); OECD(2011); Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); Maali et 
al.(2006); Belal et al (2014); Birth et al.(2008) 
7-Charity 
CSEAR (Centre for Social & Environmental Accounting Research 
1990-1991);  AAOIFI; Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); Maali et al.(2006); 
Belal et al (2014) 
8-Sponsorship Birth et al.(2008); Suwaidan and Al-omari(2004); Belal et al (2014) 
SOCIAL INTERNAL – Dimension 3  
9-Human Resource and Capital 
Management 
G4-LA5-GRI(Global Reporting Initiative); AAOIFI; Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2007); Belal et al (2014) 
10-Reward and Benefit G4-LA2-GRI;G4-LA13-GRI;AAOIFI 
ENVIRONMENT – Dimension 4  
11-Nature 
G4-EN31-GRI(Global Reporting Initiative); Rizk, R. (2014); Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2007); Maali et al.(2006); Casson and Napier (2006); 
Belal et al (2014); Cho, Patten, and Roberts (2006) 
12-Wild Life 
G4-EN13-GRI(Global Reporting Initiative); Rizk, R. (2014); Harvey, B. 
(1995);  
13-Recycle G4-EN23-GRI (Global Reporting Initiative); AAOIFI 
ETHIC – Dimension 5  
14-Institutional Ethics 
G4-GRI(Global Reporting Initiative); AAOIFI; Graafland et al.(2006); 
Belal et al (2014); Suwaidan and Al-omari (2004); 
Sutantoputra(2009) 
15-Business Ethics Equator Principle(2013); AAOIFI;  Harvey, B. (1995) 
SHARIAH GOVERNANCE – Dimension 6  
16-Shariah Governance  Framework IFSB-10(2009) 
17-Shariah Supervisory Board 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007)-Maali et al.(2006)-Belal et al (2014)- 
Ghayad(2008) 
GOVERNANCE – Dimension 7  
18-Board of Director 
G4-43-GRI(Global Reporting Initiative); G4-51-GRI; AAOIFI; Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2007); Belal et al (2014) 
19-Management Belal et al (2014) 
20-Guiding Principle of Governance IFSB-3(2006); Belal et al (2014); AAOIFI 
Colour Information 
 Dimensions 
 Themes 
Table 5.2: (SEGE) Disclosure Dimensions & Themes 
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5.3.5. Ordinary Content Analysis Index 
The SEGE disclosure score is in percentages. The calculation is based on the total score of all seven 
dimensions which comprises twenty themes and is divided by 155 checklists before multiplying it with 
one hundred to get the percentage score of each bank for each year. Moreover, all banks will have 
scores for 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 and an average score for five years.  
The score for the index follows an unweighted disclosure index as there is no specific item in the 
dimensions and themes that are deemed to be more superior to each other and neither are they less 
important to each other. Rather, all the items are treated as equally important as a whole SEGE score 
and all diverse dimensions and themes are treated as one. Furthermore, an un-weighted approach 
provides an avenue in mitigating the subjectivity issues by minimising the issues of bias associated 
with the weighted methodology (Chau and Gray, 2002).  
It is important to understand that even though the construction of the disclosure index involves 
subjectivity of judgement, it nevertheless has been proven to be a valuable tool that is still recognised 
in the area of disclosure research, particularly in social accounting (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Below is the equation for the computation of each bank for each year. Where T=Year, i=bank, 
n=number of checklists scored. 
 
Figure 5.4: Formula for the SEGE Ordinary Score 
The same method is employed to calculate the total disclosure score for individual banks for five years, 
disclosure by countries in each year and the average of five years, and also every dimensions and 
themes category. Moreover, these scores will later be used to interpret the findings in chapter 6 and 
          ℎ       
 
    ,   
 
155 Checklist 
SEGE Ordinary 
Index 
100 
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Figure 5.5: Binary Coding in Excel Sheet 
7. In the next sub-section, the binary coding example in the excel sheet will be visualised and explained. 
Furthermore, it will provide some insight into how the coding in Microsoft excel is conducted. 
5.3.5.1. Checklist via Excel Procedure (Ordinary Score) 
 
 The presence of the disclosure item in the annual report is coded as (1) in the excel sheet while the 
absence of the item in the checklist is coded as (0). The procedure for scoring the annual report mainly 
follows the method that is well-established in the literature of social reporting and business ethics as 
advocated by Beck et al. (2010), Beattie et al. (2004) and Marston and Shrives (1991). Moreover, the 
scoring method used in this research is in line with the Islamic accounting background literature, for 
instance in Belal et al. (2014) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). The procedure of the coding above (1/0) 
does not discriminate between the important and vital roles among disclosure items. Below is an 
example of binary coding in the excel work sheet:- 
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For full dimensions and the themes’ descriptions, see appendix 3 for a scoring checklist and appendix 
5 for an example of a full five years coding for a bank (for the original scoring sheet contact the author). 
However, in the next section for the SEGE quality disclosure score, a slightly different coding and 
scoring method was applied. The method was mainly influenced by the approach of Botosan (1997) 
and Beck et al. (2010) but was then extended to further criteria. 
5.3.6. Quality Content Analysis Score 
 
Quality disclosure is a subjective issue that is frequently labelled as difficult to measure (Beattie et al. 
(2004). However, some research uses binary coding to measure the quality of disclosure which 
normally takes the form of 3 levels. For example, Botosan (1997) employs (3) for quantified disclosure, 
(2) at the qualitative level and (0) for non-disclosure. However, the idea of capturing quality values 
was further extended by Beck et al. (2010) in what is known as the CONI approach, where two-step 
coding was introduced in which type 1 disclosure is mainly on phrases and type 2 ranges from a scale 
of 1 to 5 with numerical values. 
In this thesis, the 3 level scoring is designed based on the idea and spirit of previous literature to 
capture the greatest possible quality value of disclosure inside an annual report. However, the 
element of graphics has been well recognised in this thesis’ version of the 3 level scoring method in 
that graphics play an important role in determining the level of disclosure in the 3 level procedure. In 
addition, it is also important to note that a fourth field (0) score for non-disclosure also exists, 
following Beck et al. (2010).  
Moreover, this thesis views graphics as an important element to be segregated and appreciated. Even 
though graphics might be portrayed for the benefit of the company, as argued by Beattie and Jones 
(2002), graphic disclosure that the company intends to signal to stakeholders might help in 
understanding disclosure better (Bernardi et al., 2002). In the literature of Islamic accounting, there is 
limited exploration of graphic-related disclosure in studies of Islamic banks. However, there is a study 
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60 Maximum Score 
SEGE Quality Score 
Or 
3 Level Score 
100 
related to Islamic values by Rania and Clare (2010) which found that companies tend to signal their 
religiosity through images and pictures in the annual report. Thus, this thesis will fill the lacuna on 
graphic scoring in a systematic way in the 3 level scoring procedure instead of combining them as one 
value under disclosure like in previous research in the field of Islamic accounting, such as in Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2007) and Belal et al. (2014). 
The model of 3 level scoring designed in this thesis differs from that of Botosan (1997) by having an 
actual 4th coding which is explained in the last two paragraphs. Instead of (1) for non-disclosure, this 
thesis labels (0) for non-disclosure and (1) for purely narrative disclosure. Furthermore, score (2) refers 
to a high level of narrative such as policy and framework communication. One thing that differs this 
research from Botosan (1997) and Beck et al. (2010) in step two is the graphic disclosure. However, 
the same essence of statistics and figures, that is the quantitative proof from the annual report, is 
required for level 3. 
Furthermore, the procedure of the 3rd level in this study, has 3 spectrums in level 2 and level 3 which 
are visualised in the next sub-section “5.3.6.1. The 3 Level Procedure (Quality Score)”. It is important 
to note that, after scoring, the figure will be transferred to the formula below to calculate the SEGE 
Quality score to be interpreted and used in the findings for chapter 6 and 7 as the SEGE Quality score 
in the thesis. 
 Below is the equation for the computation of each bank for each year. Where T=Year, i=bank, and  
n=number of checklists scored. 
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 The formula in the last page is also used to calculate the total of each bank in each year and the average of the five year period of study. Below is the 
example of the scoring from the 3 level procedure that will be elaborated upon in the next page. This example can also be referred to in appendix 4. 
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5.3.6.1. The 3 Level Procedure (Quality Score) 
 
Level 
Criteria 
LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3 
CRITERIA 
 
BASED ON 
SEGE 
INDIVIDUAL 
DIMENSIONS 
& THEMES 
Narrative Phrases 
(Complete phrase 
regarding a theme) 
 
1st Spectrum= Narrative Phrases with Policy or 
Framework Embedded  
Or 
2nd Spectrum= Narrative Phrases with Graphic (Which Do 
Not hold information - Number, Value, Figure, Indicator, 
Measurement, Fact ) 
Or 
3rd Spectrum = Graphics (Which Do Not hold information 
- Number, Value, Figure, Indicator, Measurement, Fact ) 
1st Spectrum = Narrative Phrases with statistic (Number, 
Value, Figure, Indicator, Measurement, Fact)  
Or 
2nd Spectrum = Narrative Phrases and Graphic with statistic 
(Number, Value, Figure, Indicator, Measurement, Fact)  
Or 
3rd Spectrum = Graphic with statistic (Which held 
information- Number, Value, Figure, Indicator, Measurement, 
Fact) 
Figure 5.6: 3 Level Scoring Procedure 
.
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In assuring the procedure of the analysis, the annual report in this research is consistent and reliable. 
The table in the last page was created as a guideline to identify the criteria for Level 1, Level 2, and 
Level 3 of information extracted from the annual report. The counting process is done by the 
researcher and, for reliability and accuracy purposes, the score was checked by another research 
assistant with a minimum qualification of a degree in accounting and who had previously worked in 
an audit firm to ensure that the counting of the score was accurate. The score was then transferred 
on to another A4 size paper to be counted and double-checked by the checker. The result is then again 
checked by the researcher. In order to best describe the process of the 3 levels of content analysis, 
several examples were extracted from the annual report to visualise it and make it easy to understand 
(see appendix 12). 
5.3.7. Quantitative Research Method 
In this section, the explanation of the estimation model which complements the content analysis 
method will be explained further and the findings will be visualised in chapter seven. 
5.3.7.1. Regulatory Quality 
 
An environment where regulatory quality is low or is given less attention will indirectly promote a 
society with socially irresponsible characteristics, and this normally happens in developing countries 
(Azmat and Coghill, 2005). In addition, because of the low regulatory quality in developing countries, 
these countries are normally the target of unethical multinational companies which exploit them. This 
is what is known as the Pollution Heaven Hypothesis (PHH), as advocated by Dam and Scholtens (2008). 
Therefore, regulatory quality is an important factor to be considered in investigating the social 
reporting issue, for instance in social, environmental and ethical subjects. 
Normally, a low regulatory quality is associated with a low level of social responsibility activity by firms. 
Furthermore, narrowing the scope to the banking industry, Djalilov and Holscher (2017) findings are 
also consistent with the norms, that is to say an increase in the level of regulatory quality suggests 
that the banks may likely be engaged in social, moral, responsible and ethical activities. Regulatory 
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quality in a country also serves as an indicator of whether the bank or any organisation operating in 
the country is well governed or vice versa. 
In this thesis, both of the countries under the study are developing countries. However, there are 
distinctive characteristics between these countries that may suggest different results and opinions. 
Even though Islamic banks are grounded in the basis of divine rule and are supposed to promote the 
values of justice and morality regardless of the socio-environment, the differences in regulatory 
quality, democracy level, and government effectiveness of the two countries might affect an Islamic 
bank’s social disclosure quality. This is because the regulatory value of a country will closely follow the 
culture and social norms embedded by the authority and the regulator’s orientation in terms of either 
regulation and/or religion. In the next sub-section, the religiosity value will be further explained. 
5.3.7.2. Religiosity 
Prior literature has extensively discussed the impact of religion on economic objectives and outcomes. 
For instance, Hilary and Hui (2009) studied the influences of corporate decisions related to investment. 
Furthermore, particularly in the area of accounting, religiosity has been study with regards to the area 
of financial reporting, for instance in Dyreng et al. (2012) which focused on religious social norms’ 
impact on financial reporting and the emphasis of McGuire et al. (2012b) on the religious impact of 
irregularity in financial reporting. Despite the extensive literature in the area, less has been 
understood on the extent of religiosity’s relationship towards social disclosure, given that the 
relationship between religiosity and ethical behaviour remain abstract (Walker et al., 2012). 
However, there are several studies regarding corporate social responsibility’s relationship with 
religion. For instance, Chatjuthamard-Kitsabunnarat et al. (2014) discussed the effect of religious piety 
on social responsibility while Brammer et al. (2007) explored the relationship between religious 
attributes and individual attitudes towards social responsibility. However, less studies have been done 
connecting religion and social reporting in the banking area. Since the banking sector is the 
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intermediary and source of funds to other companies, it is seen as an important figure in the economy 
(Cowton (2002) and can be the moderator and advocator for social and environmental causes.  
Furthermore, religiosity and social responsibility are a rare topic, specifically in the area of social 
reporting specific to Islamic banks in regards to disclosure. Therefore, this study intends to explore 
the relationship of religiosity with the disclosure quality of an Islamic bank. Indeed, if individuals with 
different levels of religious orientation react differently towards corporate social responsibility, as 
argued by Brammer et al. (2007), this thesis argues that it is possible that Islamic banks with religious 
flags and orientations would react differently in their socially responsible acts, environmental effort, 
and moral and ethical values. 
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5.3.7.3. Hypotheses development 
 
Dyreng et al. (2012) argues that religiosity can lessen the likelihood of financial statement 
misinterpretation. Certainly, this can be linked to the fact that Islamic banks with higher religious value 
might have a manager that is particularly sensitive (moral-ethical) in preparing the annual report 
content, thus providing a useful and quality disclosure. The latter statement is supported by Adhikari 
(2014) who states that as religiosity affects ethical decisions within the corporate environment, Islamic 
banks have the potential to act ethically based on their religious flag and portray the value into the 
annual report disclosure. 
Since the prior literature provided consistent insight into how religiosity is proven to provide a positive 
impact towards economic objectives and ‘moral-ethical’ practices by the companies and individuals, 
this thesis therefore advocates and predicts that Islamic banks that operate in more religious 
environments will provide a better quality of disclosure in the annual report. This is consistent with 
the argument by Chircop et al. (2017) that religiosity is based on the geographical area or that the 
country level heavily influences the bank’s behaviour and that behaviour can include social and 
environmental effort. Furthermore, the bank management’s behaviour and decision on disclosure 
may be influenced by the religious setting of a country. Therefore, hypothesis one is constructed as 
follows: - 
H1: Islamic Banks located in a more religious environment are likely to have higher 
social disclosure quality 
This study further estimates whether the regulatory quality in a country can significantly influence 
social reporting quality. As suggested by prior literature, regulatory quality may influence the socially 
responsible activity of a company, but normally this happens mainly in developed countries with heavy 
rules and regulation on social issues, for instance in the United Kingdom and Sweden. In order to be 
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socially responsible, commercial entities need to be established in a strong and stable regulatory 
framework (Azmat and Samaratunge, 2009).  
Furthermore, regulatory quality will include robust standards and good enforcement from the 
government and regulator which monitors and supervises the banking industry. This normally 
promotes the engagement of social activities between the banks and society (Djalilov and Holscher, 
2017). 
However, since this thesis focuses on developing countries, there is a huge possibility that the 
regulatory quality in the developing countries will have a lack of enforcement and poorer monitoring 
schemes by the government. Therefore, this opens up the possibility of uncertainty of whether the 
regulatory quality in developing countries may promote better disclosure quality or not. Since, in 
general, regulatory quality promotes engagement of socially responsible activities by banks, this thesis 
thus argues that regulatory quality affects Islamic banks’ disclosure quality as per H2 below:- 
H2: Islamic Banks operating in a quality regulatory environment are likely to have higher 
disclosure quality 
In the next sub-section, the estimation model will be explained. 
5.3.7.4. Estimation Model 
 
                         
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 Where: 
Disclosure Quality = Quality Disclosure Score (3 Level Disclosure Score) 
Regulatory Quality = Regulatory Quality Score (World Governance Indicator) 
Religiosity = Importance of Religion Score (World Value Survey) 
Controls = Listed, Bank Age, BOD Size, SB Size, NED (Composition), Size (Ln Total Asset), Profitability 
(Ln Net Income), ROA (Return on Asset), GDP (Growth Rate) 
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Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the SEGE quality index which incorporates items which are mainly from 
Belal et al. (2014), Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) and Maali et al. (2006). Moreover, it also incorporates 
international standards like the Global Reporting Initiative, Equator Principle, CSEAR, OECD, AAOIFI 
and IFSB. The score is calculated as per the formula below which has also been explained before in 
the quality content analysis section:- 
 
 
 
 
Interest variable 
Regulatory quality is derived from a reputable world governance indicator for the period of the study 
(2010-2014). Despite criticisms of the world governance indicator such as with the construct’s validity, 
as criticised by Thomas (2010), the world governance indicator nevertheless remains one of the most 
important indicators used by policy makers and institutions in matters ranging from benchmarking to 
disbursing budgets (Kaufmann et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, religiosity scores are gathered from world value surveys. The survey covers an 
international analysis on thousands of respondents throughout the world, mainly from 99 countries 
worldwide (Kanagaretnam et al., 2015). Since religiosity does not change in a short period, the world 
value survey obtains information from respondents every five years. The religiosity data gathered and 
used in this thesis is from wave six (2010-2014), which is exactly the period of study of the thesis. 
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Main Control 
A set of control variables were identified following previous literature in Islamic banking and 
conventional literature on social responsibility and environmental study, for instance in  Mallin et al. 
(2014), Chiu and Wang (2015) and Huang and Kung (2010). In detail, the control variables are as 
follows: (1) Listed is a binary dummy variable on which 1 is for listed and 0 is for non-listed banks. This 
thesis also uses other control variables such as Bank Age (2) and the natural logarithm of total assets 
as a proxy for bank size (3). It is argued that bank age and size has an impact on corporate social 
responsibility (Mallin et al., 2014). Huge banks visible through the public eye are likely to display and 
supervise their activities towards a broader society and stakeholders (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, the thesis also controls for Board size (4) and the proportion of non-executive directors 
(5). It is argued that non-executive directors heighten the credibility and calibre of a company and help 
to retain legitimacy, as argued by Johnson and Greening (1999). Moreover, the greater number of 
board size has been linked with more committee’s being set-up in the organisation, for instance ethics 
and social responsibility committees, as means to link itself to the external environment (Pfeffer, 
1973).  
In addition, the study controlled for shariah supervisory board size (6). This is because the size of a 
Shariah supervisory board may play a positive role in social responsibility as advocated by Farook et 
al. (2011). Moreover, Shariah supervisory boards play an important role in gaining stakeholder 
confidence and legitimacy for Islamic banks (Mallin et al., 2014). Furthermore, this thesis controls for 
macro-economic factors by using GDP growth (7) as this might indirectly influence the bank’s social 
performance.  
The last group of control variables relate to profitability, namely Return on Asset (8) and Net Income 
(9). It is argued that in an unstable economic condition, organisations tend to pay less attention to 
social responsibility spending compared to economic value activity, and a good level of financial 
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performance has an influence on board of director consideration for the expenditure towards social 
causes (Mallin et al., 2014, Roberts, 1992). 
The statistical package STATA 14 is used to perform the statistical estimation on the hypotheses 
developed and discussed in the previous section. The data is organised in panel form as it constitutes 
multiple periods, which are years (5 years of annual reports), and 34 banks, which constitute 170 
identifications in the panel data. Panel data is better at measuring and identifying effects that pure 
cross-section and time-series data cannot capture. 
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 Data Collection and Significance of the Sample 
 
5.4.1. Significance of the Time Frame and the Coverage 
 
In the current literature for Islamic bank social disclosure and corporate social responsibility, there are 
numerous sampling designs with different periods, different numbers of banks, and different 
geographical locations. The samples vary between the total number of banks and their periods of 
study. The distribution ranges between one (1) bank with a long-period of time of 28 years, as 
employed by Belal et al. (2014), to ninety (90) banks with a two year time frame in Mallin et al. (2014).  
A majority of the research for Islamic bank social reporting falls in between the two time-frames, for 
instance in Rahman Belal (2001), Farook et al. (2011) and Ali Aribi and Arun (2015). This research will 
try to capture the data that falls between the years 2010 and 2014 given a five year observation of 
annual reports of 34 Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. In addition, this time frame is chosen to 
determine the disclosure commitment of Islamic banks in the two countries which are populated by 
the most Islamic banks, namely Malaysia and Bahrain.  
Moreover, these countries, Malaysia and Bahrain have been chosen as the sample as they are well-
known to be the home of two distinctive models of Islamic banks in the world, which are the Malaysian 
model and the Middle Eastern Model, as advocated by Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous (2013). Furthermore, 
looking at the statistics, Malaysia is the most populated with Islamic banks followed by Bahrain as the 
second most populated by Islamic banks. 
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Below are some of the prominent papers in the area of Islamic bank social reporting that utilise 
indexes and checklists in their research compared with the thesis. The purpose of the table below is 
to highlight the time-frame and geographical trend of the studies. 
 
Table 5.3:Geographical and Size Sample in the Literature 
The significance of the year 2010 as a preliminary starting year is because it is considered a stable year 
where the National Bureau of Economic Research declared that the economic recession ended in June 
2009 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). This makes 2010 a steady starting point to start 
the study as the years were stable up to 2014. The years 2010 to 2014 were the years that the world 
economy started to positively build-up from the 2006-2007 economic crash.  
Moreover, it is the “through” period for the economic recession for five years with the latest year in 
which annual reports are available. It is expected that the stability of the economic condition in 
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between 2010-2014 will give a reasonable stability to the results of the research. During the year 2010 
to 2014, there were several significant events in the area of the Islamic banking industry. First, in 2009, 
the IFSB introduced guiding principles for shariah governance which took effect from 2010 onwards. 
Second, the central bank of Malaysia produced a shariah governance standard in 2010 which took 
effect from 2011 onwards. Third, AAOIFI updated the standard in 2010 which took effect from 2011 
onwards. And fifth, the government of Malaysia passed the Islamic financial services act 2013 which 
took effect immediately. All of these events provide a progressive avenue to evaluate the Islamic banks’ 
disclosure movements, as it is a period of five years with numerous events occurring in the regulatory 
area of the industry. 
Moreover, these two regions have been the hub for Islamic finance standard setting bodies and many 
supportive organisations. For instance, there are the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Islamic International Rating Agencies (IIRA) and International Islamic 
Financial Market (IIFM) in Bahrain. In Malaysia, there are the Islamic Finance Services Board (IFSB), 
International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) and Islamic banking and finance 
Institute Malaysia (IBFIM). All these standard setting and research bodies help the Islamic banks to 
operate in a certain structured and procedural manner compared to other countries. Thus, this makes 
these two countries the ideal countries to study, examine and investigate the Islamic banking research 
area. Having these two countries as a study sample will help to address the research objective and 
answer the research question. 
Above all, the distinct characteristics of the sample countries and time frame of the 18 banks in 
Malaysia and 16 banks in Bahrain will help to compare the (SEGE) disclosure between these two 
models of Islamic banks. We can ask how these models differ and affect (SEGE) disclosure. Moreover, 
are there any differences in disclosure quality and ordinary disclosure between the two prominent 
countries which are Islamic banking hubs? In addition, the differences between the two countries may 
suggest the impact of religiosity levels and regulatory quality on both countries.  
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Moving further, the next subsection “5.4.2. The Annual Report” will explain on the annual report 
extraction plan and process. 
5.4.2. The Annual Report 
 
The Annual report, as mentioned by Gray et al. (1995a), is an important official document that is 
published regularly. The annual report has been widely used by researchers to analyse the social 
reporting of Islamic banks (Mallin et al., 2014, Belal et al., 2014, Kamla and Rammal, 2013, Amalina 
Wan Abdullah et al., 2013, Ahmed Haji and Anum Mohd Ghazali, 2013, Farook et al., 2011, Kamla and 
Roberts, 2010, Aribi and Gao, 2010, Othman, 2009, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007, Maali et al., 2006, 
Rahman Belal, 2001, Baydoun and Willett, 2000).  
The data is gathered by reviewing the information in the bank scope and banker’s database to get the 
best possible facts and information of all Islamic banks in the world. This process helps in screening 
and making sure that no Islamic bank is left behind. The information was gathered for 160 Islamic 
banks across the world and then Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain were selected. This left 18 
Islamic banks in Malaysia and 16 in Bahrain with a total of 34 Islamic banks in both countries. The 
identified banks’ annual reports were later gathered through the individual official bank’s website for 
a period of five years from 2010 to 2014. 
The annual report is seen as a consistent and regular medium of communication between banks and 
its stakeholders (Belal et al., 2014). Therefore, organisations provide information, value and opinions 
in the annual report. Thus, by communicating certain themes of information in the annual report, they 
provide a signal to stakeholders. Whether or not the stakeholders successfully receive the signal, the 
banks have embedded the information in their official documentation, no matter whether it is 
relevant or not to stakeholders. Moreover, this also helps to construct a public image for the 
organisation (Gray et al., 1995b). In this thesis, it is perceived that Islamic banks theoretically would 
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utilise annual reports as a means to provide a positive public image in certain themes that the bank is 
concerned with and show commitment towards stakeholder affairs. 
Furthermore, despite Mallin et al. (2014) arguing that the annual report is not complete and does not 
provide a true picture of corporate social responsibility disclosure, Ali Aribi and Arun (2015) argue that 
a substantial strand of literature utilises annual reports as the main source of data to evaluate 
companies’ attitudes concerning social reporting. This study utilises the annual report as a major 
source of analysis as the annual report is one of a bank’s official mediums of communication for its 
stakeholders, and such a medium is tangible and kept safe for a longer time in a hard copy and soft 
copy. Moreover, Smith (2003) argues that the annual reports use of channelling communication to 
stakeholders is consistent with the principles of stakeholder theory. 
As compared to other electronic media as favoured by Mallin et al. (2014), alongside the bank’s 
website, such media are much more perishable and the content cannot be guaranteed to be available 
for a long period of time due to the nature of the content of websites as frequently changing. 
Accordingly, even though there are several disclosure media available apart from annual reports, such 
as websites and corporate social media, Unerman (2000) argues that a researcher must put a limit on 
the range of media available for examination in order to ensure the completeness and consistency of 
the data under investigation. 
Furthermore, website contents tend to change over time. Therefore, static information in the annual 
report is much more reliable and preferred. In this research, it is strongly argued that the main source 
of data used to evaluate Islamic bank social reporting should be the annual report based on the above 
arguments and foundations. In addition, monitoring one communication source such as the annual 
report provides more consistency if compared to multiple disclosure media (Gray et al., 1995a). 
Moreover, Toms (2002) argues that the annual report is utilised as a quality-signalling device by the 
company, and Islamic banks, as business entities, would normally provide thorough information 
through this medium as compared to other perishable mediums. 
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Moving further, based on the annual report data gathered, below are the statistics for Malaysia and 
Bahrain: - 
 
 
This study will evaluate a total of 170 annual reports from both countries. The 90 annual reports from 
Malaysia represent the Malaysian model and 80 annual reports from Bahrain represent the  Bahraini 
model. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
This chapter articulates the methodological foundation of this thesis based on the research objectives 
of this study. In order to fulfil the research objectives, this chapter explains the philosophical 
assumption of the thesis and further explains the systematic process of the method employed by the 
study. 
Furthermore, for methodology, there are three lacunae to be filled and extended within the Islamic 
banks’ social reporting literature. These are: firstly, the enhancement of the 3 levels content analysis 
which provides a better understanding on Islamic banks’ commitment towards disclosure based on 
the work of Botosan (1997) and Beck et al. (2010). Moreover, this method will will also distinguish the 
banks that genuinely perform disclosure for stakeholders or are just legitimising themselves. Secondly, 
analysing and creating a separate result for the disclosure with respect to graphics rather than 
combining it with the result for disclosure with respect to words and phrases. Thirdly, using a double-
content analysis, which is the 3-Level and the checklist and then comparing their results to ensure the 
rigorousness of the method in the content analysis to provide a higher quality result.  
# Country Total banks Model of ISB Total Annual report 
1 Malaysia 18 Malaysian 90 
2 Bahrain 16 Bahraini 80 
+ Total 34 Malaysian-Bahraini 170 
Year 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 
Table 5.4: Countries’ Annual Report Statistic Figures 
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In addition, the selection and combination of checklists in the index created by Maali et al. (2006), 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), Belal et al. (2014) and other international standards, for instance the 
Global reporting initiative, Equator Principle, OECD, AAOIFI, and IFSB in this thesis aim to strengthen 
the SEGE disclosure checklist and framework. 
In conclusion, this chapter provides an avenue and link between the theoretical perspectives and the 
empirical method for this thesis. The methodological sequence and the result will be portrayed and 
visualised in the following chapters. Chapter 6 will provide the result for the method discussed on 
ordinary and quality SEGE disclosure and chapter 7 will deliver the result based on the quantitative 
method of estimation.   
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Chapter 6 
 
(Ordinary & Quality [SEGE] Disclosure) 
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CHAPTER 6 ORDINARY & QUALITY (SEGE) DISCLOSURE 
 
 Introduction 
 
This chapter constitutes the main part of the thesis findings which aim to differentiate and compare 
between ordinary and quality disclosure. In this chapter, the data extracted from the annual report 
using the “ordinary” and “3 level” method will be presented, commented on, and discussed from the 
tables and graphs provided. Most studies in Islamic banking disclosure specifically and disclosure 
studies generally place less consideration on the importance of differentiating the degree of disclosure 
quality. Rather, they have combined the disclosure regardless of their impact, usefulness and quality. 
Therefore, in this chapter, the ordinary and quality disclosure will be clearly separated and compared 
to each other to be able to appreciate the findings. 
In detail, this chapter consists of three main sections. The first section “6.2 Disclosure Overview” 
presents the attractive segmental-map, an overview of disclosure composition by seven dimensions 
and twenty themes. Secondly, section “6.3. Broad-Spectrum of Ordinary & Quality Findings” will 
extensively present the findings in significant yet easy to view tables, graphs and matrices, including 
the comparison of ordinary and quality disclosure. Lastly, section “6.4. Countries Range Comparison” 
will illustrate the findings from country segregation comparisons to promote an understanding and 
appreciate the differences between Malaysia and Bahrain. 
In summary, this chapter provides an insight into the findings, which are linked explicitly in one way 
or another with the role of legitimacy and stakeholder theories, which have been discussed in 
“CHAPTER 4 Theoretical Foundation and Disclosure Framework”. 
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 Disclosure Overview  
6.2.3. Disclosure Distribution 7 Dimensions 
 
 
Figure 6.1 : 7 Dimensions Segmental-Map 
The above segmental-map in figure 6.1 serves as an introduction on the disclosure coverage of the 
Islamic banks involved. The distribution of the disclosure is led by the “governance” dimension while 
the “environment dimension” is on the smallest coverage of the total portion of the disclosure 
segment. The segmental map is the result of both Malaysia and Bahrain Islamic banks average 
disclosure for each dimension. The result consists of 170 Islamic banks’ data for 5 years from 2010 to 
2014. 
What stands out in this segmental-map is the dominance of the “governance, shariah governance and 
shariah” dimension as the top three whereas “environment, ethics and social internal” dimension are 
the lowest three dimension in (SEGE) disclosure. The top three dimensions are the dimensions that 
relate to rules, guidelines, regulations and parameters, which are closely linked with legitimacy theory 
and the survival of an Islamic bank. In contrast, the lowest three dimensions were the dimensions 
GV = Governance SG = Shariah Governance SH = Shariah SE = Social External SI = Social Internal ET = Ethics EN = Environment  
SEGE = (Shariah, Social, Environment, Ethic, Governance) 
 
57% 16% 
18% 
25% 44% 2% 
6% 
115 
 
related to the social, moral and ecological aspect that is connected with stakeholder theory and the 
ethical perspective of Islamic banks. In the next sub-section, wider themes of disclosure coverage will 
be discussed. 
 
6.2.4. Disclosure Distribution via 20 Themes 
 
Figure 6.2: 20 Themes Segmental-Map 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the wider themes within the seven dimensions explained by “Figure 6.1: 7 
Dimensions Segmental-Map” from the last page. Compared to the dimension segmental-map in the 
last page, the thematic segmental-map displays a deeper categorisation of themes in a more extensive 
view, complementing the seven-dimension mapping. The information in the figure above is gathered 
from a combination of Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic banks’ average disclosure for each theme from 
2010 to 2014. 
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What is interesting about the data in this segmental-map is that it shows more detailed themes under 
the dimensions. For example, in the last page, the biggest segment of disclosure was the “governance” 
dimension while the above figure shows that the largest themes’ segment is the “board of director” 
theme. In this manner, it informs that under the “governance” dimension, the “board of director” 
theme is the leading disclosure compared to any other themes. 
The themes identified in the segmental-map signal a very important information and trend. In general, 
it still shows that Islamic banks involved in this study concentrate more on themes that are related 
closely to governance and shariah information. These are the top three themes, namely the “board of 
director”, “shariah supervisory board”, and “guiding principle of governance” themes. In contrast, the 
disclosure themes that a wider stakeholder would be interested in, like the “nature, wild life and 
recycle” themes are the lowest three themes of all. 
Based on the above information, the findings in which the “board of director” themes disclosure is 
dominant is consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) where the board of directors’ information is a 
common disclosure throughout the period of their study. Furthermore, the environment dimension 
has been left out as the lowest component of disclosure, which is consistent with Rizk (2014) findings 
and discussion where environmental themes are less covered by Islamic financial institutions.  
Moreover, in general banking literature, where issues of environment and sustainability are rigorously 
discussed, research has found that the environment is a less important factor to the banks. For 
instance, Cowton and Thompson (2000) advocate that banks should consider environmental factors 
in their lending processes while Campbell and Slack (2011) found that the environment is not a crucial 
factor for the banks’ loan filtration. In broader business ethics literature, many studies in environment 
and sustainability beyond the banking sector have discussed environmental and sustainability issues 
(Thorne et al., 2017, Roberts and Wallace, 2015, Higgins et al., 2015, Gray, 2006, Patten, 2002, 
O’Donovan, 2002, Gray et al., 2001 ). However, attention that is purer is needed on the issues of 
environmentalism, sustainability and social responsibility by corporations.  
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Having understood the broad pattern of disclosure in this study, the next section is designed to give a 
much more detailed result of the study with the ordinary and quality identification of disclosure. 
 Broad-Spectrum Findings 
6.3.1.  Ordinary Score versus Quality Score of Islamic banks Disclosure 
Performance 
 Comparison_Between_Ordinary & Quality SEGE 
N=34 Banks ORDINARY Disclosure Score QUALITY Disclosure Score 
Year Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 22.6% 8.4% 11% 55% 37% 11.9% 18.3% 68.3% 
2011 24.3% 8.8% 11% 54% 37.8% 14% 15% 81.7% 
2012 25.1% 9.9% 13% 61% 38% 15.7% 15% 93.3% 
2013 26.1% 9.8% 8% 57% 40.3% 13.1% 20% 78.3% 
2014 26.7% 10.4% 8% 54% 41.8% 13.6% 18.3% 73.3% 
5yrs Avg. 24.9% 9.5% 8 % 61% 39% 13.7% 15% 93.3% 
Table 6.1 : Quality vs Level 
Referring to table 6.1 above, it is apparent that both the ordinary and quality disclosure group have 
an increasing trend. While the disclosure is small overall in each year, it must be considered that 
Islamic banking is only 42 years old as an industry as of 2017 compared to the hundreds of years the 
conventional banking system has been established. Thus, the score is reasonable. The small increment 
every year is a positive indicator that this encouraging trend can ideally be maintained despite the ups 
and downs of the Islamic banking industry.  
The score as a whole does not seem to have any contradictions between ordinary and quality 
disclosure as both are positive increments. Equally important, this piece of information informs of the 
general environment of Islamic bank disclosure activities in both countries (Malaysia and Bahrain). 
However, the results will be different when the countries are separated in section “6.4. Countries 
Range Comparison”. The reason that this thesis starts the explanation by referring to the whole rather 
than comparing the countries directly is to give an overview of the bigger picture of Islamic banking 
disclosure in general. This is because, by rank, Malaysia and secondly Bahrain have the greatest 
number of Islamic banks and institutions that support and facilitate the Islamic banking industry 
operating within each country compared to any other country in the world.   
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Having considered the increasing trend of disclosure on both the ordinary and quality side of 
disclosure, these graphs show that, within the same period, the gross domestic product (GDP) also 
increases as a symbol of national competitiveness. The findings are consistent with the argument of 
Boulouta and Pitelis (2014) where they found that social responsibility is linked with national 
competitiveness such as GDP.  
Nevertheless, this thesis tries to inform that, within the study period, the world economy is positive 
in nature and so the ordinary and quality disclosure scores are increasing. The positive trend of GDP 
and disclosure as a whole is maybe linked to the “end of recession and recovery of world economic 
crisis (December 2007 until June 2009)”, as informed by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(2010). 
Furthermore, on top of the world economic recovery, the period of 2010 until 2014 was a period 
where new regulations were introduced, took effect and were updated within the Islamic banking 
industry, such as the IFSB Shariah Governance 2009, AAOIFI updated standard 2010, BNM Shariah 
Governance Framework 2011, and Islamic Financial Services Act 2013. All the above factors and events 
may influence the disclosure trend as a whole. The next sub-section will enlighten the findings on 
disclosure score and volume.  
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6.3.2. Comparison between Score and Volume of Disclosure 
 
6.3.2.5. Ordinary SEGE (Score Vs Volume)  
N=34 Banks ORDINARY DISCLOSURE SCORE ORDINARY DISCLOSURE VOLUME 
Year 
Avg. 
Score 
Std. Dev. Min Max Avg. Vol Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 22.6% 8.4% 11% 55% 48.9 33.1 15 209 
2011 24.3% 8.8% 11% 54% 52.1 32.6 21 202 
2012 25.1% 9.9% 13% 61% 53.3 41.9 15 268 
2013 26.1% 9.8% 8% 57% 54 28.1 17 151 
2014 26.7% 10.4% 8% 54% 57.3 30.5 12 147 
5yrs Avg. 24.9% 9.5% 8% 61% 53.1 33.3 12 268 
Table 6.2 : Ordinary (Score Vs Volume) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above table and chart clearly shows the increment of score and volume in disclosure. This verifies 
that disclosure score and volume are important observations in a research. Therefore, this thesis is 
designed to report volume findings as a complementary finding to score. 
In this sub-section, the comparison between disclosure score and volume is made to prove and 
advocate that volume is still relevant in social disclosure research. Although, in general, volume does 
not capture the proportions and magnitudes of disclosure, it can give useful information that score 
cannot. In Islamic banking social reporting literature, one of the earliest studies on disclosure in Islamic 
banks by Baydoun and Willett (2000) adopted volume of words as its method. In the next sub-section, 
the volume is segregated into more detail and more valuable findings.
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Figure 6.5: Relationship of Disclosure Score & Volume 
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6.3.2.6. Quality SEGE (Score Vs Volume) 
 
 QUALITY DISCLOSURE SCORE QUALITY DISCLOSURE VOLUME 
N=34 Banks Score Level_1 Disclosure Level _2_Disclosure Level _3_Disclosure 
Year 
Avg. 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Avg. 
Vol 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Avg. Vol Std. Dev. Min Max 
Avg. 
Vol 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
2010 37.% 11.9% 18.3% 68.3% 28.2 13.4 10 77 9.7 15.9 0 82 10.9 8.1 0 50 
2011 37.8% 14% 15% 81.7% 31.1 12.2 15 76 8.8 15.6 0 74 12.2 9.3 1 52 
2012 38% 15.6% 15% 93.3% 32.8 21.2 12 138 8.6 13.3 0 69 12.1 10.5 0 61 
2013 40.3% 13.1% 20% 78.3% 31.1 12.5 13 77 8.8 11.6 0 47 14.1 12.8 1 74 
2014 41.8% 13.6% 18.3% 73.3% 32.8 12.9 7 58 9.3 14.9 0 60 15.3 10 5 43 
5yrs Avg. 39% 13.7% 15% 93.3% 31.2 14.8 7 138 9.0 14.2 0 82 12.9 10.3 0 74 
Table 6.3: Quality (Score Vs Volume) 
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Focusing on the table in the previous page, as discussed previously, volume plays an important role in 
social reporting research that, with correct creativity, can produce a meaningful result for 
interpretation, especially in disclosure research. As shown in table 6.3, the quality score increases 
year-to-year while level one and level two varies between years. However, level three has a positive 
trend from 2010 to 2014 with a majority increment and minor decrease in 2012. Moreover, it is easily 
understood that Level one disclosure is better in number compared to level two and level three as 
disclosure goes down when strict conditions are applied.  
On the contrary, level two is lower than level three disclosure where, generally, level three (evidence-
based) disclosure will have been less disclosed. This is an important evidence that Islamic banks are 
either committed in providing evidence (Level Three) in disclosure or just provide narrative 
description (Level one) disclosure. In short, it may inform the thesis that it discloses well when they 
are doing something tangible or just use narratives without evidence when there is less to disclose.  In 
the next page, a graph will be used to comprehend the information in table 6.3 above. 
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The above chart is one of the valuable findings that shows the level and trend of quality disclosure as 
a whole and the segregation of the volume of disclosure by level one, two and three. Level one 
disclosure is normally associated with legitimacy theory and level three disclosure is associated with 
stakeholder theory. The banks that only legitimise themselves only disclose the information at level 
one while banks that care for stakeholders are normally motivated to disclose information at level 
two and three. 
One of the encouraging findings is that quality score increases yearly even though the increase is small. 
Furthermore, level three disclosure also has a positive trend with a majority of the year increasing in 
volume. This positive information might signal the intention and effort done by Islamic banks towards 
their stakeholders. Overall, the distribution of level one, two and three disclosures explicitly informs 
that Islamic banks distribute their disclosure through various strategies for legitimacy purposes and 
for stakeholders. 
Further findings will be illustrated in section “6.3.3. Top 10 Performer of Ordinary SEGE and Quality 
SEGE”. 
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Figure 6.6: 3 Level Quality Disclosure Movement 
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6.3.3. Top 10 Performer of Ordinary SEGE and Quality SEGE 
 
Top 10_Performers in ORDINARY & QUALITY SEGE 
Ranked 
ORDINARY Score QUALITY Score 
Bank Ctry Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max Bank Ctry Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 BIMB MY 56.2% 2.9% 54% 61% BIMB MY 78.3% 10.1% 68.3% 93.3% 
2 B-RAKYAT MY 41.4% 8.1% 34% 52% B-RAKYAT MY 65% 3.3% 60% 68.3% 
3 BMMB MY 38.8% 2.3% 36% 41% BMMB MY 63.3% 7.4% 55% 73.3% 
4 IHIB-BH BH 37.2% 3.6% 34% 42% HLIB MY 58.7% 5.8% 51.7% 66.7% 
5 AFFIN ISLAMIC MY 34.2% 3.8% 30% 40% AFFIN ISLAMIC MY 57.7% 4.7% 50% 61.7% 
6 HLIB MY 34% 8.9% 25% 45% BIB-BH BH 50.7% 6.2% 41.7% 58.3% 
7 BIB-BH BH 30% 4.1% 23% 33% IHIB-BH BH 49.3% 7.3% 40% 56.7% 
8 ABCIB-BH BH 28.8% 3.3% 23% 31% PUBLIC-i MY 43.3% 3.5% 38.3% 48.3% 
9 BAB-BH BH 28.4% 3.4% 23% 32% ASBB-BH BH 43% 3.8% 36.7% 46.7% 
10 VCB-BH BH 27.8% 1.1% 26% 29% ABIB-BH BH 41% 9.6% 28.3% 53.3% 
Table 6.4: Top 10 Performing Banks Movement 
 
 
Bank’s Name : BIMB = Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad , B-RAKYAT = Bank Rakyat , BMMB = Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad , AFFIN ISLAMIC = Affin Islamic Bank , HLIB = Hong Leong Islamic Bank , PUBLIC-I = Public Islamic Bank. IHIB = 
Ihtimaar Islamic Bank , BIB-BH = Bahrain Islamic Bank  , ABCIB = ABC Islamic Bank BAB-BH = Bank Al-Khair Bahrain , VCB-BH = Venture Capital Bank Bahrain , ASBB-BH = Al-Salam Bank  , ABIB-BH =Al-Baraka Islamic Bank. 
Avg.Score = Average Score, Std.Dev. = Standard Deviation, Min = Minimum , Max = Maximum  
SEGE Score : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
Green Colour = Bank That Climbed-up Into Better Rank In terms Of Quality Disclosure Compared To Ordinary Disclosure 
Red Colour = Bank That Falls-Down Into Lower Rank In terms of Quality Disclosure Compared to Ordinary Disclosure 
Yellow Colour = 1- Bank That Out Of Rank When Goes To Quality Disclosure OR 2- Bank That Is Not In The Top 10 Rank Of Ordinary Disclosure But Ranked In Top 10 Quality Disclosure 
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In “Table 6.4: Top 10 Performing Banks Movement” from the previous page, the information reveals 
an interesting finding as it illustrates individual banks ranked by Ordinary and Quality disclosure. The 
table ranked the top ten banks according to Ordinary disclosure and Quality disclosure in order to 
compare the performance and differentiate the banks’ movement between ordinary and quality 
disclosure. 
 Perhaps, the most striking finding in table 6.4 is for the top three banks. The top three banks’ 
performance in ordinary disclosure maintained the same ranking in quality disclosure. However, there 
are banks that have dropped in rank when it came to quality disclosure (These banks are highlighted 
in Red). Furthermore, there are banks that climb the rankings, that is to say they are lower ranked in 
ordinary disclosure and higher ranked in quality disclosure (These banks are highlighted in Green). 
Moreover, there are banks that are ranked in ordinary disclosure but disappear totally in quality 
disclosure, and there are banks not ranked in an ordinary disclosure but ranked in quality disclosure 
(All these banks are highlighted in Yellow). 
This finding is an intriguing discovery as we can watch the movement of banks’ “commitment” 
towards disclosure. It is possible that from this result, we can assume that there are three types of 
banks in disclosure. Firstly, banks (type-1) that maintain a balance in narrative and evidence in their 
disclosure (a balance between maintaining legitimacy and commitment towards stakeholders). 
Secondly, banks (type-2) that emphasise on narrative rather than evidence in their disclosure 
(concentrate on legitimacy). Thirdly, banks (type-3) that focus more on evidence in their disclosure 
(concentrate on stakeholder). 
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From the last page’s categorisation, it will be useful to refer to the SEGE disclosure framework is 
explained in Figure 4.3: SEGE Disclosure Framework in Chapter 4. Even though banks that concentrate 
on evidence appear to be stakeholder-oriented, based on the findings, however, banks that balance 
both elements of legitimacy and stakeholder provide a higher degree of evidence in ordinary and 
quality disclosure (see table 6.4). The banks highlighted in red score higher in ordinary and quality 
disclosure compared to banks highlighted in green. There are several factor that may lead to this, such 
as the seniority of the banks and the type of the shareholder of the banks. The top three banks have 
a strong link with the government and have strong and big shareholders that are also linked with the 
government. For example, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) is the first Islamic bank in Malaysia that 
has the luxury of “pioneering the way”.  
This bank became the pioneer and the first hope for a majority of Muslims in Malaysia for an 
alternative means of banking in 1983. The bank also had a social contract with society, and this social 
contract, during the 2010-2014 period, was at a satisfying level if compared to other Islamic banks in 
Malaysia. However, there are several dimensions and themes that need to be better addressed in 
their disclosure. 
Next is a comparison of Bahrain’s first Islamic bank, Bahrain Islamic Bank (BIB) established in 1979. 
Even though the establishment year is earlier than Malaysia’s first Islamic bank, the ordinary and 
quality disclosure score is far behind Malaysia’s first Islamic bank. This is a rather useful finding and 
suggests that age plays an important role in disclosure information as a whole, but it depends on other 
factors when it comes to each countries’ differences. A deeper discussion on the differences in 
Malaysia and Bahraini Islamic banks will be discussed in section “6.4. Countries Range Comparison” 
and “Chapter 8 Thesis Discussion & Conclusion”. Having understood the “three types of banks” and 
having witnessed the “ranked movement” in Islamic bank disclosure between ordinary and quality 
disclosure, it is useful to refer to the “commitment quadrant” in the next page. 
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6.3.4. Commitment Quadrant 
Bank commitment towards ordinary and quality disclosure can be easily identified in the 
“commitment quadrant” below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This finding has been programmed into a quadrant to display the Islamic banks’ disclosure 
commitment. This quadrant was made to differentiate and appreciate the disclosure commitment by 
Islamic banks. As seen in figure 6.7 above, if a line is drawn to represent the data of the banks, it will 
represent a positive line. However, a majority of the banks fall under Quadrant-4, being lower in 
ordinary and quality score.  
Moreover, there are three banks that are in Quadrant-2 and four banks in Quadrant-1. Interestingly, 
there are no banks in Quadrant-3 which also means no banks perform high in ordinary disclosure and 
lower in quality disclosure. Furthermore, the above quadrant shows that Islamic banks either perform 
well in both quality and ordinary disclosure or did not perform well in both disclosures. Only about 
20.5 percent of Islamic banks achieve satisfactory levels of quality disclosure and this is 11.76 percent 
in ordinary disclosure. 
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The majority of Islamic banks in Quadrant-1 share the same characteristics such as having trusted 
names in the Islamic banking industry, seniority, and government-linked shareholders. All of these 
factors may influence the commitment and standard put by the bank’s annual report preparer towards 
the information published in the annual report, and this has led to a balance between quality and 
ordinary disclosure.  
The establishment of Islamic banks in a country depends on the belief in the importance of religion in 
every aspect of life. The establishment of the first Islamic bank both in Malaysia and in Bahrain was 
based on the belief by society that banking in accordance with their religion was an important aspect 
of the whole religion. Since banking according to religion was perceived to be an important value by 
society, it created a legitimacy pressure by the society towards Islamic banks. As the pioneer and 
senior Islamic bank in each country, the banks in Quadrant-1 and Quadrant-2 appear to provide more 
quality disclosure compared to others. In addition, the majority of them, 57.14 percent of Islamic 
banks, balance between quality and ordinary disclosure and only 42.85 percent concentrate on quality 
disclosure.  
In this study, banks in Quadrant-1 are presumed to balance the disclosure information for the 
stakeholders and are legitimate. Meanwhile, Quadrant-2 focuses on the stakeholders more than 
legitimacy. Moreover, Quadrant-4 is on the lower spectrum of the legitimacy focus. However, no 
banks fall in Quadrant-3, which has a high level of concentration on legitimacy. In summary, based on 
the four quadrants, Islamic banks fall in between Quadrant-1, Quadrant-2 and Quadrant-3. It is noticed 
that a highly established Islamic bank with important history and aesthetic value tend to be in 
Quadrant-1. 
In the next section “6.4. Countries Range Comparison”, the countries’ differences will be discussed in 
detail.  
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 Countries Range Comparison 
6.4.1. Differential Analysis for Malaysia and Bahrain  
 
6.4.1.1. Normality Investigation 
 
Previously, the thesis presented the descriptive findings of the disclosure as a whole. In order to 
observe the differences of the two countries’ disclosure and statistically differentiate the two 
countries, the data needs to be test by a differential statistical analysis. However, to do this, the first 
step is to check normality of the data in order to be able to apply the correct statistical tools such as, 
for instance, the parametric and non-parametric test. Figure 6.8 below show a histogram of the two 
main data (Ordinary and Quality Score) disclosure. It is one of the many first steps among many 
indicators to evaluate whether the data is normally distributed or not.  
 
Figure 6.8 : Histogram for Preliminary Normality Indicator 
Referring to figure 6.8 above, it seems that the data is not normally distributed as the tails are not 
balanced on both sides of the disclosure score (Ordinary and Quality). Therefore, this preliminary 
assumption will be further verified and tested with the Skewness-Kurtosis tests for Normality and 
Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data with the null hypothesis of the data being normal (Ho=0). 
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Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
    ------ joint ------ 
variable Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Adj 
chi2(2) 
Prob>chi2 Statistical 
Treatment 
Quality 170 0.0000 0.0044 27.29 0.0000 *1* 
Ordinary 170 0.0000 0.0004 34.37 0.0000 *1* 
Ordinary Score       
D1-shariah 170 0.0004 0.2085 12.07 0.0024 *1* 
D2-shariahgovernance 170 0.0094 0.0013 14.22 0.0008 *1* 
D3-socialexternal 170 0.0000 0.0179 30.50 0.0000 *1* 
D4-socialinternal 170 0.0000 0.0000 51.28 0.0000 *1* 
D5-environment 170 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 *1* 
D6-ethics 170 0.0000 0.0748 18.80 0.0001 *1* 
D7-governance 170 0.1965 0.2651 2.95 0.2287 *2* 
Quality Score       
3Level Shariah 170 0.0026 0.3167 8.98 0.0112 *1* 
3Level shariahgovernance 170 0.6404 0.0007 10.16 0.0062 *1* 
3Level socialexternal 170 0.0010 0.0497 12.47 0.0020 *1* 
3Level socialinternal 170 0.1425 0.0000 16.05 0.0003 *1* 
3Level environment 170 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 *1* 
3Level ethics 170 0.0000 0.0000 48.15 0.0000 *1* 
3Level governance 170 0.2512 0.0000 24.12 0.0000 *1* 
 *1*Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney)  
*2*Two-sample t-test with equal variances 
 
  
Table 6.5: Skewness-Kurtosis Test for Normality 
 
Referring to table 6.5, all the joint prob>chi2 for the skewness-kortosis for ordinary and quality score 
is below 0.05, indicating that the data is not normal. Only one dimension (governance) in ordinary 
disclosure is above 0.005 with 0.2287 which indicates that the data is normal. Therefore, the data that 
is not normally distributed will use a non-parametric differential statistic tool [Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney)] in order to investigate the country differences in disclosure. 
Moreover, in order to confirm the above normality test, another test named the Shapiro-Wilk W Test 
for Normal Data is used to check the normality of the data. The objective of the test is the same, which 
is to ensure that the correct tools are employed for the differential statistic test. This is explain in the 
next page.  
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Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data  
    
variable Obs W V z Prob>z Statistical 
Treatment 
Quality Overall 170 0.92092 10.248 5.310 0.00000 *1* 
Ordinary Overall 170 0.91248 11.341 5.541 0.00000 *1* 
Ordinary Score       
D1-shariah 170 0.96598 4.408 3.385 0.00036 *1* 
D2-shariahgovernance 170 0.96074 5.088 3.712 0.00010 *1* 
D3-socialexternal 170 0.87673 15.973 6.323 0.00000 *1* 
D4-socialinternal 170 0.88575 14.804 6.149 0.00000 *1* 
D5-environment 170 0.78299 28.121 7.613 0.00000 *1* 
D6-ethics 170 0.93770 8.073 4.766 0.00000 *1* 
D7-governance 170 0.99005 1.289 0.580 0.28095 *2* 
Quality Score       
3Level Shariah 170 0.97582 3.133 2.606 0.00458 *1* 
3Level shariahgovernance 170 0.98251 2.266 1.867 0.03097 *1* 
3Level socialexternal 170 0.96925 3.984 3.154 0.00080 *1* 
3Level socialinternal 170 0.97156 3.685 2.976 0.00146 *1* 
3Level environment 170 0.79716 26.284 7.459 0.00000 *1* 
3Level ethics 170 0.88183 15.312 6.226 0.00000 *1* 
3Level governance 170 0.93809 8.022 4.751 0.00000 *1* 
 *1*Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney)  
*2*Two-sample t-test with equal variances 
  
   
Table 6.6 : Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data 
 
Referring to table 6.6, the Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data confirmed the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) where all the ordinary and quality score data was not normal except for the ordinary 
governance score. Therefore, all the non-normal data will be tested using a non-parametric test while 
only ordinary governance score data will use a parametric test. This is to enable the inference that the 
disclosure between the two countries are distinct to each other. Furthermore, it supports the 
descriptive statistic that is more subjective in nature, especially the 3 level disclosure. In the next 
section, the table summarising the test will be presented. 
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6.4.1.2. Significant Differences between Malaysia & Bahrain Ordinary and 
Quality Disclosure Dimensions 
 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) 
Dimensions Country Obs Rank Sum Expected Diff. 
Between 
Country 
Prob > |z| ORDINARY Disclosure     
SHARIAH 
MY 90 8206 7695 
No 0.1093 
BH 80 6329 6840 
SHARIAH GOVERNANCE 
MY 90 9024 7695 
Yes 0.0000 
BH 80 5511 6840 
SOCIAL EXTERNAL 
MY 90 6679 7695 
Yes 0.0013 
BH 80 7856 6840 
SOCIAL INTERNAL 
MY 90 8896.5 7695 
Yes 0.0001 
BH 80 5638.5 6840 
ENVIRONMENT 
MY 90 8200 7695 
Yes 0.0039 
BH 80 6335 6840 
ETHICS 
MY 90 5992.5 7695 
Yes 0.0000 
BH 80 8542.5 6840 
Two-sample t test with equal variances Mean Std.Err Std.Dev 95%C.I Ha: diff != 0 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
= 0.0084 
GOVERNANCE 
MY 90 .5386667 .0218331 .207127 .4952848  
BH 80 .6145 .0175058 .1565765 .5796556 
t = 2.6664; degree of freedom =168 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) 
Dimensions Country Obs Rank Sum Expected Diff. 
Between 
Country 
Prob > |z| 
QUALITY Disclosure     
3-LEVEL SHARIAH 
MY 90 9094 7695 
Yes 0.0000 
BH 80 5441 6840 
3-LEVEL SHARIAH 
GOVERNANCE 
MY 90 10426 7695 
Yes 0.0000 
BH 80 4109 6840 
3-LEVEL SOCIAL 
EXTERNAL 
MY 90 6838 7695 
Yes 0.0063 
BH 80 7697 6840 
3-LEVEL SOCIAL 
INTERNAL 
MY 90 8629.5 7695 
Yes 0.0021 
BH 80 5905.5 6840 
3-LEVEL ENVIRONMENT 
MY 90 8206.5 7695 
Yes 0.0035 
BH 80 6328.5 6840 
3-LEVEL ETHICS 
MY 90 6342 7695 
Yes 0.0000 
BH 80 8193 6840 
3-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
MY 90 6406 7695 
Yes 0.0000 
BH 80 8129 6840 
Table 6.7: Mann-Whitney & Two-Sample t-test 
Referring to table 6.7, all the prob>|z| are below 0.05 which reject the null hypothesis (Ho=that there 
are no differences) in respect of the two countries. Therefore, the disclosure dimensions from quality 
and ordinary disclosure show that the disclosures are distinct to each country, except for the Shariah 
dimension. This serves as evidence that the majority of the disclosure dimensions in each country are 
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different to each other. In the next section, the investigation will find high performance banks in both 
countries to evaluate whether there is a significant difference in disclosure by both countries. 
6.4.1.3. Ordinary Disclosure Differences between High Performance Banks 
 
Table 6.8 above provides evidence that there is a difference in disclosure by the performing banks in 
ordinary disclosure in both countries. This signals, in Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic banks, that 
performance in disclosure is distinct to each other. 
6.4.1.4. Quality Disclosure Differences between High Performance Banks 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test (Quality Disclosure- Malaysia & Bahrain) 
High Performance Disclosure obs rank sum expected 
Malaysia  48 1358.5 1780 
Bahrain 40 2557.5 2136 
combined 88 3916 3916 
    
unadjusted variance 14240.00  
adjustment for ties -126.65  
adjusted variance 14113.35  
Ho: threel~e(mybhhi~e==0) = threel~e(mybhhi~e==1) 
z =   -3.548    
Prob > |z| =    0.0004 There is a difference between the high performance bank in disclosure in 
the two countries 
Table 6.9: Differences in High Performance Disclosure Banks - Quality 
Table 6.9 provides statistical evidence that the quality disclosure by the performing banks in both 
countries are distinct in nature. This evidence will later support the findings in section 6.4.3 
country’s top 10 performing bank movement.   
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test (Ordinary Disclosure) 
High Performance Disclosure obs rank sum expected 
Malaysia 53 2017.5 2438 
Bahrain 38 2168.5 1748 
combined 91 4186 4186 
    
unadjusted variance 15440.67  
adjustment for ties -84.96  
adjusted variance 15355.70  
Ho: segesc~e(mybhse~e==BH) = segesc~e(mybhse~e==MY) 
z =   -0.621    
Prob > |z| =   0.0007 There is a difference between high performance bank in disclosure in 
the two countries 
Table 6.8: Differences in High Performance Disclosure Banks - Ordinary 
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6.4.2. Comparison of Ordinary Score & Volume (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
 
ORDINARY DISCLOSURE SCORE 
 Malaysia Bahrain 
Year 
 
Avg. 
Score 
Std. Dev. Min Max 
Avg. 
Score 
Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 22.8% 10.6% 11% 55% 22.3% 5.3% 12% 35% 
2011 23.3% 10.8% 11% 54% 25.4% 6.1% 15% 40% 
2012 24.9% 12.3% 15% 61% 25.3% 6.9% 13% 42% 
2013 27.2% 11.9% 15% 57% 24.7% 6.8% 8% 35% 
2014 27.8% 12.9% 14% 54% 25.4% 6.6% 8% 34% 
5yrs Avg. 25.2% 11.7% 11% 61% 24.6% 6.3% 8% 42% 
N 18 Banks 16 Banks 
Table 6.10: Ordinary SEGE Score (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
ORDINARY DISCLOSURE_VOLUME 
 Malaysia Bahrain 
Year 
 
Avg. 
Vol 
Total 
Vol. 
Std. Dev. Min Max Avg. Vol 
Total 
Vol. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
2010 51.8 933 44.6 15 209 45.6 729 11.9 21 58 
2011 53.8 967 42.7 21 202 50.2 804 16.4 28 96 
2012 59.7 1075 55.6 25 268 46.2 744 16.4 15 82 
2013 58.3 1050 35.4 26 151 49.1 786 16.5 17 88 
2014 63.8 1149 38.5 24 147 50 800 16.1 12 70 
5yrs Avg. 57.5 1034.8 43.1 15 268 48.2 768.6 15.3 12 96 
N 18 Banks 16 Banks 
Table 6.11: Ordinary SEGE Disclosure Volume (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
 
 
 
Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 provide a summary of the statistics for the ordinary disclosure score and 
volume. This is one important finding to show that disclosure volume plays as important a role as 
score. This study tries to emphasise that, apart from disclosure index score, volume is considered an 
important tool to complement the index score. 
 
 
Country’s Name: Ctry = Country, MY = Malaysia, BH = Bahrain 
Avg. Vol= Average Volume, Std. Dev. = Standard Deviation, Min = Minimum, Max = Maximum  
SEGE Score : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
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It is established that index score has been used systematically in the literature to replace volume from 
the previous literature, as index scores show a proportion which are more representative of disclosure 
performance. Moreover, volume is used as a secondary replicability test to confirm the index score, 
as suggested by Krippendorff (2012). As proof and explanation, the variance between the score and 
volume in table 6.10 and 6.11 did not differ much and has the same pattern for both countries. 
Moreover, any huge amount of discrepancy between the score and volume signals that the results are 
less reliable and need further explanation to strengthen the findings. 
Looking at table 6.10, Malaysian Islamic banks are more consistent in their disclosure score. The score 
increases from year to year while Bahraini Islamic banks appear to fluctuate. Even though one might 
argue that the disclosure score is relatively small in number, this is only because the checklist considers 
the harmonisation of Maali et al. (2006), Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) and Belal et al. (2014). 
Furthermore, the checklist also includes elements from reputable international bodies such as the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI), Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Centre for 
Social and Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR). 
A comparison of the two results reveals the pattern of disclosure by the two countries. The difference 
in regulatory environment and society’s cultural setting may explain these differences. As discussed 
in the background part, the two countries have distinct characteristics that may lead to different 
disclosure commitments. This result is an evidence of that. 
Moving further, in the next section the quality disclosure for both countries will be discussed. 
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6.4.3. Comparison of Quality Score & Volume (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
 
QUALITY DISCLOSURE_SCORE 
Year 
Malaysia Bahrain 
Avg. 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Avg. 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
2010 38.3% 14.4% 18.3% 68.3% 35.5% 8.4% 20% 53.3% 
2011 39.2% 17.6% 15% 81.7% 36.3% 8.8% 25% 56.7% 
2012 40.3% 19.8% 15% 93.3% 35.5% 9.1% 18.3% 56.7% 
2013 44.6% 15.5% 21.7% 78.3% 35.5% 7.7% 20% 48.3% 
2014 45% 16.2% 18.3% 73.3% 38.1% 9.1% 21.7% 58.3% 
5yrs Avg. 41.5% 16.7% 15% 93.3% 36.2% 8.5% 18.3% 58.3% 
N 18 Banks 16 Banks 
Table 6.12: Quality SEGE Disclosure Score (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These results further support the findings in the ordinary score in the last two pages in table 6.10, 
where the pattern is consistent in Malaysian Islamic banks and fluctuates in Bahraini Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, it also confirms that the previous ordinary finding has a connection with quality 
disclosure and a close relation with country characteristics. 
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Figure 6.9: Bar Chart Malaysia vs Bahrain Ordinary Score 
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In the quality disclosure, Malaysian Islamic banks score positively consistent and increment in both 
quality and ordinary disclosure from 2010 to 2014. However, Bahraini Islamic banks have an 
inconsistent trend in quality score and remain the same for ordinary score, apart from one static score 
in 2013. Figure 6.9 clearly demonstrates the bar chart movement of both countries. The difference 
between these two countries is distinct, where Malaysia consistently increases even though in small 
increments, and Bahrain varies throughout 2010 to 2014. 
Referring to table 6.12, from 2010 to 2014, Malaysian Islamic banks increased by a total of 7 percent 
in quality disclosure while Bahrain increased by only 3 percent between those years. It can be 
concluded that Malaysian Islamic banks are more committed and consistent in nature compared to 
Bahrain Islamic banks. The reason for this may be explained by the countries’ organisational support, 
such as with institutions that support the growth of Islamic banks from four perspectives, namely that 
of strong government and legislature, training and education, a strong-willed central banker and 
standard bodies, and markets and clients. The quadrants for the four perspectives will be explained 
further in the discussion section “6.6 Summary and Conclusion” to clearly display the difference 
between the Malaysian and Bahraini model of Islamic banking. 
In the next page, the difference between Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic banks is further exposed by 
the distinctive characteristics between them by observing the quality disclosure in the three Level 
disclosure matrix. 
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 Table 6.13: Quality SEGE Disclosure Volume (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
 
As can be seen in table 6.13 above, level one disclosure has been dominated by Bahraini Islamic banks for every year between 2010 to 2014. The average 
volume of disclosure in level one by Bahrain is higher than Malaysia in all years except in 2012. However, the results change significantly in level two disclosure 
where Malaysian Islamic banks dominate a higher average volume in all years. Another important finding in this research is that the average score of level 
three by Malaysian Islamic banks is higher than Bahrain Islamic banks and consistently increases throughout the years 2010 to 2014. This finding supports 
the argument that countries with top-down approaches to the Islamic banking movement provide more quality disclosure compared to ones with bottom-
up movement. This table also provides proof that volume can capture information content ‘quality’ at the same standard as an index if not at a more superior 
level. This is a breakthrough as earlier research like Wiseman (1982) employed a two dimensional index which has been argued by
QUALITY_DISCLOSURE_VOLUME  
Year 
MALAYSIA & BAHRAIN 
 Level_1 Disclosure Level _2_Disclosure Level _3_Disclosure 
Ctry Avg. Vol 
Total 
Vol. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Avg. Vol Total Vol. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Avg. 
Vol 
Total Vol. Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 
MY 27.2 491 15.9 10 77 11.5 206 20.7 0 82 13.1 236 9.9 5 50 
BH 29.4 470 10.4 15 55 7.7 123 7.8 0 25 8.5 136 4.8 0 17 
2011 
MY 27.9 503 13.9 15 76 11.3 202 19.9 0 74 14.6 262 11.4 3 52 
BH 34.6 554 9.1 20 54 6.1 98 8.5 0 36 9.5 152 5.2 1 20 
2012 
MY 33.2 598 27.7 15 138 11.1 200 17.3 0 69 15.4 277 12.9 3 61 
BH 32.4 519 10.9 12 54 5.7 92 5.5 0 23 8.3 133 5 0 18 
2013 
MY 30.4 552 14.4 15 77 9.3 168 12 0 39 18.6 330 16 7 74 
BH 31.9 510 10.3 13 48 8.3 133 11.4 0 47 8.9 143 4.1 1 15 
2014 
MY 32.1 577 13.1 13 58 12.8 230 19.4 0 60 19 342 12 8 43 
BH 33.6 537 13 7 50 5.3 85 5.6 0 23 11.1 178 4.5 5 20 
5yrs Avg. 
MY 30.2 544.2 17.6 10 138 11.2 201 17.8 0 82 16.1 289 12.5 3 74 
BH 32.4 518 10.7 7 55 6.6 106 7.9 0 47 9.3 148.4 4.7 0 20 
Country’s Name: Ctry = Country , MY = Malaysia , BH = Bahrain, Avg.Vol= Average Volume, Std.Dev. = Standard Deviation, Min = Minimum , Max = Maximum, SEGE Score : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
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Beck et al. (2010) as scoring for information content ’quality’. 
The research on ‘quality’ corporate disclosure can be traced back to 1971 in a study by Singhvi and 
Desai (1971) where they found that, with an increase in stockholders, a company is more likely to 
disclose extra information because of the additional consciousness towards social responsibility 
compared to other corporations that have a small number of stockholders. Furthermore, the study of 
Beck et al. (2010) developed a better method to capture the information content ‘quality’. This thesis 
improves upon the idea of having the three steps into the more advanced method of 3 levels of 
disclosure where the results are presented in a volume and quality index compared to only the volume 
index in Beck et al. (2010). Moreover, this 3 level method differed from Beck et al. (2010) by including 
graphic and spectrums in each level of coding. This has been explained earlier in the methodology 
section ‘5.3.7.1. The 3 Level Procedure (Quality Score)’. The figure below demonstrates the property 
of volume and score that this method of coding can produce.  The blue line is the average percentage 
for 3 level score and the bar chart represents the volume of each level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the next page, one of the thesis’ intriguing findings involving the comparison of the performance of 
each bank in the two countries will be elaborated in detail. 
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Figure 6.10: 3 Level Structure (Volume# and Score %) 
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6.4.4. Country’s Top 10 Performing Bank in Ordinary & Quality SEGE Disclosure 
6.4.4.1. Top Banks-Ordinary Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referring to table 6.14 within the ordinary score, Malaysian Islamic banks’ top 5 performers lead the score while Bahraini bank’s highest score, if competing 
within the Malaysian circle of Islamic banks, would only gain the 4th place. This is certainly one of the more important findings and shows that, even though 
Bahrain is the leading country in the Middle East for the Islamic banking industry and Malaysia is one for the Far East, their disclosure commitments are 
distinctive to each other by a huge gap. Thus, country socio-politics, culture, financial environment setting, regulatory quality, and the religious setting of a 
country may affect the countries’ disclosures. These entire factors are discussed in the discussion section and are proof of the regulatory quality and religious 
setting given in chapter 7. 
TOP 10_ORDINARY DISCLOSURE SCORE (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
Rank Malaysia Bahrain 
Bank 
Avg. 
Score 
Std. Dev. Min Max Bank Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 BIMB 56.2% 2.9% 54% 61% IHIB-BH 37.2% 3.6% 34% 42% 
2 B-RAKYAT 41.4% 8.0% 34% 52% BIB-BH 30% 4.1% 23% 33% 
3 BMMB 38.8% 2.3% 36% 41% ABCIB-BH 28.8% 3.3% 23% 31% 
4 AFFIN-i 34.2% 3.8% 30% 40% BAB-BH 28.4% 3.4% 23% 32% 
5 HLIB 34% 8.9% 25% 45% VCB-BH 27.8% 1.1% 26% 29% 
6 RHIB 25.6% 2.6% 23% 29% ASBB-BH 27.2% 2.9% 23% 31% 
7 PUBLIC-i 25.6% 3.6% 21% 30% ABIB-BH 26.6% 2.5% 25% 31% 
8 AM-i 23.2% 2.2% 21% 26% GFH-BH 25.2% 1.9% 22% 27% 
9 OCBC AL-AMIN 21.2% 2.9% 17% 25% IIB-BH 24.8% 4.3% 18% 29% 
10 KFHMB 18.6% 3.5% 15% 24% KFH-BH 24.4% 2.5% 22% 28% Table 6.14: Ordinary Disclosure Performance (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
Bank’s Name : BIMB = Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad , B-RAKYAT = Bank Rakyat , BMMB = Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad , AFFIN-i = Affin Islamic Bank , HLIB = Hong Leong Islamic Bank , RHIB = Rashid Hussein Islamic Bank ,  PUBLIC-I 
= Public Islamic Bank , AM-i = Arab Malaysian Islamic Bank , OCBC-AL-AMIN= Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Al Amin, KFHMB = Kuwait Finance House Malaysia .  IHIB = Ihtimaar Islamic Bank , BIB-BH = Bahrain Islamic Bank  , 
ABCIB = ABC Islamic Bank BAB-BH = Bank Al-Khair Bahrain , VCB-BH = Venture Capital Bank Bahrain , ASBB-BH = Al-Salam Bank  , ABIB-BH =Al-Baraka Islamic Bank Bahrain  , GFH-BH = Gulf Finance House , IIB-BH = International 
Investment Bank , KFHB = Kuwait Finance House Bahrain 
Avg. Score = Average Score, Std. Dev. = Standard Deviation, Min = Minimum , Max = Maximum  
SEGE Score: Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
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Comparing the two results on figure 6.11 reveals an interesting trend for the two countries. 
Interestingly, after rank five, Malaysian Islamic banks start performing below their counterparts in 
Bahrain. This may signal that there are banks that are really committed and there are banks that 
perform below normal average disclosure. 
 What is important to note in figure 6.11 is that the top five Islamic banks in Malaysia score above 
average and Bahraini Islamic banks score below average while rank 6 to rank 10 Bahraini Islamic banks 
score above average and Malaysian Islamic banks score below average. However, there is no huge gap 
between Bahraini and Malaysian Islamic banks below rank 5 with average disclosure. On the other 
hand, from rank 5 to rank 1, there is a huge and consistent gap in average disclosure. 
The top five ranked Islamic banks in Malaysia performing above average disclosure while the opposite 
being true for Bahrain may signal that, in Ordinary score, the top five Islamic banks in Malaysia are 
better compared to Bahraini Islamic banks. To prove this further, a deeper observation into quality 
disclosure needs to be exposed and explained in the next page’s table and figures. 
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Figure 6.11: Rank Movement by Country 
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6.4.4.2. Top Banks-Quality Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOP 10_QUALITY DISCLOSURE SCORE (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
Rank 
Malaysia Bahrain 
Bank Avg.Score Std. Dev. Min Max Bank Avg.Score Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 BIMB 78.3% 10.1% 68.3% 93.3% BIB-BH 50.7% 6.2% 41.7% 58.3% 
2 B-RAKYAT 65% 3.3% 60% 68.3% IHIB-BH 49.3% 7.32% 40% 56.7% 
3 BMMB 63.3% 7.4% 55% 73.3% ASBB-BH 43% 3.8% 36.7% 46.7% 
4 HLIB 58.7% 5.8% 51.7% 66.7% ABIB-BH 41% 9.5% 28.3% 53.3% 
5 AFFIN-i 57.7% 4.7% 50% 61.7% ABCIB-BH 38.7% 2.5% 35% 41.7% 
6 PUBLIC-i 43.3% 3.5% 38.3% 48.3% VCB-BH 38.3% 2% 36.7% 41.7% 
7 RHIB 37% 5.7% 31.7% 46.7% GFH-BH 36.3% 1.8% 33.3% 38.3% 
8 OCBC AL-AMIN 36.7% 5.5% 31.7% 43.3% IIB-BH 35.7% 3% 31.7% 40% 
9 AL-RAJHI 36.3% 5.9% 28.3% 45% FEB-BH 35.7% 2.5% 33.3% 40% 
10 AM-i 35.3% 4.1% 28.3% 38.3% BAB-BH 35% 7.4% 26.7% 45% 
Table 6.15: Quality Disclosure Performance (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
Bank’s Name : BIMB = Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad , B-RAKYAT = Bank Rakyat , BMMB = Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad , AFFIN-i = Affin Islamic Bank , HLIB = Hong Leong Islamic Bank , PUBLIC-I = Public Islamic Bank , RHIB = Rashid 
Hussein Islamic Bank  , OCBC-AL-AMIN= Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Al Amin, AL-RAJHI = Al- Rajhi Bank Malaysia , AM-i = Arab Malaysian Islamic Bank . BIB-BH = Bahrain Islamic Bank  , IHIB = Ihtimaar Islamic Bank , ASBB-BH 
= Al-Salam Bank , ABIB-BH =Al-Baraka Islamic Bank Bahrain , ABCIB = ABC Islamic Bank , VCB-BH = Venture Capital Bank Bahrain , GFH-BH = Gulf Finance House , IIB-BH = International Investment Bank , FEB-BH First Energy Bank , 
BAB-BH = Bank Al-Khair Bahrain . 
Avg.Score = Average Score, Std.Dev. = Standard Deviation, Min = Minimum , Max = Maximum  
SEGE Score : Shariah, Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
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As discussed in the methodology part, the quality score is a method to enhance the ordinary score 
and can be used as a “double checker” for the ordinary score. Hence, to deepen the understanding of 
the data and to prove the superiority of the top 5 Islamic banks in Malaysia, table 6.16 and figure 6.17 
will be the references. 
What stands out in table 6.15 is the huge difference in quality score between Malaysia and Bahrain. 
This is obvious given that 50.7% as the first place in Bahrain corresponds to the sixth place in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, the top 5 banks in Malaysia score higher than even the bank in the first place in Bahrain. 
However, this time, the last 5 Islamic banks in Malaysia maintain a superior ranking compared to 
ordinary score where before the last five banks scored below Bahraini Islamic banks. 
A comparison of the two results in figure 6.12 quality score and figure 6.11 ordinary score reveals that 
the top 5 Islamic banks in Malaysia perform better in ordinary and quality score. This may suggest that 
these Islamic banks signal their accountability to stakeholders by responding to many aspects of 
stakeholders while also taking good care of the social contract between the banks and society. This is 
a strong argument as the Islamic banks’ annual report has been through a rigorous checklist and 3 
level marking to ensure that the result is consistent and reliable. 
The next page will present a deeper analysis of bank movement in quality and ordinary disclosure.
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Figure 6.12: Quality Top 10 Performing Bank Movement 
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6.4.4.3. Malaysia Top 10 Performing Bank Movement 
Table 6.16: Malaysia, Bank Level Difference (Ordinary Vs Quality) 
 
 
 
 
Top 10_Performers in Malaysia (Ordinary Vs Quality) 
Rank Ordinary SEGE Score Quality SEGE Score 
Bank Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max Bank Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 BIMB 56.2% 2.9% 54% 61% BIMB 78.3% 10.1% 68.3% 93.3% 
2 B-RAKYAT 41.4% 8% 34% 52% B-RAKYAT 65% 3.3% 60% 68.3% 
3 BMMB 38.8% 2.3% 36% 41% BMMB 63.3% 7.4% 55% 73.3% 
4 AFFIN ISLAMIC 34.2% 3.8% 30% 40% HLIB 58.6% 5.8% 51.7% 66.7% 
5 HLIB 34% 8.9% 25% 45% AFFIN ISLAMIC 57.7% 4.6% 50% 61.7% 
6 RHIB 25.6% 2.6% 23% 29% PUBLIC-i 43.3% 3.5% 38.3% 48.3% 
7 PUBLIC-i 25.6% 3.6% 21% 30% RHIB 37% 5.7% 31.7% 46.7% 
8 AM-i 23.2% 2.2% 21% 26% OCBC-AL-AMIN 36.7% 5.5% 31.7% 43.3% 
9 OCBC-AL-AMIN 21.2% 2.9% 17% 25% AL-RAJHI-MY 36.3% 5.9% 28.3% 45% 
10 KFHMB 18.6% 3.5% 15% 24% AM-i 35.3% 4.1% 28.3% 38.3% 
Bank’s Name : BIMB = Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad , B-RAKYAT = Bank Rakyat , BMMB = Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad , AFFIN ISLAMIC = Affin Islamic Bank , HLIB = Hong Leong Islamic Bank , RHIB = Rashid Hussein Islamic Bank , 
PUBLIC-I = Public Islamic Bank , AM-i = Arab Malaysian Islamic Bank , OCBC-AL-AMIN= Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Al Amin, KFHMB = Kuwait Finance House Malaysia Berhad . 
Avg. Score = Average Score, Std. Dev. = Standard Deviation, Min = Minimum , Max = Maximum  
SEGE Score : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
GREEN Colour = Bank that climbed up into better rank in terms of Quality Disclosure compared to Ordinary Disclosure 
RED Colour = Bank that fell down into a Lower Rank in terms of Quality Disclosure compared to Ordinary Disclosure 
YELLOW Colour = 1- Bank that is Out Of Rank in Quality Disclosure OR 2- Bank That is not In the top 10 rank of Ordinary Disclosure but is ranked in top 10 Quality Disclosure 
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As can be seen from table 6.16, what is striking about the figures in the table is the movement of the 
banks from ordinary score to quality score. Some banks stay at the same place while some climb up 
and some climb down. In the Malaysian case, there are some striking findings where the top 3 Islamic 
banks stay in exactly the same place without any movement in ordinary and quality disclosure where, 
normally, a movement would be expected. These findings may suggest that the top 3 Islamic banks 
are the best of all the banks in the study.  
The top 3 Islamic banks are the Islamic banks that have a valuable history and have a close relationship 
with society. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) was the first Islamic bank established in Malaysia and 
Bank Rakyat (B-Rakyat) was the first Islamic bank based on the cooperative scheme. Moreover, Bank 
Muamalat was the first Islamic bank to emerge from society after the collapse of Bumiputera Bank, 
which was the largest and only indigenous people’s bank (Utusan, 2001). 
 All these banks have a close relationship with society, which makes them not just take care of the 
social contract between them and society as a means of legitimacy but go beyond by addressing more 
complex ordinary and quality disclosure themes in many stakeholder-related issues. The disclosure of 
these three Islamic banks is at least consistent with the rank in each ordinary and quality disclosure. 
The three banks’ disclosure also contain the use of more graphics and statistics. The effort made by 
these Islamic banks clearly supports the development of stakeholder theory’s movement in the ethical 
branch of the stakeholder. 
Moving further, there are Islamic banks in red which indicate that, in terms of quality disclosure, the 
banks’ ranks have dropped. Moreover, Islamic banks in green indicate that the Islamic banks have 
climbed the rank in quality disclosure. Furthermore, yellow indicates that the Islamic banks are listed 
in quality disclosure without having been ranked in the top 10 ordinary disclosure and vice versa. 
In the Malaysian context, referring to table 6.16, three Islamic banks in red are ranked high in ordinary 
disclosure but dropped a rank in quality disclosure. This means that in terms of ordinary disclosure, in 
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adhering to the checklist, the Islamic banks performed well. However, the Islamic banks do not provide 
enough evidence of 3 level disclosure in the annual report. This thesis argues that Islamic banks that 
dropped a rank in quality disclosure are not up to the stakeholder-accountability standard. However, 
they might still fall into the stakeholder managerial branch. 
On the other hand, the three banks in green have a lower rank in ordinary disclosure but a higher rank 
in quality. This thesis argues that these kinds of banks that provide more useful 3 level evidence in the 
annual report demonstrate that they are serious in stakeholder relationships and are accountable to 
various stakeholders. 
Furthermore, Islamic banks in yellow provide important information. Even though the scores are low, 
they provide crucial information for the findings. An Islamic bank might not be scoring well in an 
ordinary disclosure but that Islamic banks might provide more evidence in their annual report. For 
example, they might say one phrase about nature but provide three pieces of evidence in their annual 
report such as saving 1 tonne of paper in one year, planting one thousand trees as part of their CSR 
efforts, and saving 60 thousand on the electricity bill in a bank-wide go green initiative. This is why the 
3 level method is chosen to differentiate between the banks that just tick boxes off the checklist and 
banks that provide further evidence. 
All of these results show that there are banks that are good at ordinary disclosure but do not perform 
in quality disclosure. One important information from these findings is that a deeper evaluation should 
be taken into consideration when examining the annual report rather than just an outdated approach. 
Only a few Islamic banks are consistent in their ordinary and quality disclosure rank and that is an 
uncommon occurrence if compared to Bahraini Islamic banks, as discussed in the next sub-section. 
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6.4.4.4. Bahrain Top 10 Performing Bank Movement 
Top 10_Performers in Bahrain 
Rank ORDINARY Disclosure Score QUALITY Disclosure Score 
Bank Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max Bank Avg. Score Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 IHIB-BH 37.2% 3.6% 34% 42% BIB-BH 50.7% 6.2% 41.7% 58.3% 
2 BIB-BH 30% 4.1% 23% 33% IHIB-BH 49.3% 7.3% 40% 56.7% 
3 ABCIB-BH 28.8% 3.3% 23% 31% ASBB-BH 43% 3.8% 36.7% 46.7% 
4 BAB-BH 28.4% 3.4% 23% 32% ABIB-BH 41% 9.5% 28.3% 53.3% 
5 VCB-BH 27.8% 1.1% 26% 29% ABCIB-BH 38.7% 2.5% 35% 41.7% 
6 ASBB-BH 27.2% 2.9% 23% 31% VCB-BH 38.3% 2% 36.7% 41.7% 
7 ABIB-BH 26.6% 2.5% 25% 31% GFH-BH 36.3% 1.8% 33.3% 38.3% 
8 GFH-BH 25.2% 1.9% 22% 27% IIB-BH 35.7% 3% 31.7% 40% 
9 IIB-BH 24.8% 4.3% 18% 29% FEB-BH 35.7% 2.5% 33.3% 40% 
10 KFH-BH 24.4% 2.5% 22% 28% BAB-BH 35% 7.4% 26.7% 45% 
Table 6.17: Bahrain, Bank Level Difference (Ordinary Vs Quality) 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank’s Name : IHIB = Ihtimaar Islamic Bank , BIB-BH = Bahrain Islamic Bank  , ABCIB = ABC Islamic Bank BAB-BH = Bank Al-Khair Bahrain , VCB-BH = Venture Capital Bank Bahrain , ASBB-BH = Al-Salam Bank  , ABIB-BH =Al-
Baraka Islamic Bank Bahrain  , GFH-BH = Gulf Finance House , IIB-BH = International Investment Bank , KFHB = Kuwait Finance House Bahrain , FEB-BH First Energy Bank. 
Avg.Score = Average Score, Std.Dev. = Standard Deviation, Min = Minimum , Max = Maximum  
SEGE Score : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
GREEN Colour = Bank that climbed up into a better rank in terms of Quality Disclosure compared to Ordinary Disclosure 
RED Colour = Bank that fell down into a lower rank in terms of Quality Disclosure compared to Ordinary Disclosure 
YELLOW Colour = 1- Bank that is Out of Rank in Quality Disclosure OR 2- Bank that is not in the top 10 rank of Ordinary Disclosure but is ranked In top 10 Quality Disclosure 
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With reference to table 6.17, the movement of the Islamic bank ranks from ordinary to quality 
disclosure will be discussed further. As compared to Malaysian Islamic banks where at least three 
banks remain the same rank either in ordinary or quality disclosure, Bahraini Islamic banks are not 
static; rather, all Islamic banks move places in ordinary and quality disclosure rank. They either climb 
down or up and the gap between the ranked movements is significant. 
Four of the Islamic banks in Bahrain dropped their rank from ordinary when compared to the quality 
disclosure score rank while another four climbed up the rank. The main difference between Bahraini 
Islamic banks and Malaysia is the movement gap. Bahraini Islamic banks have larger movements. For 
instance, As Salam Islamic Bank Bahrain (ASBB) moved up from 6th place in ordinary score to 3rd place 
in quality disclosure score while Bank Al-Khair Bahrain (BAB-BH) climbed down from 4th place in 
ordinary disclosure to 10th place in quality disclosure. As compared to Malaysian Islamic banks, 
Bahraini Islamic banks’ movements were more volatile compared to Malaysian Islamic banks’ 
movements that were more stable.  
The big gap shows that an Islamic bank might perform well on the checklists but may not necessarily 
provide valuable and practical evidence in their annual reports. Thus, the need to have a deeper 
analysis like what this thesis has done is important. In a conservative country such as Bahrain, these 
findings prove that disclosure quality can be really varied and low compared to a moderate and 
progressive country like Malaysia. 
All in all, for Bahrain, there are two distinctive differences. The first one is that none of the Islamic 
banks have a static rank and, when it comes to the movement of the rank, many have a huge gap 
between their ranked movement from ordinary to quality disclosure. All of these signal a clear 
disclosure disparity between the two countries even though they are in the same, small Islamic 
banking industry. Certainly, there are distinct differences in these two countries. The findings 
differences for both countries may answer the research question on the differences between the two 
models of Islamic banking. The performance of the ordinary and quality disclosure of the two countries 
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may be influenced by the regulatory quality of the countries’ working and social culture in the nation 
and how important the social contract (religious value) is perceived by both society and the Islamic 
banks. Where there are stronger ties and sensitivity between the parties, it is presumed that the 
disclosure will be better in terms of volume, quality and graphic utilisation. These findings have proven 
to be consistent in that direction. 
Furthermore, the stakeholders in Malaysia and Bahrain are different in nature. The stakeholders in 
Malaysia are much more sensitive, particularly for society as a whole. This was proven by the fact that 
the initiative for the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Malaysia came from the Bumiputra 
Economic Congress where a majority of Muslim members suggested the need to establish Islamic 
banks in Malaysia to the government of Malaysia in 1980. This was followed by the steering committee 
findings in 1981 which suggested that the Islamic bank project was viable and profitable enough to 
operate after considering the religious, legal and operational aspect, as informed by Utusan (2001). 
However, Bahrain’s first Islamic banking establishment was mainly based on the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) proposal to all its members to embrace and put effort into the Islamic bank 
initiative. Nevertheless, Bahrain established its Islamic bank in 1979 without a single legal Act and with 
only a rulebook by the Bahrain central bank, compared to Malaysia with the Islamic Banking Act in 
1983 and the Takaful Act 1984. This clearly differentiates the effort that these two countries have had 
in managing their regulatory affairs. Even though Bahrain is the most advanced financial centre for 
conventional and Islamic market in the Middle Eastern region, Malaysia has nevertheless been far 
more progressive and advanced compared to Bahrain in managing Islamic finance and banking issues 
from the beginning and in recent times. It is beneficial to reiterate that this study has compared the 
two most prominent countries in the Islamic banking sector. 
In the next section, one of the interesting findings, that of graphics utilisation in the annual report by 
both countries, will be presented.  
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6.4.5. Graphics Utilisation by the Countries 
 
 
Table 6.18 above presents the graphics utilisation rate in both countries. Normally, research in social 
reporting literature calculates the graphics disclosure and includes it in the main score. However, this 
research separated the graphic disclosure statistics in order to appreciate it and to motivate further 
the exploration of graphics in the social reporting area. 
The most interesting aspect of this table is the maximum percentage of graphics utilisation of both 
countries. Malaysia scores high in all years between 2010-2014 with a maximum of 100 percent in 
2014 while Bahrain’s maximum score is static throughout the years. This shows that there are Islamic 
banks that are really commited to providing graphics to complement the narative part of disclosure in 
the annual report, and, on the other hand, there are islamic banks that do not fully utilise the potential 
of graphics. 
Even though the average score for both countries falls between 16.98 percent and 20.5 percent, the 
maximum score may suggest that there are Malaysian Islamic banks that take disclosure towards 
various sensitive stakeholders seriously while Bahraini Islamic banks are not really sensitive to various 
stakeholder demands. The justification of the sensitivity response from various stakeholders is 
explained in the SEGE framework in the theoretical foundation chapter.  
 GRAPHICS UTILISATION 
 MALAYSIA BAHRAIN 
YEAR 
Avg. Score Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Avg. Score Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
2010 19.04% 29.80% 0 85.70% 16.98% 14.97% 0 42.90% 
2011 16.67% 24.61% 0 71.40% 16.98% 15.85% 0 42.90% 
2012 19.04% 27.26% 0 71.40% 17.88% 16.09% 0 42.90% 
2013 23.88% 34.78% 0 87.00% 16.98% 15.85% 0 42.90% 
2014 23.88% 34.44% 0 100% 16.09% 17.99% 0 42.90% 
5.YRS.AVG 20.50% 30.18% 0 83.10% 16.98% 16.15% 0 42.90% 
N 18 Islamic Banks 16 Islamic Banks Table 6.18: Graphic Utilisation 
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Figure 6.13 clearly shows that Malaysian Islamic banks’ graphics utilisation is always above average, 
except in 2011, while all Bahraini Islamic banks performed below the countries’ average, except in 
2011 with slightly (and insignificantly) higher scores. Despite this, the overall findings for graphics 
utilisation reveals that Malaysia is superior in utilising graphics in its annual reports to help in 
delivering the disclosure message according to the related dimensions and themes they are interested 
in.  
Even though the overall average score is around 20 percent, this can be considered significant enough 
if the Islamic banking industry that operates mainly in third world countries (and which have limited 
exposure towards disclosure initiatives) are compared to conventional banks in first world countries. 
Looking at the pooled estimation later in chapter 7, section 7.3.6, religiosity has a significant positive 
impact towards graphics disclosure while, here, we know that in terms of religiosity, Malaysia is much 
more religious with an 84.8 percent score in the world value survey compared to the 40.6 percent of 
Bahrain. This may be one of the reasons why Malaysian Islamic banks’ performance in graphics 
disclosure is better than Bahraini Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, graphics utilisation is an important and striking finding in this thesis. In the social 
reporting and business ethics literature within the scope of Islamic banking, no research has 
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Figure 6.13: Graphic Utilisation Movement 
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specifically adressed graphics utilisation in the annual report of islamic banks. However, research like 
Rania and Clare (2010) have explored the issue of graphics in Arabian companies in the middle east, 
and many other studies, for instance Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), have included graphics in their overall 
disclosure. Most studies take graphics as a whole to be a part of disclosure score. However, there are 
studies that touch upon the importance of graphics utilisation in financial reports such as Uyar (2009), 
Yin (2005), Bernardi et al. (2002), Beattie and Jones (2002), Beattie and Jones (1997), Preston et al. 
(1996), Beattie and Jones (1994), Beattie and Jones (1992). 
Moreover, it is argued that graphics play an important role in annual reports which can lead to a better 
understanding of the information (Levian, 1980). These ideas are supported by Beattie and Jones 
(2002) who argue that visual, graphic and pictorial aids assist readers to instantly appreciate the 
information provided in the annual report.  
Even though some might argue that graphics might mislead the user of the annual report, the same 
can be said of jargon words, impression management and accounting treatment in the annual report. 
The most important aspect to avoid users of annual reports from being mislead is to equip users with 
the knowledge and understanding of how to use annual reports according to their objectives. For 
instance, auditors, researchers, and investors all have different objectives in using the annual report. 
In this thesis, the use of graphics has been used as a key marker for 3 level disclosure score for quality 
disclosure in level 2 and level 3 which have been explained in the methodology chapter. Meanwhile, 
separate statistics for graphics utilisation for each country have been disclosed for each year to see 
which country utilises them the most. All in all, for graphics utilisation, Malaysia proves to be superior 
in utilising graphics compared to Bahrain, which may be the result of different levels of religiosity as a 
country and the commitment of several Malaysian Islamic banks who maintain the stakeholder 
relationship and the social contract within society at large.  
Thus, some of the findings  will be elaborated upon with examples from annual reports from each 
country to deepen the understanding on the important role that graphics play in the annual report 
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and how crucial the study and research area is to be explored. The example below may suggest the 
differences between ‘authentic performers’ and ‘unauthentic performers’ in disclosure performance. 
One of the important features of good disclosure is providing evidence, for instance figures and 
pictures as in appendix 8: Disabled benefits in Annual Report Bank Rakyat 2013 page 109. The Islamic 
bank has shown its commitment to disclosure when a picture was provided and a quotation from an 
employee was taken. Regardless of the issues of corporate greenwashing or window dressing as 
advocated by Laufer (2003), this can be regarded as the first step in the process and can be an indicator 
of whether the islamic banks are making an effort in their disclosure with regards to specific 
dimensions and themes. Disclosure like this provides more information to concerned stakeholders on 
themes and dimensions that they are interested in besides maintaining legitimacy by taking care of 
the social contract between society and the Islamic banks. On another note, disclosure like this 
provides greater evidence compared to the phrases level and may signal the bank’s comittment 
towards stakeholders. 
However, the there are also Islamic banks that provide their social responsibility disclosure in a very 
minimal way, for instance in figure 6.14. 
Figure 6.14: CSR Section for Al-Salam bank Bahrain from Annual Report 2012 pg.54, 2013 pg.60, 2014 pg.63 
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The above figure is one interesting example by Bahraini Islamic bank. Al-Salam bank Bahrain provided 
similar and identical corporate social resposibility statements in their 2012, 2013 and 2014 annual 
report. Certainly, this statement was only made to fulfill the standard requirements outlinedby the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) under Governance 
standard section (7) Corporate Social Responsibility Report that was imposed in Bahrain.  
The above example demonstrates the type of disclosure comprised of mere phrases with a standard 
approach towards disclosing certain themes or aspects of interest which the bank has deemed 
important. Moreover, this type of disclosure may signal that the banks are satisfying their legitimacy 
from the (AAOIFI) and/or are only satisfying the most influential and important stakeholders for the 
Islamic bank’s survival. In addition, this may indicate that this disclosure only goes into the managerial 
stakeholder branch rather than the ethical branch of stakeholders. Moreover, if compared to banks 
that do not have specific social responsibility headers in their annual report, several Islamic banks 
perform better in terms of social repsonsibility related disclosure. The next section discusses the seven 
main dimensions of disclosure in a multifaceted matrix.  
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6.4.6. Disclosure Matrix for 7 Dimensions 
 
The above table is quite revealing in several ways. First, unlike the other tables, table 6.19 summarises most of the research findings via dimensions. However, 
due to the need to extract the findings in an explainable manner, the table needs to be organised in a matrix with five reading variables which are country, 
seven dimensions, ordinary and quality disclosure score, and time frame. Second, the table assists in understanding the comparison between ordinary and 
quality disclosure by both countries. Thirdly, the table can use to reveal and appreciate the ordinary and quality disclosure comparison of a particular country. 
Lastly, the table can be useful in reading the performance of both countries’ disclosure in a mix of dimensions and type of disclosure. 
Country Ordinary Quality Ordinary Quality Ordinary Quality Ordinary Quality Ordinary Quality Ordinary Quality Ordinary Quality
MY 15.70% 44.40% 45.30% 65.70% 9.20% 21.60% 31.30% 76.90% 3.30% 6.20% 3.10% 7.40% 53.60% 53.70%
BH 15.80% 35.40% 36.40% 40.60% 16.20% 38.20% 20.50% 63.50% 0% 0% 6.90% 13.50% 55.80% 61.10%
MY 16.90% 44.80% 45.50% 69.40% 11.60% 25.90% 30.40% 77.80% 4.10% 8.00% 2.50% 6.50% 53.80% 50.00%
BH 16.30% 32.90% 41.60% 40.60% 18.70% 41.70% 19.90% 57.30% 1.30% 2.10% 8.80% 19.80% 65.50% 64.60%
MY 20.40% 45.90% 47.40% 69.40% 13.20% 27.20% 26.10% 74.10% 3.70% 6.80% 4.40% 15.70% 55.80% 51.90%
BH 16.30% 34.20% 40.90% 38.50% 18.50% 36.10% 19.90% 56.30% 2.50% 2.80% 10.30% 20.80% 63.50% 63.90%
MY 22.90% 53.30% 51.10% 77.80% 18.80% 38.90% 33.20% 76.90% 2.20% 4.30% 5.00% 16.70% 54.40% 51.20%
BH 17.80% 35.80% 42.40% 40.60% 18.10% 36.10% 20.80% 56.30% 0% 0% 9.40% 19.80% 60.00% 63.20%
MY 25.20% 53.00% 52.80% 71.30% 22.90% 41.40% 25.60% 72.20% 4.40% 9.90% 6.40% 22.20% 51.80% 50.00%
BH 19.00% 37.90% 40.20% 41.70% 16.90% 37.50% 22.30% 65.60% 0.40% 0.70% 9.70% 22.90% 62.50% 66.00%
MY 20.20% 48.30% 48.40% 70.70% 15.10% 31.00% 29.30% 75.60% 3.50% 7.00% 4.30% 13.70% 53.90% 51.40%
BH 17.10% 35.30% 40.30% 40.40% 17.70% 37.90% 20.70% 59.80% 0.80% 1.10% 9.00% 19.40% 61.50% 63.80%
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
5yrs Avg.
7 DIMENSIONS MATRIX
Year
MALAYSIA & BAHRAIN
SHARIAH SHARIAH GOV. SOCIAL EXTERNAL SOCIAL INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ETHICS GOVERNANCE
Table 6.19: Matrix for 7 Dimensions 
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The purpose of table 6.19, apart from what is mentioned above, is to highlight the striking findings of 
both countries’ dimensions that play an important role in this research. Looking and comparing at the 
Shariah Governance and Governance score in Malaysia and Bahrain, there are distinct features 
between these countries.  
First, Malaysia is the clear leader in Shariah Governance disclosure score while Bahrain scores higher 
than Malaysia in Governance score. In Islamic banking literature, the words Middle East or Gulf 
Corporation Council (GCC) model and Malaysian model of Islamic banks are not new terms, and this 
is advocated by Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous (2013). Looking at the history of where Islam emerged, 
generally, the world is more likely to label Bahrain as more Islamic compared to Malaysia that received 
Islamic teachings much later compared to the Middle East. However, looking at the score of Shariah 
Governance, Malaysia is much more committed to providing information in ordinary disclosure and 
useful information in quality disclosure for the stakeholder with 70.8 percent as compared to Bahrain 
at 40.4 percent.  
Furthermore, Malaysia’s higher score in Shariah Governance does not mean that Islamic banks want 
to look religious as perceived by a general audience. Rather, the higher score of Shariah Governance 
indicates a pure commitment by Malaysian Islamic banks in the disclosure of Shariah matters. This is 
supported by the World Value Survey (importance of religion score) where Malaysia scored 84.8 
percent while Bahrain scored 40.6 percent in wave 6 (2010-2014), the same period this study was 
conducted. Moreover, the World Value Survey score was parallel to the Shariah Governance score’s 
findings by elucidating that countries that perceive religion as important have a higher score for 
Shariah Governance (Malaysia) compared to ones that have a lower score for importance of religion 
(Bahrain). 
Second, looking at the social external and social internal dimensions, the results are opposite for each 
country where Bahrain scores slightly higher in the social external dimensions in both ordinary and 
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quality disclosure while Malaysia scores higher in the social internal dimensions as compared to 
Bahrain. 
However, an important piece of information between these two dimensions is the gap range between 
the dimensions and countries. In terms of dimensions, the social internal dimension has received more 
attention by both Islamic banks in both countries, where the gap difference between quality disclosure 
is huge and more than 50 percent. For instance, Malaysia scored a 75 percent average for five years 
in social internal quality disclosure (the highest score of all dimensions for Malaysia), compared to the 
31 percent in social external dimensions, while Bahrain scored 59 percent in social internal quality 
disclosure (the second highest score of all dimensions for Bahrain), as compared to the 37 percent in 
the social external score. These significant gaps show that Islamic banks in both countries give more 
attention to the social internal dimension which includes human resources and capital management 
disclosure and rewards and benefits related disclosure. 
Furthermore, as an example, a unique disclosure by Bank Rakyat Malaysia Limited in the annual report 
2013 (page 109) had disclosure about disabled employees’ benefits (supported with graphics) and the 
extension of payment holiday schemes for house financing to the employees of Bank Islam Malaysia 
limited in the 2011 annual report (page 185). Moreover, Bahraini Islamic banks frequently displayed 
employee training hours. For instance, the Bahrain Islamic Bank annual report 2011 disclosed that 
6000 hours of training had been undertaken on page 24. Similarly, in the Al-Salam bank Bahrain annual 
report 2010 (page 32), 9000 hours of training by employees was undertaken. The above are examples 
of qualitative information extracted from the annual report by Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic banks 
in order to support and explain Malaysia and Bahrain’s high score findings in social internal disclosure. 
Third, one of the distinctive features of Bahraini Islamic banks is governance score, which is around 
61.5 percent for ordinary governance score and 63.8 percent for quality governance score averaged 
over 5 years. In the later part in chapter 6, regulatory quality (world governance indicator) is not 
significant towards disclosure in Bahrain; however, Bahrain scores high in governance disclosure. This 
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may signal that Bahrain Islamic banks generally want to look good in their governance by providing 
more disclosure, but, in reality, they only disclose more on the board of directors and top management 
rather than on governance policy and standards as presented in the table below: - 
COUNTRY 
GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF 
GOVERNANCE 
BOARD 
OF 
DIRECTOR 
TOP 
MANAGEMENT 
OVERALL 
GOVERNANCE 
Bahrain 40.8 % 78% 82.5% 63.75% 
Malaysia 50.5% 70.9% 24.3% 51.36% 
Table 6.20: Governance (Malaysia VS Bahrain) 
The table above show the disclosure themes that Islamic banking in Bahrain concentrate on. There is 
a high level of top management and board of director’s disclosure, which mostly consists of pictures 
of the top management and board of directors and their biographies. However, there is less disclosure 
on the guiding principles of governance. Furthermore, one of the interesting facts about Bahraini 
Islamic banks is that some of the banks do declare the use of an international governance standard, 
for instance in the annual report of Al-Salam bank 2014 page 4, as compared to Malaysia that only 
uses Malaysian standards for corporate governance. 
In addition, Malaysia does not concentrate on the top management disclosure theme. The minimal 
commitment to the top management disclosure is proven with a low score of 24.3 percent by 
Malaysia’s Islamic banks as compared to 82 percent in Bahrain. Looking at the majority of Bahraini 
Islamic banks’ annual reports, the top management biography proportion is too extensive for decent 
disclosure. 
Malaysia scores 10 percent higher than Bahrain in the guiding principles of governance even though 
Malaysia uses its own set of governance standards. The standards are mainly influenced by the 
Malaysia Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and the Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) with the latest amendment in 26 April 2017 superseding the MCCG 2012 issued by the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia. Compared to Bahrain, the latest Corporate Governance Code and 
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Principle was released on 16 March 2010 and was issued solely by the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce. 
Looking at the structure of corporate governance initiatives and bodies, Malaysia has an advantage 
compared to Bahrain. Thus, the corporate governance structure may explain the different figures 
between these two countries in table 6.20. Therefore, the findings seem to suggest that Malaysian 
Islamic banks are likely to have a better disclosure quality score as compared to Bahraini Islamic banks. 
Even though the rough score in the overall governance score shows that Bahrain is better, when a 
deeper analysis explores the themes involved (top management, board of director), the interpretation 
may change. 
Furthermore, for example, many Malaysian Islamic banks have their governance model disclosed in 
the annual report compared to Bahraini Islamic banks. For instance, Malaysia’s RHB Islamic bank 
annual report 2014 pg.16 is shown below: - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above provides clearer evidence of the commitment of Malaysian Islamic banks towards 
disclosing governance information with regards to the “guiding principle of governance themes”, 
Figure 6.15: Governance Model (RHB Islamic 2014 Annual Report, pg.16) 
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which explains why Malaysia has a higher score in that theme compared to Bahrain even though the 
overall governance score is led by Bahrain. With detailed themes, the true potential of disclosure 
information interpretation may be correctly identified. In the next page, more detailed themes will be 
discussed.  
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6.4.7. Disclosure Quality Comparison on 20 Themes 
 
 
Figure 6.16: 20 Themes Commitment by the Two Model 
Figure 6.16 above details the twenty themes under the seven main dimensions as discussed in 
“Chapter 3 Research Method & Methodology” on the structure of the themes. The themes help to 
further explain and investigate the performance of the disclosure in Malaysian and Bahraini models 
of Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, deeper thematic exploration in the annual report content analysis investigation may 
help identify the “true performers” and “fake performers” or, on the other hand, identify the real 
disclosure that Islamic banks are concentrating on. For instance, through the seven dimensions, 
Bahraini Islamic banks have superseded Malaysian Islamic banks’ score in the ethics dimension. 
However, with deeper themes, a clearer interpretation under the ethics dimensions can be found. 
Bahrain concentrates on Institutional ethics while Malaysian Islamic banks disclose more on Business 
ethics. This information informs us that Bahrain, in other words, concentrates on ethics with regards 
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to an Islamic bank’s ethical conduct inside the banks, for instance in the disclosure of a formal ethical 
code of conduct and employee training on ethical policy. On the other hand, Malaysian Islamic banks 
concentrate more on business ethics, which relates more to the relationship with other stakeholders, 
for example in the disclosure of promoting small businesses and the screening policy for 
environmental impact in channelling financing. Generally, based on the above example, if themes are 
properly designed, it will help capture important information and unveil differences for two or more 
comparisons, the same way that this study is conducted on the two countries that are synonymous 
with the two models of Islamic banks. 
Moreover, another signal that proves Bahraini Islamic banks perform better in one dimension while 
actually having deeper themes is that it actually concentrates on less important themes such as 
governance dimension, which has been discussed under table 6.18, where top management themes 
(82.5%) contribute to the high score in governance dimensions for Bahrain overall. Figure 6.18 below 
is an example of top management disclosure that contributes to the high governance dimension 
disclosure in Bahrain instead of more disclosure on governance model as in Malaysia in figure 6. 16 
before. 
 Figure 6.17: Top Management Picture Disclosure, Al-Baraka Bahrain 2013, pg.16, 
162 
 
Another important information to understand is Shariah dimension. Even though in overall Shariah 
score Malaysia performs better in disclosure, it is crucial to recognise that Bahraini Islamic banks 
disclose more on the “Shariah compliance on banking transactions and Islamic values” themes. This 
may signal important information about these two countries as the result may suggest that Bahraini 
Islamic banks concentrate more on banking transactions and Islamic values in order to be legitimate 
in the eyes of society. For instance, “Shariah compliance on banking transaction” themes concentrate 
on the technical side of Islamic business transactions. Furthermore, the “Islamic values” themes 
provide information that subjectively inform the reader of annual reports on the Islamic goodwill that 
the Islamic banks carry. For instance, as can be seen in the Islamic art and motifs in the annual report 
in the figure below:- 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18, may influence unknowledgeable readers to think that this bank is more Islamic than other 
Islamic banks if the reader has no proper training and is not exposed to prior knowledge before 
interacting with the annual report. 
However, Malaysian Islamic banks concentrate on something that has a real impact to society, for 
instance in the disclosure of zakat and benevolent loans (loan without interest). This is because a 
majority of Islamic banks in the Malaysian model pay zakat (religious levy) out of their business profit 
(0.025% before taxes) to charitable organisations on top of government zakat distribution bodies. For 
example, Bank Muamalat Malaysia Limited’s (BMMB) annual report 2014 page 130 below discloses 
Figure 6.18: Islamic Motives Bahrain Islamic bank 2011 Annual Report pg.5 
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their social responsibility focus grouped into community building, education support, environmental 
protection and poverty alleviation for zakat fund spending:-  
 
 
The above disclosure provides useful information to the readers and other stakeholders who are 
concerned with the banks’ zakat activity instead of just providing the monetary value of zakat in the 
annual report.  
However, a majority of Islamic banks in Bahrain do not pay zakat based on their interpretation of 
Islamic law on business zakat. For Bahrain, zakat payment is the individual responsibility of the 
customers and the shareholders. For example, see the statement of the First Energy bank annual 
report 2014 pg.37 that displays their view on the zakat payment responsibility standpoint. 
Overall, this section highlights the usefulness of having a detailed specification theme under a vast 
dimension to identify the real differences and impact of disclosure by the two countries. Thus, this can 
facilitate an understanding of the real path of the disclosure, whether it is more for stakeholders or 
just for legitimacy purposes.  
Figure 6.19: Zakat Fund Spending Focus Group, BMMB 2014 Annual Report pg.130 
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6.4.8. Unique and Universal Disclosure 
 
           Table 6.21: Unique & Universal Comparison (Malaysia-Bahrain) 
One of the distinct features of the Islamic bank disclosure categorisation is ‘unique’ disclosure, which 
refers to shariah and shariah governance dimension-related themes. This feature was first introduced 
by Belal et al. (2014) in their study of one particular bank for 28 years with the term ‘particular’ for 
Islamic themes disclosure. However, this thesis changes the term to ‘unique’ item of disclosure and 
adds the shariah governance framework as one of the dimensions to be scored, with an updated 
Islamic Finance Services Board standard for shariah governance framework [IFSB-10(2009)] compared 
to IFSB (2006) in Belal et al. (2014). Referring to table 6.21, it is obvious that Malaysia’s ‘unique’ 
disclosure is better than Bahraini Islamic banks with a score not less than 50 percent in each year from 
Unique & Universal Quality Disclosure  (Malaysia VS Bahrain)
Year
Observation
Unique 18 50.50% 14.70% 23.80% 71.40%
Universal 18 31.80% 16.80% 10.30% 69.20%
Unique 16 36.90% 10.40% 19% 57.10%
Universal 16 34.80% 10.70% 20.50% 56.40%
Unique 18 51.80% 19.70% 14.30% 90.50%
Universal 18 32.30% 18.40% 10.30% 76.90%
Unique 16 35.10% 9.50% 19% 57.10%
Universal 16 36.90% 11.50% 20.50% 66.70%
Unique 18 52.60% 20.40% 23.80% 100%
Universal 18 33.60% 21.10% 10.30% 89.70%
Unique 16 35.40% 10.10% 19% 52.40%
Universal 16 35.60% 11.90% 17.90% 66.70%
Unique 18 60.30% 17.30% 33.30% 95.20%
Universal 18 36.20% 16.70% 10.30% 69.20%
Unique 16 37.20% 9.60% 19% 57.10%
Universal 16 34.60% 9% 20.50% 48.70%
Unique 18 58.20% 15.50% 28.60% 80.90%
Universal 18 37.90% 19.20% 12.80% 74.40%
Unique 16 39% 11.70% 14.30% 61.90%
Universal 16 37.70% 9.50% 25.60% 56.40%
Unique 18 54.71% 17.68% 14.29% 100%
Universal 18 34.36% 18.26% 10.26% 89.74%
Unique 16 36.73% 10.11% 14.29% 61.90%
Universal 16 35.90% 10.40% 17.95% 66.67%
2014
MY
BH
Avg.5 Years
MY
BH
2012
MY
BH
2013
MY
BH
2010
MY
BH
2011
MY
BH
Ctry Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
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2010 to 2014. As compared to Bahrain, the unique disclosure is far less with an average of 36.73 
percent in five years. The above shows that Malaysia provides more information on shariah matters 
compared to Bahraini Islamic banks. This might be explained by the ‘top-down’ approach of the 
Malaysian administration in the government body, such as by the central bank and parliament itself. 
The classification of Malaysia as using a top-down approach in Islamic banks movements is supported 
by Belal et al. (2014).  
In the context of Malaysia, the effort and willingness of the top leaders in the central bank and 
parliament show how the Malaysian people as a society and the top organisations maintain such an 
excellent social contract. Moreover, the important roles played by the central bank and the parliament 
show the importance of stakeholders. This was proven by the latest Islamic Financial Services Act 
passed by parliament in 2013 that supersedes the Islamic banking act 1983 and Takaful act 1984. 
Furthermore, the Malaysian central bank’s biggest department is the Islamic banking department with 
the Shariah Advisory Council at the central bank level established in 1997, the earliest in the world. 
However, this may be compared to the Bahrain central bank where only Rule Book 2 exists in relation 
to Islamic banking and finance related matters and the creation of a national level shariah advisory 
body is still pending. 
Moving on to universal disclosure, Bahrain performs better compared to Malaysia, even though the 
score is not more than 50 percent, and this can give some hint as to the commitment of both countries 
towards universal disclosure. This seems to suggest that Bahraini Islamic banks’ disclosure is balanced 
between universal and Shariah-related themes but is lower in nature while Malaysia discloses more 
on unique disclosure themes compared to universal themes and the ‘unique’ disclosure is higher than 
universal disclosure. The differences between unique and universal disclosure answers the research 
question on the comparison of the two countries’ disclosure. 
In summary, Malaysia’s disclosure for ‘unique’ label disclosure is better than Bahraini Islamic banks 
and the reason is explained above. 
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6.4.9. Similarity & Diversification Thread of Disclosure between Islamic Banks (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
6.4.9.1. Malaysia Clustered Thread Disclosure Diversification 
 
 Figure 6.21: Malaysia Disclosure Thread between the Islamic banks Figure 6.20: Malaysia Diversification from the Thread in the Annual Report 
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Referring to figure 6.21, the threads show the disclosure similarity among Islamic banks in Malaysia. 
Later, the figure can be compared with the Bahraini Islamic banks’ thread. Islamic bank disclosure for 
all Islamic banks in Malaysia is not heavily similar. However, the thread shows that there are 
similarities between the performing banks. These are the top 3 performing Islamic banks in disclosure 
in ordinary and quality disclosure, namely Bank Islam Malaysia, Bank Rakyat Malaysia and Bank 
Muamalat Malaysia. This might suggest that these banks share the same vision and approach towards 
disclosure.  
Moreover, the diversification of the disclosure signal in which Islamic banks in Malaysia approach 
disclosure is not stagnant; it provides the freedom of presentation of disclosure. This openness on one 
side is noble. However, proper motivation and moral persuasion techniques by the central bank on 
social, shariah, environmental, ethics and governance disclosure might increase the potential of the 
disclosure. The above-mentioned techniques can be applied in the Malaysian case because the 
society’s values (religion-regulatory quality) are moderate. The majority of people from the society 
(executive, manager, senior management and board of directors) of the Islamic banks, coming from a 
background with similar values, seem to have a standard or principle that makes the disclosure as it is 
seen in the Malaysian Islamic bank context. 
The diversity and the rich disclosure of Malaysian Islamic banks can be seen in figure 6.20, where there 
are many captured disclosures, which portray the richness and variety of disclosure. The differences 
will be clearer when compared to the Bahraini context in the next section. On the other hand, these 
differences provide further insight in answering the research question derived from the research 
objectives. 
In the next section, the Bahraini Islamic banks’ thread and diversification will be illustrated and 
presented. 
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6.4.9.2. Bahrain Clustered Thread Disclosure Diversification  
  
 Figure 6.23: Bahrain Disclosure Thread between Islamic Banks Figure 6.22: Bahrain Diversification from the Thread in the Annual Report 
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It is apparent from figure 6.23 that the threads of disclosure among Islamic banks in Bahrain are almost 
99% similar to each other, covering and referencing each other. This is a striking finding compared to 
the Malaysian Islamic banks thread previously. One of the rational explanations for this is that Bahrain 
Islamic banks seem to have followed the same template or guideline provided by the AAOIFI and a 
further explanation might be that the culture of disclosure is not matured. In terms of society’s culture 
(importance of religion), Bahrain is well behind Malaysia at around 40% while Malaysia is around 80%. 
Islamic banks are well-grounded in the religion and geographical area in which they operate, and these 
play an important role in their disclosure behaviour. As argued by Sidney (1988), culture and 
environmental differences between countries and areas might influence the financial reporting 
regime; however, this thesis argues that it does not only influence financial reporting but also social 
reporting as well.  
Therefore, when looking at figure 6.22, there is less captured disclosure, which portrays poor and less 
diversity in Bahraini Islamic banks’ SEGE disclosure. The captured-image of disclosure in the annual 
reports tend to be distributed in the same area, southwest (refer to the compass guide) of figure 6.24. 
However, Malaysian Islamic banks’ disclosure distribution is quite evenly distributed. These two 
differences show that Malaysian Islamic banks are much more diverse in disclosure while Bahraini 
Islamic banks are much more concentrated in certain areas. 
Furthermore, to reiterate the findings in the four figures (6.20, 6.21, 6.22, and 6.23) in section ‘6.4.9. 
Similar & Diversification Thread of Disclosure between Islamic Banks (Malaysia Vs Bahrain)’, the thread 
symbolises the similarity of disclosure among Islamic banks in the country while the diversification in 
the thread shows the variation of the disclosure among Islamic banks in the country. Overall, in terms 
of variation, Malaysia has more variation in terms of disclosure as compared to Bahrain Islamic banks, 
and a further reasoning that might explain the variation will be explained in the discussion and 
conclusion chapter.  
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 Illustration of Interesting Quotes 
 
In this section, the thesis tries to provide some insight into interesting and peculiar quotes from the 
annual report analysis. This is beneficial as it may help to understand further the commitment of the 
Islamic banks and further explore the uniqueness of Islamic bank disclosure. Moreover, this section 
provides links and examples to the previous discussion by having quotes related to disclosure from 
Islamic banks’ annual reports, where the disclosure quotes are classified under specific themes. 
6.5.1. Social Internal Dimension Quotes 
 
Figure 6.24 : BIMB 2011 Annual Report pg.185 
Referring to figure 6.24, the above quotes show that Islamic banks appreciate not just the customer 
but extend the facilities to their own employees to benefit from the payment holiday programme. 
Furthermore, for the Islamic banking industry, this is the first one of its kind and not all Islamic banks 
offer this payment holiday scheme. This scheme helps customers save for the start of the academic 
year, and it is aimed at helping the family with school expenses. 
6.5.2. Shariah Dimension Quotes 
 
Figure 6.25:BIMB 2013 Annual Report pg. 150 
The Islamic banks have shown their commitment to shift to other, more reliable contracts as part of 
their financial solution. This commitment of disclosure belongs to the Shariah commitment theme, in 
particular inside the Shariah dimension. Malaysian Islamic banks demonstrate the moderate approach 
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by tolerating the financing contract that is preferred by their Middle Eastern partners. This will never 
happen on the Bahraini side. 
 
6.5.3. Social External Dimension Quotes  
 
 
Figure 6.26: B-Rakyat 2010 Annual Report pg.95 
In terms of social external, the opportunity provided by the banks to university students in giving work-
related experience is more or less the same as the Bahraini Islamic bank. Nonetheless, the only 
difference is that Bahraini Islamic banks usually disclose information without statistical evidence. 
Furthermore, on top of statistics, Malaysian Islamic banks usually pair their disclosure with graphics.  
6.5.4. Environmental Dimension Quotes 
 
 
Figure 6.27: HLIB 2014 Annual Report pg.16 
Islamic banks do disclose environmental initiatives, but this is still less compared to other dimensions. 
However, this is considered a unique and infrequent disclosure in the context of the Islamic banking 
industry. Furthermore, in comparison to the 16 Bahraini Islamic banks in the sample, not one has 
disclosure at the policy level for environmental causes. On another note, overall, Islamic banks in 
general still need to enrich themselves in terms of volume and quality of disclosure as the environment 
is one of the triple ‘E’ disclosure themes that are in the bottom three ranking. 
In the next two sub-sections, the governance (Shariah & general) sample will be illustrated. 
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6.5.5. Shariah Governance Dimension 
 
 
Table 6.22: RHB Islamic 2012 Annual Report, pg.223 
This is an example of the disclosure of Islamic banks’ shariah governance structure as not many Islamic 
banks illustrate it in graphical form. Many of the Islamic banks provide a shariah supervisory board 
report which is merely a declaration of the shariah compliance of the bank’s operation to gain 
legitimacy from society. However, small numbers of Islamic banks provide the reporting structure of 
the shariah governance unit in a graphic. Generally, the majority of the public only recognises the 
shariah supervisory board and has little knowledge about the shariah compliance and review unit, 
shariah advisory section and shariah risk management. These units handle and execute the processes 
in the shariah governance parameter. 
Moreover, the majority of disclosure is usually in the shape of a narrative. In the next sub-section, the 
general governance sample will be presented.   
173 
 
 
6.5.6. Governance Dimension Quotes 
 
 
Table 6.23:RHB Islamic 2012 Annual Report, pg.19 
Referring to table 6.23, the majority of Islamic banks have a clear governance model with at least each 
of the board of directors’ leading in several important committees. However, there are some Islamic 
banks that have a separate corporate governance committee instead of the traditional committees 
that are combined as a whole to be a governance model. Furthermore, there are not many Islamic 
banks that disclose their governance models in the annual report using a graphical medium. 
Moving further, the next sub-section is the most unusual disclosure of all Islamic banks under 
observation.  
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6.5.7. Unusual Disclosure Quotes 
 
 
Table 6.24: BMMB 2013 Annual report, pg.359 
The information on the figure above is one of a kind as no other Islamic bank in Malaysia or Bahrain 
discloses this detail. This type of disclosure is rare and distinct. Moreover, the bank normally only 
discloses Shariah non-compliance income in general. Certain Islamic banks disclose further by stating 
the source of the non–compliant income, which is normally from late penalty charges.  
Excess cash at the teller is common to professional bankers. However, the information is rarely 
disclosed to the public due to unknown and ambiguous excess sources of money. Moreover, this 
information has been disclosed in the Islamic bank’s annual report which is peculiar but informative. 
An example of this type of disclosure may signal that the above Islamic bank is trying its best to be as 
transparent as possible. 
In the next section, a summary of chapter six will be concluded generally while being as informative 
as possible to include all the discussions in the chapter. 
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 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 6 Ordinary & Quality (SEGE) Disclosure is one important chapter of findings where the findings 
employ the ‘double content analysis technique’. Moreover, this technique provides a rich amount of 
information and interpretation which has been presented and discussed previously in this chapter. 
This chapter provides insight into the Social, Shariah, Environment, Governance & Ethics (SEGE) 
disclosure within the lenses of ‘ordinary and quality’ disclosure in three important phases. 
The first phase represented the general findings in both countries to see the disclosure commitment 
of the Islamic banking industry as a whole. This is because studying these two countries allowed the 
results to have the closest interpretation for Islamic banking-related issues in general. As mentioned 
before, statistically, Malaysia has the greatest number of Islamic banks in the world and Bahrain has 
the second most. At the same time, Malaysia and Bahrain are the most advanced countries in Islamic 
banking development. Moreover, within these countries, many organisations support the 
establishment, movement, development and independence of the Islamic finance industry, which has 
been discussed in the background. Furthermore, these countries are known as the leaders in Islamic 
banking, with Malaysia known as having the Malaysian model of Islamic banking that leads in South 
East Asia and Bahrain representing the Middle Eastern model.  
The second phase explains the findings by dividing the results into two countries as a comparison, 
even though these two countries are categorised as the leaders for the Islamic bank movement. 
However, to get a deeper understanding of these two countries, a deeper analysis needs to be 
explained. By having a comparison for these two countries, it is obvious that there are differences as 
explained and discussed in the chapter previously, where Malaysian Islamic banks prove to be better 
(in SEGE) overall and in a majority of other important dimensions and themes such as Shariah, Shariah 
governance, social internal and environment. On the other hand, Bahrain discloses more on the 
Governance dimension and supersedes Malaysia in Social external disclosure by only 2.6 percent in 
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ordinary disclosure and 6.9 percent in quality disclosure. The differences of the disclosure portray 
other factors that may explain the disparity, such as the administrative culture of a country, the 
regulatory quality of a country, how society perceives religion, the history of the country, how 
structured the societal organisation is in their religious and worldly affairs, and the people of the 
country itself. Many of these are subjective but some can be tested with relevant tools and indicators 
presented in chapter 7 while the subjectivity may be explained by the information discussed in chapter 
8. 
The third phase presents an even deeper result that answers research question 4 on individual bank 
performance. In the third phase, the differences between the two models and countries become 
clearer with the display of the movement of the banks in ordinary and quality disclosure which has 
been presented and discussed before in sub-section 6.4.3. The differences of the top ten banks 
confirm the previous country level findings in sub-section 6.4.1 and 6.4.2. This comparison of each 
bank by two countries and by disclosure quality is a new technique in Islamic social reporting literature, 
if not in ethical literature in general. Country differences can be double-checked by taking a closer 
look into each individual Islamic bank and comparing them together to get any results that may explain 
the differences at the country level.  
In conclusion, chapter 6 provides information on the Islamic banks’ general disclosure as a whole 
system and then takes a closer look into the countries’ differences with regard to ordinary and quality 
disclosure. Furthermore, this provides insight into each individual Islamic bank to deliver a deeper 
understanding on both the Islamic banking model and the countries’ disclosure differences. In addition, 
chapter 6 provides the answers to research questions 1, 2 and 4. 
To further prove the findings and investigate the disclosure of these countries. A supplementary 
estimation and test is conducted and explained in the next chapter. On another note, to understand 
both chapter 6 and 7’s findings completely, ‘chapter 8 Thesis Discussion and Conclusion’ needs to be 
read in conjunction with the previous chapters.  
177 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
(Regulatory & Religion Impact on Quality of 
[SEGE] Disclosure) 
  
178 
 
CHAPTER 7 REGULATORY AND RELIGION IMPACT ON QUALITY 
OF (SEGE) DISCLOSURE 
 Introduction 
This chapter consists of four main sections, namely ‘7.2. Modelling Process and Regressions 
Estimation’, ‘7.3. Pooled Model Estimation (Malaysia-Bahrain)’, ‘7.4. Comparison of Malaysia and 
Bahrain’ and ‘7.5. Conclusion’ 
The objective of chapter 7 is to provide further support for the findings in chapter 6. In chapter 6, the 
main findings in the narrative and statistics show that Malaysia, which is more religious and is better 
in regulatory quality compared to Bahrain, performs better in SEGE disclosure in both ordinary and 
quality SEGE disclosure. Moreover, the movement of the individual Islamic banks in Malaysia in 
ordinary ranking and quality ranking provides further evidence that Malaysia is much better in SEGE 
disclosure. 
The differences between these two Islamic banking models, despite being the two leading countries 
in the Islamic banking industry, are obvious. These differences between the countries are portrayed 
in chapter 6 and may be influenced by many factors. However, this thesis is interested in exploring the 
factors that relate closely to Islamic banks, which are religiosity (as a proxy of society’s ethos) and 
regulatory quality (as a representation of society’s effectiveness in administration). All of these are 
considered the values of a country, and this is explained in chapter 8 as this thesis believes that the 
country’s values are potentially one of the many factors that determines the nature of Islamic bank 
disclosure in a country. 
Furthermore, chapter 7 will provide statistical estimation evidence using a panel random effects 
regression analysis with a robust standard error to test the significance of religiosity and regulatory 
quality towards SEGE disclosure quality in the sample as a whole (Malaysia & Bahrain) and as a country 
on its own. The results in chapter 6 serve as complementary evidence and strengthen the main 
findings in chapter 6. 
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 Modelling Process and Regression Estimation 
7.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The SEGE disclosure quality score provides a measure of the extent of total disclosure which are 
related to the Social External, Social Internal, Shariah, Shariah Governance, Environment, Ethics and 
Governance dimension disclosure category. These indices are computed for the period of 5 years from 
2010 to 2014. These scores will later be distributed into 7 dimensions and 20 themes accordingly and 
then they will be explained. 
Total SEGE Quality/Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 170 37.01% 11.88% 18.33% 68.33% 
2011 170 37.79% 14.02% 15.00% 81.67% 
2012 170 38.04% 15.65% 15.00% 93.33% 
2013 170 40.34% 13.12% 20.00% 78.33% 
2014 170 41.76% 13.62% 18.33% 73.33% 
5yrs 170 38.99% 13.67% 15.00% 93.33% 
SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score   
Table 7.1: Yearly Overall Quality SEGE Disclosure Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics in Table 7.1 above holds important information that will inform of the result 
of the later estimation regression. It is important to notice that the score, on average, increases even 
though not by a huge amount. This means the trend is positive. In the later part when the score is 
divided into countries, Malaysia maintains its increment and positive trend while Bahrain fluctuates 
and is inconsistent.  
This is important to note at the early stage as, in studying Islamic banks in two or more countries, the 
differences need to be addressed and explained. This is because the result of the estimation might be 
significant in pooled data; however, the contribution may be made by a certain dominant country. 
This will be explained further in the estimation result. 
Furthermore, this study suggests that future research needs to consider digging into deep information, 
such as pairing the relevant results with statistics in each country that could explain and back up the 
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thesis or research objective and hypothesis. In addition, interviews are another option, although they 
are time consuming. Moreover, this is important to verify further research findings. 
 
 Malaysia Bahrain 
 Obv Avg. Score Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Obv Avg. Score Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
2010 90 38.3% 14.3% 18.3% 68.3% 80 35.5% 8.4% 20% 53.3% 
2011 90 39.1% 17.5% 15% 81.6% 80 36.2% 8.7% 25% 56.6% 
2012 90 40.2% 19.7% 15% 93.3% 80 35.5% 9.1% 18% 56.6% 
2013 90 44.6% 15.5% 21.6% 78.3% 80 35.5% 7.6% 20% 48.3% 
2014 90 45% 16.2% 18.3% 73.3% 80 38.1% 9.1% 21% 58.3% 
5yrs  90 41.4% 16.6% 15% 93.3% 80 36.1% 8.4% 18% 58.3% 
Table 7.2: Bahrain & Malaysia Descriptive Overall 
Parallel to what has been informed earlier on the previous page, table 7.2 show that Malaysia provides 
a consistent positive trend even though not by a huge amount. However, Bahrain’s statistics fluctuate 
and are inconsistent. Moreover, observing the maximum value, it is clear that Islamic banks in 
Malaysia disclose at a higher rate compared to Bahrain where Bahrain falls only between 48% to 58% 
as compared to Malaysia (68%-93%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.3 above refers to the full sample of descriptive statistics for the seven dimensions of disclosure. 
This will later be divided into more spectrums of which 20 themes are explained in the next page. In 
general, the most disclosed information in the SEGE dimensions are governance and shariah 
governance while the dimensions that are ideally expected by social and environmental advocates 
(environment/ethics/social internal/social external) are on the lower end of the spectrum. Generally, 
7 SEGE Dimensions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Shariah - D1 170 18.7% 9.8% 0% 51% 
Shariah Governance – D2 170 44.6% 12.2% 0% 83% 
Social External – D3 170 16.5% 18% 0% 74% 
Social Internal – D4 170 25.4% 15.9% 0% 100% 
Environment – D5 170 2.4% 7.6% 0% 47% 
Ethics – D6 170 6.6% 7.1% 0% 35% 
Governance – D7 170 57.4% 18.8% 8% 96% 
SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score   
Table 7.3: 7 Dimensions Descriptive Full Sample 
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the statistics signal that Islamic banks give more attention towards governance type disclosure than 
disclosure related to its business survival. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referring to the table 7.4 above, some of the findings are in accordance with the previous literature 
and earlier studies, for instance Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) with the lowest level of disclosure for 
shariah themes and community related themes. Moreover, the lowest of all themes is dominated by 
environment based themes that ideally can be one of the important aspects for disclosure, as 
advocated by Rizk (2014) on how Islam promotes environmental sustainability. In addition, the social 
20 SEGE Themes 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SHARIAH – D1 170 18.7% 9.8% 0% 51% 
T1-Shariah Compliance 170 23.2% 20.3% 0% 75% 
T2-shariah Awareness 170 19.3% 19.4% 0% 85.7% 
T3-Zakat 170 19.9% 16.5% 0% 62.5% 
T4-Benevolent Loan 170 4.8% 9.3% 0% 44.4% 
T5-Islamic Value 170 29.4% 18.5% 0% 100% 
            
SHARIAH GOVERNANCE –D2 170 44.6% 12.2% 0% 83% 
T6-Shariah Governance Framework 170 9.5% 15.5% 0% 83.3% 
T7-Shariah Supervisory Board 170 62.3% 14.4% 0% 100% 
            
SOCIAL EXTERNAL –D3 170 16.5% 18% 0% 74% 
T8-Community Involvement 170 11.4% 20.1% 0% 87.5% 
T9-Charity 170 24.9% 23% 0% 87.4% 
T10-Sponsorship 170 14.3% 22.4% 0% 87.5% 
            
SOCIAL INTERNAL –D4 170 25.4% 15.9% 0% 100% 
T11-Human Resource Management 170 16.6% 21.5% 0% 100% 
T12-Reward & Benefit 170 32.0% 15.2% 0% 85.7% 
            
ENVIRONMENT –D5 170 2.4% 7.6% 0% 47% 
T13-Nature 170 3.1% 10.6% 0% 66.7% 
T14-Wild Life & Animal Right  170 1.6% 7.5% 0% 50% 
T15-Recycle 170 3.1% 11.6% 0% 66.7% 
            
ETHICS –D6 170 6.6% 7.1% 0% 35% 
T16-Institutional Ethics 170 11.6% 13.3% 0% 66.6% 
T17-Business Ethics 170 2.4% 5.3% 0% 27.2% 
            
GOVERNANCE –D7 170 57.4 18.8 8% 96% 
T18-Board of Director 170 74.2% 20.3% 10% 100% 
T19-Top Management 170 51.3% 46.1% 0% 100% 
T20-Guiding Principle of Governance 170 45.0% 19.1% 0% 91% 
SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score T=Theme D= Dimension 
Table 7.4: 20 Themes SEGE Descriptive 
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role of the Islamic banking environment is still below expectations if the society-related themes of 
SEGE disclosure are looked at, and this is in accordance with Kamla and Rammal (2013) study. 
The top three disclosure themes were board of director (T-18) 74.2%, Shariah supervisory board (T-7) 
62.3% and top management (T-19) 51.3%. These findings seem to be consistent with previous research 
where Islamic banks concentrate more on the directors on a board and its management compared to 
social and community themes (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007, Hassan and Harahap, 2010, Belal et al., 2014). 
As discussed previously, the themes that relate to governance are given more attention by the Islamic 
banks due to the need to survive and for the sake of powerful and high influence stakeholders. Moving 
further, the table below will provide 3 level disclosure information. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.5 shows the 3 level disclosure commitment as whole for Malaysia and Bahrain. It is clear that 
level 1, which is phrases level disclosure, is dominant as compared to level 2 and level 3. This is, 
however, expected as the higher the level the more requirements need to be fulfilled. Interestingly, it 
seems that Islamic banks across the two countries seem to disclose statistical proof (level 3) more as 
compared to policy disclosure (level 2). 
These statistics are for the whole sample. However, when the statistics are segregated into countries, 
the differences between the countries will be clearer. This will be presented in the next page. 
  
SEGE 
Disclosure 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Level 1 170 31.20588 14.76398 7 138 
Level 2 170 9.052941 14.17568 0 82 
Level 3 170 12.90588 10.25431 0 74 
Graphic 170 6.523529 12.39594 0 82 
SEGE : Shariah, Social, Environmental, Governance & Ethics Score  
Level 1 = Disclosure at the level of phrases, Level 2 = Disclosure at the level of policy 
and graphic, Level 3 = Disclosure at the level of statistical figure 
Graphic= Disclosure of picture, designer table. Details of procedure of level 1,2 & 3 
explained in chapter 4 section 4.3.7 Quality Content Analysis Score 
Table 7.5: 3 Level Disclosure Descriptive 
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MALAYSIA      
SEGE 
Disclosure 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Level 1 90 30.17 17.60 7 138 
Level 2 90 11.20 17.77 0 82 
Level 3 90 16.13 12.55 0 74 
Graphic 90 8.48 15.89 0 82 
SEGE : Shariah, Social, Environmental, Governance & Ethics Score   
Level 1 = Disclosure at the level of phrases, Level 2 = Disclosure at the level of 
policy and graphics, Level 3 = Disclosure at the level of statistical figures 
Graphic= Disclosure of picture, designer table. For a detailed procedure for level 
1,2 and 3 kindly refer to the methodology chapter 
Table 7.6: Malaysian Islamic Banks 3 level Commitment 
BAHRAIN      
SEGE 
Disclosure 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Level 1 80 32.38 10.72 7 55 
Level 2 80 6.638 7.943 0 47 
Level 3 80 9.28 4.73 0 20 
Graphic 80 4.33 5.91 0 25 
SEGE : Shariah, Social, Environmental, Governance & Ethics Score   
Level 1 = Disclosure at the level of phrases, Level 2 = Disclosure at the level of 
policy and graphic, Level 3 = Disclosure at the level of statistical figure 
Graphic= Disclosure of picture, designer table. For a detailed procedure for level 
1,2 and 3 kindly refer to the methodology chapter 
Table 7.7: Bahraini Islamic Banks 3 level Commitment 
The commitment between Malaysia and Bahrain can be clearly seen in the comparison of table 7.6 
and 7.7 above. Malaysia is way above Bahrain in level 3 disclosure with 16 counts on average 
compared to 9 counts for Bahrain. In Bahrain, the higher the level, the lesser the disclosure. However, 
for Malaysia, the trend is the same as the whole sample discussed previously in the last page. This is 
another indicator to show that, in order to study Islamic banks’ social reporting disclosure, an ideal 
study needs to segregate the results by each country as each country has different levels of 
stakeholder maturity, cultural diversity and values that cannot be generalised. The different statistical 
results for both countries have their own reasoning and interpretation based on the influence and 
sensitivity of the stakeholders inside each country in addition to the cultural setting and countries’ 
values in religiosity and regulatory adherence. This will be discussed further in chapter 8 discussion 
and conclusion. 
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7.2.2. Correlation of Variable 
 
Table 7.8:Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
  
PEARSON CORRELATION 
SEGE 
SCORE 
REGULATORY 
QUALITY 
IMPORTANT 
OF RELIGION 
LISTED 
BANK 
AGE 
BOD SIZE 
SSB 
SIZE 
NED SIZE PROFITABILITY  ROA 
GDP 
(GDP 
GROWTH 
RATE) 
SEGE DISCLOSURE SCORE 1            
REGULATORY QUALITY 0.011 1           
IMPORTANT OF RELIGION 0.1939* -0.4792* 1          
LISTED 0.3231* 0.1612* -0.3364* 1         
BANK AGE 0.5623* 0.0779* -0.0917* 0.2936* 1        
BOD SIZE 0.2851* 0.1235* -0.33* 0.2583* 0.2066* 1       
SSB SIZE 0.3999* -0.0551* 0.5284* 0.0381 0.3067* 0.0542* 1      
NED -0.2212* -0.041 0.0718* 0.0432 -0.4414* 0.057* 0.0362 1     
SIZE 0.4042* -0.2668* 0.567* 0.1428* 0.2607* 0.0198 0.5139* 0.1549* 1    
PROFITABILITY  0.1857* -0.303* 0.5156* -0.1752* 0.0644* -0.1698* 0.2853* 0.0753* 0.512* 1   
ROA 0.0719* -0.2128* 0.1987* -0.0362 0.1207* -0.0146 0.0753* -0.0232 0.1723* 0.5723* 1  
GDP (GDP GROWTH RATE) 0.098* -0.5916* 0.6698* -0.2254* -0.0576* -0.1962* 0.2667* 0.022 0.3877* 0.3805* 0.1731* 1 
This table displays the Pearson correlation matrix for the covariates: the test variable, interest variable and main control variable. SEGE score is the score derived from the quality disclosure score of the 
annual report. Regulatory quality is the score gathered from world governance indicator. Religiosity is the data gathered from world values survey based on the percentage of respondents indicating 
that religion is important to them. Listed: The dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank age since its 
foundation. BOD Size: Number of board members. SSB Size: Number of Shariah Supervisory Board Members. NED: Percentage of Non-Executive Directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of 
the total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of the net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of the country 
as a proxy for macroeconomic factors. *: Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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A correlation matrix analysis is carried out to detect any possible autocorrelation between SEGE 
quality disclosure with each interesting and main control variable. This is to ensure that the correlation 
between each variable is at an acceptable level as having too high a correlation might affect the 
result’s reliability. In addition, the correlation matrix coefficient is also expected to assess and test the 
construct validity of the measurement and to check for multi-collinearity.  Overall, there is no 
significantly high correlation between the variables involved. Referring to the table 7.8 in the last page, 
the Pearson correlation shows the association of each variable and the significant association is set 
and identified at a 95% confidence level or is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
The results show that SEGE score is significant on almost all variables. Most of these results are in 
agreement with the previous literature. For instance, SSB is positively significant with SEGE disclosure 
which is in agreement with Mallin et al. (2014) and Farook et al. (2011) as they argue that larger sizes 
of SSBs lead to higher social responsibility disclosure due to an increase in the capacity of the 
monitoring role. 
Moreover, the proportion of the BOD is highly significant to SEGE disclosure and is positively 
associated with SEGE disclosure quality. This suggests the positive impact of board size on SEGE 
disclosure. The significant correlation between the majority of all of the control variables and the 
dependant variables signals the importance and significance of controlling for these variables in the 
regression estimation. 
Furthermore, as far as multi collinearity is concerned, multi collinearity is tested based on the 
correlation incorporating all independent and control variables. All correlation score matrices are less 
than 0.8, the cut-off limit generally suggested by prior literature, as multi collinearity is likely to exist 
between the scores of 0.8 and above as argued by Gujarati and Porter (2003). The results from table 
6.8 above suggest there is nothing to be concerned about for multi collinearity between the variables. 
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7.2.3. Hausman Test 
 
Chi2 (9) = (b-B) ‘ [(v_b-v_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 = 7.97 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.5370 
(The prob>chi2 suggest that the random effect is favourable compared to the 
fixed effect estimation) 
(v_b-v_B is not positive) 
Table 7.9: Hausman Test for the Model 
 
The Hausman test was undertaken to determine whether the consistent fixed effect (FE) or the 
efficient random effect (RE) is suitable for the model estimator (Stata Journal, 2017). To perform this, 
the estimation for the random effect is run and stored in the Stata system and the fixed effect 
estimation was refitted to make it current. Then, the Hausman test was run. The results above indicate 
that the random effect is more efficient and suitable for the model estimation since the p-value is 
more than 0.05. Furthermore, for the full results and details of the Hausman test, please refer to 
Appendix 13. 
Moreover, after confirming a suitable random effect estimator, the Breush and Pagan Langrangian 
Multiplier test for Random Effect was conducted to assess whether the random effect (RE) estimator 
is suitable compared to the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator. The test is presented in the next 
page. 
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7.2.4. Breush and Pagan Langrangian Multiplier test for Random Effect 
 
Chibar2(01) = 152.40 
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000  
(Random Effect Suitable for the estimation) 
Table 7.10: Lagrange Multiplier (LM)Test 
 
The essence of the Lagrange multiplier (LM) is that the variance across entities is assumed to be  zero 
(Torres-Reyna, 2007). Moreover, it helps in making a decision between the random effect and simple 
OLS regression (Stata Journal, 2017). Based on the result, the null (there is no difference across units) 
was successfully rejected. There is evidence that there are significant differences between units or, in 
other terms, there is a panel effect. Therefore, the random effect estimator is more appropriate for 
the regression estimation. To get the full results and details of the Lagrange Multiplier test, please 
refer to Appendix 14. 
Based on the test results from the Hausman test and Lagrange multiplier (LM) previously, the thesis 
employed a random effect estimator based on the assumption of restrictive error terms’ correlation. 
Furthermore, the estimated standard errors were corrected to control for heteroscedasticity and 
cluster at the unit level. The command included the parameter [ xtreg variable 1,2,3…. n, re robust 
cluster (id) ] to ensure that the best possible measurement was taken in the estimation. The main 
model for the estimation regression will be presented in the next page and subsection. 
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 Pooled Model Estimation (Malaysia-Bahrain) 
7.3.1. Main Quality Score & Model Estimation 
 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable: id  
   
R-sq:   
within  = 0.1779  
between = 0.5387  
overall = 0.4921  
SEGE Disclosure Coef. P>z 
Regulatory Quality .742264 0.006 
Religiosity .267507 0.001 
Listed .096629 0.016 
Bank Age .006424 0.000 
BOD Size .006729 0.212 
SSB Size .0000735 0.988 
NED -.01019 0.671 
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.0046 0.499 
Profitability (ln Net 
income) 
.001652 0.422 
ROA -.05645 0.332 
GDP(GDP Growth 
Rate) 
-.14224 0.805 
_cons -.43072 0.045 
   
SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
This table displays the main model random effect estimation. SEGE Score: The score derived 
from the quality disclosure score from the annual report. Regulatory Quality: The score 
gathered from the world governance indicator. Religiosity: The data gathered from the world 
values survey based on the percentage of respondents indicating that religion is important 
to them. Listed: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange 
of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. 
BOD size: Number of board members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory board 
members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Size: Natural logarithm 
of total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a 
country as a proxy for macroeconomic factors. Standard error is robust and adjusted for 34 
clusters in ID. 
Table 7.11 : Main Model Estimation (Pooled-Malaysia & Bahrain) 
Referring to table 7.11, R-square indicates that the model explains 49.21% of the variability of the 
response data around the mean. Compared to a similar study investigating the effect of religiosity, the 
R-squared does not go very far in explaining the model. For instance, in Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) 
the model’s R-squared is 54.9%, suggesting that religiosity impacts earning transparency disclosure 
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positively. Moreover, there are studies where the R squared only explains between 20% to 25%. For 
example, the study of Du (2013) had a 22.5% R-squared and found that religiosity could restrain the 
manager from unethical behaviour. Furthermore, in literature that studies religiosity and risk, the R 
squared model of Gao et al. (2017) was at 53.3%  and Chircop et al. (2017) was at 33.9%, where they 
found that religiosity also affected risk-taking behaviour. Therefore, it is understandable that 
religiosity might have be influential and explain social disclosure since it is proven in the literature to 
explain ethical behaviour, risk, and social responsibility (Gao et al., 2017, Chircop et al., 2017, 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2015, Walker et al., 2012, McGuire et al., 2012b, McGuire et al., 2012a). 
The summary of the main model presented in table 7.11 is the main interest of the research. It serves 
as a benchmark for the Islamic banking industry as the countries involved in the pooled estimation are 
countries that play an important role in the Islamic banking and finance field. Moreover, both 
countries have initiatives for promoting and sustaining the Islamic banking and finance business, even 
though there will be many differences between the two countries. Nevertheless, the two countries 
are key players and the main drivers in shaping the Islamic finance world (Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous, 
2013). Refer to Appendix 15 for the full results and details of the main model. 
The main interest variable is significant at 5% and 1% for both regulatory quality and religiosity. It is 
argued that developing countries like Malaysia and Bahrain might have less awareness of regulatory 
quality (Azmat and Samaratunge, 2009). However, the results are supported by Djalilov and Holscher 
(2017) who found that banks are likely to engage in social responsibility activities when the regulatory 
quality level increases. Furthermore, banks are an important institution in the economy of a country. 
Banks are normally well governed compared to other business entities such as the food and beverage 
business industry.  Moreover, banks anywhere in the world are governed and regulated by central 
banks which make regulatory quality performance inevitable in affecting bank activities. This thesis is 
in accordance with de Villiers and Marques (2016) where social responsibility disclosure is better in a 
country that is more democratic and has better regulatory quality. 
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In terms of religiosity, since the individual orientation of a religion’s ethics influences the social 
responsibility direction (Jamali and Sdiani (2013), it is possible that large numbers of individuals that 
work in the bank can influence the bank’s orientation towards social reporting. The religiosity 
estimation being highly significant towards SEGE disclosure might be explained by the above 
discussion. Moreover, Dyreng et al. (2012) found that religiosity affects financial reporting and this 
might possibly extend to social reporting as well since a high association with religiosity is proven to 
reduce irregularity in financial reporting (McGuire et al., 2011). This thesis advocates that religiosity 
has a positive relationship towards social reporting and the religiosity of a society plays an important 
role in shaping Islamic bank social reporting. 
Even though the results suggest that religiosity and regulatory quality have a significant effect towards 
the SEGE disclosure quality of Islamic banks, the results need to be paired with other separate 
regression estimations by both countries separately and utilise other relevant statistics for the 
variables that cannot be tested due to slow moving data (changes over long periods of time), in order 
to see which countries have a significant effect. In the later part in this chapter, the slow-moving data 
(Religiosity) will be compared between countries to see which countries are really affected by 
religiosity and which countries are most likely to disclose more SEGE disclosure. 
The significance of religiosity towards disclosure can be linked to the social norms theory where 
religiosity affects ethical decisions inside the corporate environment as part of the values embedded 
in a society (Adhikari, 2014). Moreover, the wider coverage of Islamic bank stakeholders also includes 
the wider society, which makes the moral responsibility of Islamic banks tied to the demand of societal 
norms (Reno et al., 1993). The study’s findings are in one way or another connected and in agreement 
with Walker et al. (2012) where ethical judgement is influenced by religiosity, such as in this study, 
and social disclosure (judgement to disclose information) is influenced by religiosity. Furthermore, Du 
(2013) findings support that religion can also influence managers to disclose ethically.  
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Furthermore, referring to table 7.11, apart from the interest variable discussed previously, there are 
control variables that are significant towards the disclosure of Islamic banks, namely bank age (age of 
the bank since establishment). The thesis found that the age of the banks is positively significant 
towards SEGE disclosure, and this results in agreement with Roberts (1992) where she advocates that 
the longer the company’s existence, the more engagement it has with social responsibility activity and 
social reporting initiatives so as to care for company reputation. This result is also consistent with 
Brammer et al. (2007) and Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) where they found that large banks are likely to 
monitor activities that will affect wider groups of stakeholders. Furthermore, the results are also in 
line with Mallin et al. (2014) where they specifically study Islamic banks as the sample, which are a 
stronger link to this thesis. In the next section, the main model will be tested by adding more relevant 
control variables to test whether the interest variable’s (religiosity and  regulatory quality) significant 
value changes. 
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7.3.2. Robustness and Sensitivity of Model 
7.3.2.1. Logit and Probit Model 
INTEREST VARIABLE High_Low_Quality SEGE Disclosure  
 Logit Probit 
Regulatory Quality 44.04* 25.09* 
 (23.40) (13.34) 
   
Religiosity 7.487* 4.203* 
 (4.289) (2.431) 
FIRM LEVEL CONTROL    
Listed 2.932 1.528 
 (2.376) (1.296) 
   
Bank Age 0.171 0.0943 
 (0.108) (0.0611) 
   
BOD Size 0.576** 0.320** 
 (0.253) (0.142) 
   
SSB Size -0.0738 -0.0245 
 (0.429) (0.249) 
   
NED -0.697 -0.203 
 (2.167) (1.245) 
   
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.0170 -0.0106 
 (0.816) (0.469) 
   
ROA -9.371* -4.796* 
 (5.337) (2.874) 
   
Profitability (ln Net income) 0.204 0.0900 
 (0.172) (0.0931) 
   
COUNTRY LEVEL CONTROL     
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -12.14 -2.458 
 (34.73) (19.22) 
   
_cons  -40.72** -23.31** 
 (19.99) (11.42) 
   
lnsig2u 1.848*** 0.759 
_cons (0.691) (0.689) 
   
N 170 170 
   
Standard errors in parentheses                               * p<0.1        ** p<0.05      ***p<0.01 
This table displays the Logit and Probit Panel Data Regression. Hi_Lo SEGE Score: High performance Disclosure=1 Low 
Performance Disclosure. Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance indicator. Religiosity: the 
data gathered from the world values survey based on the percentage of respondents indicating that religion is 
important to them. Listed: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the 
respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: Number of board 
members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside 
the board. Size: Natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings 
before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a country as proxy 
for macroeconomic factors.  
Table 7.12 : Logit & Probit Model Regression Panel Data 
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In order to test the robustness of the main model, the logit and probit regression was conducted. The 
high-performance group and low performance group of the disclosure score was determined and 
labelled as (1) and (0). This later was regressed using a logit and probit command for panel data 
(Statistic---->Binary Outcomes---->Panel Logistic Regression---->Panel Logistic Regression). 
Referring to table 7.12, the results show that when regulatory and religiosity increase, the probability 
for high disclosure also increases. The result is identical for both logit and probit models at the 10% 
significance level. This is one of the extra methods to investigate whether the variable in the model 
can explain the SEGE disclosure and to test for the robustness of the model created. 
Moving further, another method to test the model’s robustness is by adding a relevant control variable 
to the main model to observe the changes of the significant value in the interest variable (regulatory 
quality and religiosity). This will be presented and discussed in the next sub section. 
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7.3.2.2. Adding Control Variable 
INTEREST VARIABLE Quality SEGE Disclosure (Robust Std. Err. -Std. Err. Adjusted for 34 clusters in id) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulatory Quality 0.764*** 0.772*** 0.773*** 0.769*** 0.740*** 0.634** 
 (0.245) (0.248) (0.249) (0.248) (0.272) (0.281) 
       
Religiosity 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.279*** 0.272*** 0.276*** 0.283*** 
 (0.0751) (0.0743) (0.0752) (0.0790) (0.0863) (0.0876) 
FIRM LEVEL CONTROL             
Listed 0.0948** 0.0970** 0.0910** 0.0809 0.0808 0.0846 
 (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0419) (0.0507) (0.0506) (0.0520) 
       
Bank Age 0.00641*** 0.00639*** 0.00658*** 0.00657*** 0.00660*** 0.00627*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00111) (0.00119) (0.00122) (0.00127) (0.00116) 
       
BOD Size 0.00616 0.00668 0.00660 0.00645 0.00650 0.00658 
 (0.00510) (0.00533) (0.00536) (0.00540) (0.00545) (0.00540) 
       
SSB Size 0.000406 0.000261 -0.000153 0.000132 -0.0000414 -0.00155 
 (0.00440) (0.00444) (0.00451) (0.00456) (0.00486) (0.00489) 
       
NED -0.0113 -0.00944 -0.00637 -0.00632 -0.00711 -0.0118 
 (0.0249) (0.0243) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0246) (0.0251) 
       
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.00199 -0.00482 -0.00479 -0.00752 -0.00732 -0.00603 
 (0.00583) (0.00682) (0.00677) (0.00655) (0.00662) (0.00623) 
       
ROA -0.0314 -0.0558 -0.0620 -0.0587 -0.0592 -0.0702 
 (0.0476) (0.0574) (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0600) (0.0627) 
       
Profitability (ln Net income)  0.00162 0.00170 0.00163 0.00165 0.00153 
  (0.00200) (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00209) (0.00197) 
       
Ownership   -0.0161 -0.0274 -0.0270 -0.0235 
   (0.0161) (0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0255) 
       
Size (Paid-up Capital 1 bill)    0.0208 0.0208 0.0224 
    (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0283) 
COUNTRY LEVEL CONTROL             
GDP (GDP Growth Rate)     -0.136 -0.298 
     (0.581) (0.626) 
       
Corruption Control (WGI)      0.173 
      (0.117) 
       
_cons -0.461 -0.455 -0.454 -0.425 -0.402 -0.438 
 (0.198) (0.199) (0.200) (0.191) (0.204) (0.207) 
       
N 170 170 170 170 170 170 
       
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 SEGE : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & 
Ethics Score 
This table displays the main model estimation. SEGE Score: The score derived from the quality disclosure score of the annual report. Regulatory Quality: 
The score gathered from the world governance indicator. Religiosity: The data gathered from the world values survey based on percentage of 
respondents indicating that religion is important to them. Listed: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the 
respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: The number of board members. SSB size: The number of 
shariah supervisory board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of the total assets. Ownership: 
Percentage of ownership by public. Profitability: Natural logarithm of net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. 
GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of the country as a proxy for macroeconomic factors. Corruption Control: World Governance Indicator 
score. Standard error is robust and adjusted for 34 clusters in ID. 
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The discussion in section 7.3.2.2 is still on the main model. However, the main model has been tested 
with the addition of a control variable to determine whether regulatory quality and religiosity are still 
significant. Overall, for the pooled data (both countries), there is evidence that regulatory quality and 
religiosity significantly affect SEGE disclosure positively. However, to get more accurate results and 
interpretations for individual countries, a separate religiosity scores needs to be compared for each 
country. From the above results, the thesis may suggest that the higher the religiosity, the higher the 
SEGE disclosure is for the banks. On the other hand, which countries are more affected can be seen 
with the religiosity score obtained in the World Value Survey. 
The relationship of religiosity with SEGE disclosure has been determined. However, to see which 
country performs better, the real religiosity score needs to be observed.  
COUNTRY RELIGIOSITY SCORE (WORLD VALUE SURVEY) 
MALAYSIA 84.8 % 
BAHRAIN 40.6 % 
Table 7.13: Religiosity by Country 
The statistical estimation suggests that the importance of religion affects SEGE disclosure positively. 
Therefore, it is important to observe the real difference between the countries. This is because 
religious perspectives do not change in a short time of period. Referring to table 7.13 above, it is clear 
that Malaysia’s score is high and the difference between Malaysia and Bahrain is huge (44.2%). This 
signals that between Malaysia and Bahrain, Malaysian Islamic banks are more likely to have high SEGE 
disclosure as compared to Bahrain. This result provides an insight for future research in that the local 
behaviour of a society, especially the culture and beliefs of a particular nation or area, might also affect 
disclosure commitment. Currently, much research in the Islamic banking area concentrates on 
financial characteristics, for instance see Mallin et al. (2014) and Farook et al. (2011). However, since 
Islamic banks are closely related to religious value, it is important to observe the interrelated and 
interconnected values that might affect disclosure. In the next section, the regression will provide 
statistical evidence on high religiosity countries’ relations to disclosure. 
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7.3.3. Comparative Model 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
=    +      ℎ                         +                        +            
 
   
+     +     
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable: id  
   
R-sq:   
within = 0.1779  
between = 0.5387  
overall = 0.4921  
   
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed) 
   
   
SEGE Disclosure Coef. P>z 
High Religious Country .118238 0.001 
Regulatory Quality .7422641 0.006 
Listed .0966293 0.016 
Bank Age .0064243 0.000 
BOD Size .0067293 0.212 
SSB Size .0000735 0.988 
NED -.01019 0.671 
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.0046 0.499 
Profitability (ln Net 
income) 
.001652 0.422 
ROA -.05645 0.332 
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -.14224 0.805 
_cons .3221141 0.147 
SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
This table displays the differential statistical model random effect estimation. SEGE Score: The score derived from the 
quality disclosure score of the annual report. Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance 
indicator. High Religious Country: Value of 1 for a highly religious country and 0 for a less religious country. Listed: Dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank 
Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: The number of board members. SSB size: The number of shariah 
supervisory board members. NED: The percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: The natural logarithm 
of total assets. Profitability: The natural logarithm of net income. ROA: The ratio of earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets. GDP: The growth rate of the gross domestic product of country as a proxy for macroeconomic 
factors. Standard error is robust and adjusted for 34 clusters in ID. 
Table 7.14: Highly Religious Country 
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                                                                                                                                                                         
=    +                          +                                       
+            
 
   
+     +      
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable: id  
   
R-sq:   
within = 0.1803  
between = 0.5399  
overall = 0.4934  
   
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed) 
   
   
SEGE Disclosure Coef. P>z 
Regulatory Quality .6093331 0.036 
Interact_Reg_Quality .1664968 0.001 
Listed .0986872 0.014 
Bank Age .0063443 0.000 
BOD Size .0067965 0.205 
SSB Size .0005571 0.906 
NED .0110447 0.643 
Size (Ln Total Asset) -.0044784 0.512 
Profitability (ln Net income) .0016469 0.420 
ROA -.0599767 0.304 
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -.2366069 0.688 
_cons -.2192581 0.349 
   
SEGE : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
This table displays the differential statistical model random effect estimation. SEGE Score: The score derived from the 
quality disclosure score of the annual report. Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance 
indicator. Interactive regulatory Quality: Country value times regulatory quality score. Listed: Dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age 
since its foundation. BOD size: The number of board members. SSB size: The number of shariah supervisory board 
members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Profitability: Natural logarithm of net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: 
Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a country as proxy for macroeconomic factors. Standard error is robust and 
adjusted for 34 clusters in ID. 
Table 7.15: Interactive Regulatory Quality 
 
In order to identify a whether highly religious countries have an effect towards disclosure quality, the 
comparative regression in table 7.14 has been conducted. Looking at the r-squared, the model 
explains 49.21% of the SEGE disclosure. Furthermore, the regression provides evidence that highly 
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religious countries are more likely to increase SEGE disclosure with a 1% significance value. Moreover, 
regulatory quality is also significant at 1%. This provides supporting statistical evidence towards the 
descriptive value of religiosity in the world value survey explained previously. 
Moving further, referring to table 7.15, the interactive regulatory score was created (country value 
times the regulatory score) in order to obtain the interactive value for regulatory quality. This is to 
predict whether the regulatory quality is different between the countries and affects the SEGE 
disclosure. Based on the result, the interactive variable is positive, and the coefficient makes the 
normal regulatory coefficient stronger and supports the regulatory effect on SEGE disclosure. 
Moreover, the model above excludes religiosity as the interactive variable is highly correlated to the 
religiosity variable.  
The next section will provide evidence on the relationship of the seven dimensions of SEGE 
disclosure with regulatory quality and religiosity. 
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7.3.4. 7 Dimensions Disclosure 
 
DIMENSION D 1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
Robust Std. Err. SHARIAH 
SHARIAH 
GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM 
SOCIAL 
EXTERNAL 
SOCIAL 
INTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT ETHIC GOVERNANCE 
Regulatory 
Quality 1.133 0.214 2.355** -0.181 0.339 1.396 -0.512 
 (0.694) (0.712) (0.945) (0.819) (0.641) (1.010) (0.364) 
        
Religiosity 0.435*** 0.581*** 0.247 0.631*** 0.247** 0.0418 -0.0748 
 (0.130) (0.179) (0.196) (0.197) (0.112) (0.132) (0.102) 
        
Listed 0.107** -0.103 0.250*** 0.0975 0.0922 0.0836 0.0891** 
 (0.0480) (0.0834) (0.0753) (0.0971) (0.0725) (0.0531) (0.0391) 
        
Bank Age 0.00670*** 0.00183 0.00983*** 0.00826*** 0.00371*** 0.00878*** 0.00195 
 (0.00228) (0.00299) (0.00203) (0.00269) (0.000945) (0.00199) (0.00133) 
        
BOD Size 0.00278 -0.00139 0.0296** 0.00216 0.00351 0.0117** 0.00863 
 (0.00777) (0.00755) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.00544) (0.00588) (0.00742) 
        
SSB Size 0.000616 0.0164 0.00767 -0.0212 -0.00372 0.00310 -0.00241 
 (0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0140) (0.0221) (0.00397) (0.0122) (0.00698) 
        
NED 0.0353 0.0416 -0.0660 -0.0149 -0.0431* -0.0264 -0.0157 
 (0.0556) (0.0418) (0.0641) (0.0849) (0.0225) (0.0599) (0.0387) 
        
Size(Ln Total 
Asset) -0.0190 0.0162 -0.00615 -0.0384 0.00577 -0.0215 0.0178* 
 (0.0178) (0.0233) (0.0249) (0.0454) (0.0140) (0.0251) (0.0107) 
        
Profitability (ln 
Net income) 0.00430 0.000645 0.00364 -0.00405 -0.00150 0.00732* -0.00125 
 (0.00343) (0.00435) (0.00544) (0.00526) (0.00302) (0.00418) (0.00306) 
        
ROA -0.167 0.0372 -0.150 0.0294 0.0342 -0.0308 0.0165 
 (0.116) (0.133) (0.183) (0.196) (0.0682) (0.150) (0.111) 
        
GDP (GDP Growth 
Rate) 0.771 -0.932 -1.005 -0.188 -0.101 0.0380 -0.539 
 (0.974) (0.954) (1.392) (1.465) (0.805) (0.925) (0.616) 
        
_cons -0.717 -0.157 -1.864 0.762 -0.456 -0.948 0.804 
 (0.523) (0.597) (0.775) (0.742) (0.515) (0.822) (0.293) 
        
N 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
SEGE Score: The score derived from the quality disclosure score of the annual report. Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world 
governance indicator. Religiosity: The data gathered from the world values survey based on the percentage of respondents indicating that 
religion is important to them. Listed: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country 
and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: Number of board members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory 
board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability: Natural 
logarithm of net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product 
of a country as a proxy for macroeconomic factors. Standard error is robust and adjusted for 34 clusters in ID. 
Table 7.16: SEGE 7 Dimensions (Heptagonal Dimensions) 
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Table 7.16 presents the results of the Generalised Least Squares panel regression with a robust 
standard error of the SEGE seven dimensions. Moreover, the table in the last page illustrates the 
proportion of the seven dimensions of SEGE disclosure. What stands out in the table is that Shariah 
(Dimension-1) and Shariah Governance (Dimension-2) are highly significant to the importance of 
religion as a proxy of religiosity. It is an interesting finding that both religion-related dimensions are 
highly significant to the religious variable. These findings signal that the Islamic banks that operate in 
a religious environment tend to disclose more information on religious factors such as shariah and 
shariah governance related themes. Moreover, social internal and environment are also positively 
significant towards religiosity. 
Even though limited numbers of studies specifically study the relationship between disclosure and 
religiosity, previous literature, for instance Brammer et al. (2007), has touched upon the attitudes of 
religious people towards corporate social responsibility where a religious person has different 
attitudes towards a firm’s responsibility as compared to a non-religious person. In prior literature, a 
consistent signal given is that religiosity provides positive moral and noble characteristics. For instance, 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) found that management earnings are less in a society that has high 
religiosity, and Barnett et al. (1996) found that those employees with a high sense of religiosity are 
more likely to report peer misconduct in an organisation. All this literature in one way or another 
supports the thesis’ findings. 
In relation to this study, the same essence of moral and noble character which the research expects 
and predicts is that Islamic banks which are based on religious principles and operate in a religious 
environment will perform better in disclosure related to religious values and social aspects. The results 
above are consistent with the research expectations. Moreover, the results are consistent with 
stakeholder theory and the social norms perspective that the majority of the stakeholders that are 
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influenced by social norms may contribute to the significance of social disclosure. Next, the selected 
themes from the twenty-themes estimation will be reported. 
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7.3.5. Selected Themes Disclosure 
Table 7.17: SEGE 20 Themes (Icosagonal Themes) 
Robust Std. Err 
(Adjusted for 34 clusters in ID.) 
Shariah 
Compliance 
Zakat 
Benevolent 
Loan / Qard 
Hassan 
Shariah 
Governance  
Framework 
Charity Sponsorship 
Human Resource 
and Capital 
Management 
Reward and 
Benefit 
Nature 
Guiding Principle 
of Governance 
Regulatory Quality 4.858** 1.769** -0.585 0.677 3.954** 2.160 -0.383 0.145 1.356** 0.102 
  (2.454) (0.884) (1.187) (1.227) (1.943) (1.339) (0.775) (1.382) (0.652) (0.560) 
            
Religiosity 0.0799 0.830*** 1.255*** 0.991*** -0.125 0.501* 0.737** 0.562* 0.413* 0.416*** 
  (0.288) (0.226) (0.331) (0.237) (0.360) (0.261) (0.368) (0.317) (0.218) (0.143) 
            
Listed 0.244* -0.0892 0.227 0.0295 0.320*** 0.231* 0.237 -0.0208 0.169 0.0992 
  (0.130) (0.112) (0.139) (0.0843) (0.105) (0.140) (0.201) (0.136) (0.116) (0.0668) 
            
Bank Age 0.00422 0.00528 0.0105** 0.00217 0.00764** 0.0100*** 0.0172*** -0.000748 0.00559** 0.000870 
  (0.00525) (0.00356) (0.00489) (0.00392) (0.00375) (0.00326) (0.00527) (0.00330) (0.00222) (0.00209) 
            
BOD Size 0.0114 -0.000774 -0.000968 -0.00193 0.00975 0.0539*** -0.0158 0.00885 0.00318 0.0170* 
  (0.0199) (0.00849) (0.0134) (0.0102) (0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0124) (0.0112) (0.00870) 
            
SSB Size 0.0847*** -0.0522** -0.0717** 0.0270 0.0637** -0.0244 -0.0586* 0.00561 -0.0200 -0.0107 
  (0.0314) (0.0233) (0.0365) (0.0264) (0.0289) (0.0209) (0.0353) (0.0288) (0.0138) (0.0154) 
            
NED 0.0828 -0.0807 -0.0253 0.0795 -0.153 -0.0869 -0.0784 0.0120 -0.0697* -0.0265 
  (0.115) (0.0961) (0.139) (0.0600) (0.122) (0.0850) (0.132) (0.113) (0.0375) (0.0689) 
            
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.0295 0.107*** -0.0595 0.0275* -0.0625 0.0399 -0.0557 -0.0215 0.0204 -0.0193 
  (0.0728) (0.0330) (0.0626) (0.0151) (0.0680) (0.0293) (0.0509) (0.0538) (0.0244) (0.0235) 
            
Profitability (ln Net income) -0.00493 -0.00745 0.00647 0.00174 0.00249 0.00454 0.000502 -0.0113 -0.00505 0.00315 
  (0.0138) (0.00539) (0.00787) (0.00331) (0.0103) (0.00727) (0.00847) (0.00803) (0.00762) (0.00337) 
            
ROA 0.206 -0.0503 -0.593 -0.0191 -0.0506 -0.409 -0.0671 0.164 0.133 0.0377 
  (0.301) (0.119) (0.377) (0.0763) (0.256) (0.329) (0.351) (0.175) (0.158) (0.0715) 
            
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) 0.858 2.640* -0.125 -1.952 -0.109 -1.451 -0.991 0.611 -0.340 0.675 
  (2.995) (1.425) (2.506) (1.477) (2.077) (1.898) (2.489) (1.909) (1.754) (1.269) 
            
_cons -3.459 -2.093 0.603 -1.233 -2.120 -2.402 1.050 0.532 -1.339 0.152 
  (1.937) (0.638) (0.922) (0.998) (1.506) (1.170) (0.630) (1.168) (0.560) (0.449) 
                    
N 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from world governance indicator. Religiosity: The data gathered from the world values survey based on the percentage of respondents indicating that religion is important to them. 
Listed: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: Number of board members. SSB 
size: Number of shariah supervisory board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of net income. ROA: Ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a country as a proxy for macroeconomic factors.  
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Referring to table 7.17: SEGE 20 Themes (Icosagonal Themes), the importance of religion is highly 
significant at 1% with themes that are related to Islamic values such as zakat (Islamic levy), benevolent 
loan, and shariah governance framework. The thesis also found that the importance of religion is also 
highly significant to the guiding principles of governance. The results may suggest that religiosity plays 
an important role in motivating and stimulating the disclosure quality of Islamic banks. Being effective 
and having the majority of middle and top management personnel coming from a religious 
background might encourage the elevation of social reporting initiatives. This argument is in accord 
with Angelidis and Ibrahim (2004) findings that an individual’s degree of religiousness has a significant 
relationship with ethical and corporate social responsiveness.  
Furthermore, the individual religiousness setting depends on the area and the country’s religious 
values and knowledge. Therefore, the employee of the Islamic banks plays an important role in 
determining the ethical judgement in socially responsible actions and social reporting. This is in line 
with the findings of Walker et al. (2012) on religiosity on the ethical decisions of employees. Moreover, 
Walker et al. (2012) also supports that religiosity and social outcome are achieved through the social 
structure of society. The thesis argues that one of the explanations for the impact of religiosity’s 
influence on social reporting is based on the essence of the religiosity of its personnel working and 
managing the policy and procedure in Islamic banks and from the values of a social structure of a 
particular geographical area. 
In addition, the same essence applies to the regulatory quality’s influence on the disclosure of shariah 
compliance, zakat, charity and nature themes. The regulatory quality depends on the society’s values 
that are embedded in the social structure in a particular geographical area and this difference makes 
the adherence to a particular set of rules become easier. In fact, in order to be socially responsible, 
the business needs to have a strong and stable regulatory framework (Azmat and Samaratunge, 2009) 
which is achieved through the willingness of the personnel to comply with the regulatory requirement. 
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This, however, depends on the social construct of the area where the Islamic banks operate. From the 
evidence in table 7.17, it may suggest that a strong regulatory quality is likely to increase the disclosure 
of charitable causes and natural issues in Islamic banks. This is in accordance with Toms (2002) where 
he argues that the disclosure in the annual report with regards to nature or environmental issues 
might be a device to signal the quality of the company, and, in this case, the Islamic bank. 
This thesis also found that the shariah compliance themes are highly significant with shariah 
supervisory board size. As compared to previous studies like Mallin et al. (2014), where they found 
that the total corporate social responsibility index is significant with the shariah supervisory board, 
this thesis found no significant relationship with the total disclosure index but found a highly 
significant relationship within smaller and specific themes. This thesis argues that the shariah 
supervisory board’s scope of duty only determines the shariah compliance of the Islamic bank’s 
operation which normally has a minimum attachment to overall social responsibility operations.  
The limited duty explained above is in line with any standard shariah supervisory board guidelines 
such as IFSB (2009), BNM Shariah Governance Framework (2010), BNM Shariah Governance Exposure 
(2017) and AAOIFI (2010) which touch upon the shariah supervisory role and scope. Therefore, this 
thesis argues and suggests that a proper and specific theme is required to obtain a more meaningful 
result and interpretation. 
Overall, regulatory quality and religiosity are important factors that should be considered when 
investigating the culture in an organisation or in a particular geographical area. As culture is 
determined generally by education22, it will shape the religiosity and regulatory understanding and 
adherence. Education is an important role in a cultural setting for disclosure as advocated by Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002).   
                                                        
22 The current religiosity and regulatory quality in a particular area is a part of the culture that is shaped by 
education/knowledge that is pre-taught (Evolution -  generation to generation / Revolution -  fast track governmental 
programme). 
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7.3.6. Level 1, 2, 3 & Graphic Disclosure 
 
Robust Std. Err Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Graphic 
Regulatory Quality -13.05 -30.58 50.64 18.55 
  (71.91) (51.17) (34.99) (38.53) 
      
Religiosity 0.0172 15.07 25.75*** 12.21* 
  (13.32) (10.92) (6.270) (6.998) 
      
Listed 10.31 13.08* 7.374* 6.026 
  (8.502) (7.521) (3.864) (6.088) 
      
Bank Age 0.301* 0.324*** 0.432*** 0.359*** 
  (0.178) (0.106) (0.0456) (0.127) 
      
BOD Size 0.857 0.925 0.597* 0.580 
  (0.564) (0.591) (0.309) (0.397) 
      
SSB Size 1.816*** 1.795* 0.569 1.379 
  (0.590) (0.980) (0.520) (1.267) 
      
NED 4.087 -7.420* -0.672 -6.278 
  (4.233) (4.345) (2.673) (3.961) 
      
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.508 -0.846 -1.234 -0.669 
  (1.829) (1.717) (1.355) (1.493) 
      
Profitability (ln Net income) 0.405 0.187 0.274*** 0.0683 
  (0.302) (0.318) (0.0979) (0.224) 
      
ROA -0.867 -19.46** -6.028* -16.05** 
  (7.893) (7.915) (3.469) (7.882) 
      
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -87.30 66.74 -17.23 80.34 
  (79.41) (68.96) (40.38) (80.07) 
      
_cons 25.02 7.326 -43.59 -26.10 
  (54.88) (40.71) (29.07) (33.61) 
N 170 170 170 170 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  
Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance indicator. Religiosity: The data gathered from the world values survey 
based on the percentage of respondents indicating that religion is important to them. Listed: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: 
Number of board members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside 
the board. Size: Natural logarithm of the total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of the net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a country as a proxy for macroeconomic 
factors. Level 1: Disclosure at the phrases level. Level 2: Includes policy and graphics. Level 3: Disclosure at the evidence level. For a 
detailed procedure, please refer to Figure 4.8: 3 Level Scoring Procedure. 
Table 7.18: Graphic & 3 Level Estimation 
Another important finding was in table 7.18 above. Perhaps the most compelling finding is the 
significant association between religiosity and the level 3-type disclosure and graphic disclosure. 
Referring to table 7.19, religiosity is highly significant at 1% while graphic disclosure is significant at 
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10% with religiosity. This is an interesting finding which explains the more religious the area where 
the Islamic banks operate, the more likely the Islamic banks are to disclose at the evidence level, for 
instance in providing figures and statistics for charity and environmental efforts done in an annual 
report. For instance, the figure 7.1 below is taken from one of the annual reports: - 
On another spectrum, the thesis found that the graphical type of disclosure is also influenced by 
religiosity. This is also an interesting finding that is currently not found in the literature of Islamic 
accounting specifically and business ethics in general. One example of graphics disclosure relates to 
environmental efforts taken by the banks and disclosed in the annual report in figure 7.2 below: - 
Overall, in this sub-section, this thesis argues that religiosity influences better disclosure and provides 
a rich input from graphics to evidence-based phrases. In other words, this means that the more 
important religion is to society, the higher the quality of the disclosure made by the Islamic banks in 
the annual report.   
Figure 7.1 : Hong Leong Islamic Bank, Annual report 2013, pg.17 
Figure 7.2 : Hong Leong Islamic Bank, Annual report 2013, pg.18 
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7.3.7. Unique and Universal Disclosure 
Robust Std. Err UNIQUE DISCLOSURE UNIVERSAL DISCLOSURE 
Regulatory Quality 0.822 0.715* 
  (0.510) (0.404) 
  
  
Religiosity 0.472*** 0.159* 
  (0.122) (0.0845) 
  
  
Listed 0.0467 0.126*** 
  (0.0526) (0.0429) 
  
  
Bank Age 0.00528** 0.00669*** 
  (0.00236) (0.000825) 
  
  
BOD Size 0.00171 0.0104* 
  (0.00669) (0.00573) 
  
  
SSB Size 0.00519 -0.00291 
  (0.0124) (0.00597) 
  
  
NED 0.0335 -0.0368 
  (0.0414) (0.0238) 
  
  
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.00804 -0.00201 
  (0.0137) (0.00776) 
  
  
Profitability (ln Net income) 0.00326 0.00101 
  (0.00337) (0.00241) 
  
  
ROA -0.109 -0.0334 
  (0.101) (0.0753) 
  
  
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) 0.265 -0.362 
  (0.824) (0.610) 
  
  
_cons -0.525 -0.403 
  (0.401) (0.326) 
N 170 170 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1 ** p<0.05                  *** p<0.01 
Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance indicator. Religiosity: The data gathered from the world values 
survey based on the percentage of respondents indicating that religion is important to them. Listed: Dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. 
BOD size: Number of board members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive 
directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of the total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of the net income. ROA: Ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a country as a proxy for 
macroeconomic factors. Unique Disclosure: Disclosure related only to Islamic banks. Universal Disclosure: Disclosure applied to Islamic 
banks and conventional banks.  
 
Table 7.19: Unique & Universal Disclosure 
208 
 
Table 7.19 above illustrates a comparison of the estimation result of the unique and universal SEGE 
disclosure. It is apparent from table 7.19 that religiosity is highly significant to unique SEGE disclosure 
at 1% while it is significant at 10% in universal disclosure. On the other hand, regulatory quality is 
significant at 10% for universal disclosure. These findings are not counterintuitive as it is expected that 
religiosity may influence disclosure related to Islamic banks (unique).  
The findings also found evidence that religiosity also influences universal disclosure themes even 
though they are not as strong as compared to the unique SEGE disclosure themes. On the other hand, 
the expectation that regulatory quality has a strong relationship with the universal type of disclosure 
turns out to be only significant at 10%. However, it suggests that regulatory quality is one important 
factor to be considered in disclosure research and this might relate to de Villiers and Marques (2016) 
findings on more information on corporate social responsibility in countries that have higher quality 
regulations. 
However, the thesis is aware that there are others factors that are assumed ceteris paribus in this 
thesis that might also influence the disclosure, for instance if there is a particular type of law 
implemented in a country (Liang and Renneboog, 2017). These findings serve as a precursor to more 
rigorous research involving Islamic banks on their social, shariah, ethics, environmental and 
governance disclosure specifically and other religious-based institutions generally. Based on Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2007) and Mallin et al. (2014), Islamic bank disclosure on unique items became common 
during the early stages of Islamic banks and became less popular after the Islamic banks had grown 
strong, where universal disclosure themes emerged further.  
Nevertheless, while Mallin et al. (2014) found financial performance to be positive and significant 
towards unique corporate social disclosure, this research found that religiosity is significant towards 
the unique themes of SEGE disclosure which are much more concentrated and focus on a religious 
motive. To prove which countries are likely to have an influence on religiosity, the regression analysis 
needs to be supported by the raw statistics produced by the world value survey (refer to Table 7.13: 
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Religiosity by Country, for statistics and discussion). This is because religiosity does not change over a 
short period. Therefore, the two countries need to be regressed as pooled data to get the result which 
is then compared with the religiosity of each country.  
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 Comparison of Malaysia and Bahrain 
7.4.1. Main SEGE Estimation [SEGE Disclosure Score] 
SEGE DISCLOSURE 
(Robust Std.Err.) Malaysia Bahrain 
Regulatory Quality 0.851** 0.428 
  (0.412) (0.844) 
    
Listed 0.273*** 0.0465** 
  (0.0338) (0.0234) 
    
Bank Age 0.00595*** 0.00426*** 
  (0.00122) (0.000753) 
  
  
BOD Size 0.000569 0.0119** 
  (0.00634) (0.00495) 
  
  
SSB Size -0.00450 0.00551 
  (0.00473) (0.0102) 
  
  
NED -0.0424 0.0145 
  (0.0629) (0.0265) 
  
  
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.00531 0.00714 
  (0.00835) (0.0136) 
  
  
Profitability (ln Net 
income) 
0.00764 0.000691 
  (0.00603) (0.00232) 
  
  
ROA -0.555 -0.0541 
  (0.895) (0.0613) 
  
  
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -0.907 0.0395 
  (0.651) (1.309) 
  
  
_cons -0.190 -0.228 
  (0.284) (0.689) 
    
N 90 80 
Standard errors in parentheses        * p<0.1            ** p<0.05            *** p<0.01 
SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
This table displays the main model estimation. SEGE Score: The score derived from the quality disclosure score of the annual report. 
Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance indicator. Religiosity: The data gathered from the world values survey 
based on the percentage of respondents indicating that religion is important to them. Listed: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is 
listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: Number of 
board members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: 
Natural logarithm of total assets. Ownership: Percentage of ownership by the public. Profitability: Natural logarithm of net income. ROA: 
Ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a country as a proxy for 
macroeconomic factors. Corruption Control: World Governance Indicator score. Standard error is robust and adjusted for 34 clusters in ID. 
Table 7.20: Main SEGE Estimation (Malaysia vs Bahrain) 
This section provides an in-depth result through the segregation of the two countries of Malaysia and 
Bahrain. However, it is important to reiterate that, in this section, the religiosity variable has been 
removed from the main interest variable as compared to the pooled variable. This is because the 
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religiosity value and beliefs do not simply change within a short period of time but are built by the 
values embedded within society. Therefore, the data gathered by the world value survey caters for 
the 6th wave (2010-2014), which is the period of the study. Consequently, religiosity has been 
excluded from the main estimation for a comparison of the countries. This has been explained in the 
previous section and the discussion is in section 7.3.2.  
Moving forward, table 7.20 in the previous page informs that, between the two countries, Malaysian 
Islamic banks’ SEGE disclosure is much more influenced by regulatory quality, where higher quality 
regulations affect SEGE disclosure positively. However, Bahrain Islamic banks are not affected by 
regulatory quality. This result provides one of the answers to the research question on the differences 
of the two models of Islamic banks, where Malaysia’s “top to bottom” approach may  be one of the 
factors that contributes to this difference as compared to the “bottom to top” approach in Bahraini 
society (Warde, 2010). 
Moving further, the bank’s age and the listed status of Islamic banks is positively significant towards 
the main SEGE disclosure of Islamic banks in both countries, and this result conforms to the literature. 
Furthermore, what is more important to be discussed are the differences in the regulatory quality and 
differences in religiosity. This needs to be investigated further through the roots of society’s values 
within each country. The results might be significant statistically, but the factors that may contribute 
to a proper implementation of the regulations and the influences of religion need to be explained 
further. 
These factors are further elaborated in chapter 8, discussion and conclusion, where the Malaysian and 
Bahraini context of religious values and the implementation of regulations is discussed critically. In the 
next section, the seven dimensions of both countries’ estimations will be presented and elaborated.
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7.4.2. 7 Dimension (Malaysia Vs Bahrain) 
Malaysia - 7 Dimensions SHARIAH 
SHARIAH 
GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM 
SOCIAL EXTERNAL SOCIAL INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ETHIC GOVERNANCE 
Regulatory Quality 1.471 1.841* 2.682** -0.728 0.278 1.775 -0.627** 
 (0.936) (1.087) (1.293) (0.941) (0.806) (1.391) (0.273) 
Listed 0.323*** 0.234*** 0.445*** -0.0139 0.391*** 0.142** 0.189*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0344) (0.0597) (0.0549) (0.0202) (0.0696) (0.0296) 
Bank Age 0.00500*** -0.00127 0.00998*** 0.00875*** 0.00387*** 0.00772*** 0.00297 
 (0.00191) (0.00257) (0.00180) (0.00263) (0.000892) (0.00256) (0.00181) 
BOD Size -0.0127 0.0282* 0.0156 -0.00143 0.00926 0.0222** -0.00148 
 (0.0115) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0239) (0.00794) (0.00967) (0.00620) 
SSB Size -0.00693 -0.0219 -0.00384 -0.0174 -0.00465 -0.0197 0.00142 
 (0.0161) (0.0234) (0.0177) (0.0316) (0.00602) (0.0187) (0.00826) 
NED -0.00420 0.182 -0.231 0.104 -0.0545 -0.191* -0.0573 
 (0.143) (0.132) (0.185) (0.143) (0.0554) (0.103) (0.103) 
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.0286 0.0706*** 0.00640 -0.0545* 0.0158 0.0395 0.00756 
 (0.0255) (0.0200) (0.0343) (0.0289) (0.0194) (0.0349) (0.0134) 
Profitability (ln Net income) 0.0102 -0.00704 0.00784 0.00543 -0.000298 0.0252 -0.00480 
 (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0114) (0.00837) (0.00755) (0.0212) (0.00722) 
ROA -0.831 3.148 -1.014 -0.108 -0.144 -3.688 1.143 
 (1.944) (1.990) (1.880) (1.938) (1.296) (2.502) (1.114) 
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -1.376 -6.367*** -2.700 -0.701 1.008 -0.169 0.674 
 (1.556) (1.883) (1.909) (2.785) (0.699) (1.946) (1.215) 
_cons -0.233 -1.120 -1.702* 1.759*** -0.421 -1.732* 0.928*** 
 (0.688) (0.776) (1.007) (0.599) (0.644) (1.027) (0.192) 
        
N 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Standard errors in parentheses  * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  
Table 7.21: 7 Dimensions (Malaysia) 
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Bahrain- 7 Dimensions SHARIAH 
SHARIAH 
GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM 
SOCIAL EXTERNAL SOCIAL INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ETHIC GOVERNANCE 
Regulatory Quality 
0.0593 1.208 -0.137 6.726 -0.460 -1.787** -1.517* 
 
(1.925) (1.510) (2.988) (4.120) (0.663) (0.890) (0.775) 
Listed 
0.0124 -0.139*** 0.186*** 0.148 0.00944 0.0976 0.0224 
 
(0.0404) (0.0522) (0.0636) (0.130) (0.0142) (0.0642) (0.0346) 
Bank Age 
0.00606*** 0.00373* 0.00391 0.0130*** 0.000861 0.00599 -0.00146 
 
(0.00233) (0.00220) (0.00262) (0.00485) (0.000819) (0.00370) (0.00174) 
BOD Size 
0.0108* 0.00227 0.0331* 0.00894 -0.00100 0.00144 0.0113 
 
(0.00578) (0.00887) (0.0184) (0.0162) (0.00330) (0.00769) (0.0112) 
SSB Size 
0.00378 0.0308** -0.00260 0.0112 -0.00493 0.0278 0.00250 
 
(0.0154) (0.0145) (0.0306) (0.0479) (0.00452) (0.0236) (0.0152) 
NED 
0.0186 0.0130 -0.0374 -0.0255 0.00588 0.0428 0.0129 
 
(0.0418) (0.0458) (0.0758) (0.124) (0.0125) (0.0655) (0.0457) 
Size(Ln Total Asset) 
0.0435 -0.0600* 0.0527 -0.124 0.0181 -0.0620 0.0746*** 
 
(0.0384) (0.0329) (0.0381) (0.101) (0.0168) (0.0397) (0.0212) 
Profitability (ln Net income) 
0.00456 -0.000597 0.00176 -0.00262 -0.00523 0.00477 -0.00213 
 
(0.00363) (0.00450) (0.00682) (0.00751) (0.00473) (0.00524) (0.00304) 
ROA 
-0.273** 0.0713 -0.195 0.196 0.0783 -0.0337 -0.00387 
 
(0.128) (0.153) (0.189) (0.239) (0.0737) (0.179) (0.110) 
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) 
0.758 1.201 -2.214 6.403 -1.191 -2.126 -1.922*** 
 
(1.892) (1.622) (3.715) (5.139) (1.385) (1.335) (0.684) 
_cons 
       
 
-0.333 -0.152 -0.284 -3.876 0.273 1.888** 1.090* 
 (1.494) (1.225) (2.444) (3.542) (0.456) (0.775) (0.583) 
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Standard errors in parentheses  * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  
Table 7.22: 7 Dimensions (Bahrain)
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This section references tables 7.21 and 7.22 for Malaysia and Bahrain respectively. Referring to table 
7.21, Malaysian Islamic banks’ disclosure on specific dimensions of shariah governance is significant 
at 10% while social external is significant at 5%. This suggests that the higher the regulatory quality, 
the more the disclosure on social external and the shariah governance dimension. Since Islamic 
financial institutions promote social and ethical identity (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007) and are expected 
to comprehensively cover social welfare and justice, as advocated by Belal et al. (2014), Malaysian 
Islamic banks at least address social external which is comprised of charity, community involvement 
and sponsorship themes. This is, however, totally different in the case of Bahrain. 
In the Malaysian context of heavy support from the top levels of government (Warde, 2010), the 
quality regulatory may be driven by government initiatives that make the shariah governance 
dimension significant towards regulatory quality. If compared to the initiatives of shariah governance 
inventiveness by the Malaysian and Bahraini governments, Malaysia is much more advanced with the 
central bank taking the initiative in shariah governance in 2004,  2010, and 2017. This is very different 
in the Bahraini context where the only standard that can be associated with the Bahraini government’s 
initiative is the AAOIFI accounting, auditing and governance standards which consist of seven 
standards that are not as comprehensive or detailed as the ones by its Malaysian counterpart. 
Moving further, it is noticeable that Malaysian regulatory quality is negatively significant to 
governance dimension disclosure, and this might be explained by the moderate value of the culture 
and society in a country as, in a matured society, it is assumed that the better the regulatory quality, 
the less disclosure is needed on the organisation’s governance. In a country such as Bahrain, where 
the society and the cultural values are conservative, it is not surprising that ethics and governance are 
negatively significant to regulatory quality.  This is because in a country that is prone to conservative 
values, disclosure on ethics and governance are merely a tool for legitimisation. This will be further 
explained and discussed in section 8.2, the Malaysian and Bahraini Context. In the next section, 
selected disclosure themes will be explained. 
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7.4.3. Selected Themes (Malaysia Vs Bahrain)  
 
Table 7.23: Malaysia vs Bahrain Selected Themes 
Country Malaysia  Bahrain 
Robust Std. Err 
Shariah 
Compliance 
Charity Nature  Zakat Wild Life Institutional Ethic 
Regulatory Quality 6.249** 4.228* 1.376*  7.177** -3.573* -2.187* 
  (3.184) (2.513) (0.753)  (3.365) (1.963) (1.322) 
Listed 0.473*** 0.257*** 0.636***  -0.115 0.0721 0.0629 
  (0.0414) (0.0640) (0.0368)  (0.138) (0.0976) (0.0678) 
Bank Age -0.00432 0.00436 0.00545***  0.00113 0.0121** -0.00319 
  (0.00418) (0.00533) (0.00179)  (0.00645) (0.00561) (0.00331) 
BOD Size 0.0274 0.0232 0.0172  0.0127 -0.00492 0.0140 
  (0.0285) (0.0278) (0.0168)  (0.00785) (0.00832) (0.0284) 
SSB Size 0.0663* 0.0640* -0.0296  -0.0595* 0.0469 -0.0275 
  (0.0376) (0.0340) (0.0241)  (0.0337) (0.0361) (0.0331) 
NED -0.317 -0.484 -0.0686  -0.0627 -0.0342 0.0317 
  (0.222) (0.359) (0.0697)  (0.130) (0.0661) (0.115) 
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.107 -0.0273 0.0307  0.0786 0.0138 0.204*** 
  (0.0850) (0.0920) (0.0291)  (0.0597) (0.0517) (0.0447) 
Profitability (ln Net 
income) 0.0411* 0.0313 0.00765  -0.00265 0.00242 -0.00677 
  (0.0249) (0.0233) (0.0187)  (0.00626) (0.0101) (0.00831) 
ROA -4.411 -3.209 -1.901  0.0530 -0.190 -0.0378 
  (3.318) (4.301) (3.258)  (0.166) (0.169) (0.348) 
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -7.899 -4.042 1.754  8.754** -1.950 -3.519* 
  (4.935) (4.292) (1.703)  (3.672) (1.311) (1.841) 
_cons -3.184 -2.611 -1.376*  -5.819** 2.392 0.497 
  (2.571) (1.827) (0.719)  (2.636) (1.583) (0.950) 
N 90 90 90  80 80 80 
Standard errors in 
parentheses * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01     
Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance indicator. Listed: Dummy variables taking a value of 1 if the is bank listed on the stock exchange of a 
particular country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: Number of board members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory board 
members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of net income. ROA: Ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a country as a proxy for macroeconomic factors.  
216 
 
In this particular section, only selected themes will be discussed. This is because the objective of this 
thesis is to explore the differences in the main SEGE disclosure’s association with these two models, 
namely the Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic bank model. However, the selected themes discussion is 
made to strengthen the discussion on the differences in the detailed themes that are also derived 
from the main dimensions. It is important to reiterate that chapter 7 serves to further support the 
findings in chapter 6 with more scientific evidence before going into a more subjective discussion in 
chapter 8. 
Referring to table 7.23, Malaysian disclosure themes are positively influenced by regulatory quality. 
The shariah governance, charity and nature themes are significant towards regulatory quality. 
However, Bahrain’s disclosure on wildlife and institutional ethics is negatively influenced by regulatory 
quality. This might explain that if the regulatory portion is managed well, the disclosure of such issues 
need not be a priority for a country with conservative values. Nonetheless, the regulatory quality is 
positive to zakat (Islamic levy on Islamic business to charity) disclosure even though Bahrain Islamic 
banks are not required to pay zakat. This shows that Bahrain Islamic banks adhere to the requirement. 
One of the factors that may explain the Malaysian case is the strong and high influence of stakeholders 
such as the central bank of Malaysia that are heavily involved in the shariah governance framework. 
Moreover, sensitive stakeholders normally shape disclosure, for instance in environmental issues 
(which this thesis associates with nature themes). Huang and Kung (2010) argue that pressure can be 
from external and internal stakeholders that are shaped by the values of society. In the Malaysian case, 
well-informed and mature stakeholders play an important role in shaping SEGE disclosure not just by 
pressure, but, most importantly as this thesis argues, through the education and values instilled in the 
majority of individuals that manage the Islamic banks, central bank and others in the administration 
of the country. In addition, well-informed and mature stakeholders are a product of a country’s values 
and culture (religious orientation, social construct, regulatory structure and administration). A clearer 
analogy will be discussed in chapter 8.  
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 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the second part of the empirical analysis in which the objective is to support the 
findings in chapter 6. Furthermore, it provides a statistical estimation to further strengthen the 
findings in chapter 6. This chapter investigates the relationship between the main interest variable 
(religiosity and regulatory quality) and the SEGE disclosure in Islamic banks operating in Malaysia and 
Bahrain. A set of statistical tests and analyses are prepared and utilised including descriptive statistics, 
a correlation analysis, and a regression analysis. All of these tests and analyses are undertaken in order 
to measure the magnitude and influence of SEGE quality disclosure towards the main interest 
variables (religiosity and regulatory quality) while controlling for corporate characteristics. Moreover, 
the findings provide valuable information that religiosity, as a part of culture, and regulatory quality, 
as a part of socio-politics, have implications towards social reporting.  
One of the key findings in this chapter provides insight into the influence of religiosity. Therefore, the 
implication might be utilised by standard makers and future research to identify the sample selection 
and segregate the sample that have religious influence in one group to allow more narrow and 
accurate results and interpretations when dealing with social disclosure and other performance-based 
indicators. This is because a disclosure by an organisation in a certain geographical area that has no 
influence on religion may have different a socio-culture that influences how they disclose information. 
The results reveal a highly significant relationship between regulatory quality and the importance of 
religious and SEGE disclosure for the whole sample of Islamic banks in the two countries as a whole. 
This signals that the importance of religious and regulatory quality have an influence towards Islamic 
bank SEGE disclosure. However, since religions do not change in a short period, the two countries 
need to be checked through separate statistics which have been discussed previously in ‘Table 7.13: 
Religiosity by Country’. In summary, Malaysian Islamic banks may have a better right to be associated 
with a high relationship with religiosity concerning their SEGE disclosure. Furthermore, the regulatory 
quality is found to be significant only with Malaysia’s SEGE disclosure while there is no association 
with Bahraini Islamic banks’ SEGE disclosure. 
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In conclusion, the overall chapter reinforces the thesis’ general argument that religiosity and 
regulatory quality play an important role in influencing SEGE disclosure, where the degree of the 
impact and implication will be determined by the values that shape the stakeholders’ orientations 
towards disclosure. Moreover, the values of the orientation will be different between countries and 
geographical areas. This is what makes the differences between SEGE disclosure between the 
countries. In the next chapter, chapter 8, thesis discussion and conclusion, a subjective discussion to 
conclude the findings in chapter 6 and 7 will be undertaken.  
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CHAPTER 8 THESIS DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an understanding of the findings in some parts of chapter 6 and 7, 
integrate it with the research aims, and respond to the research questions. This chapter is an 
important chapter to be understood and is crucial for recognising the reason for the distinct features 
of the differences in disclosure results between Malaysia and Bahrain.  
Moreover, it will not just inform of the differences of disclosure between the two countries, it will also 
try to determine the reason for the subjective factors that influence the disclosure style of Islamic 
banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. In chapter 6 and chapter 7, the disclosure findings and results were 
presented based on the statistics gathered from the content analysis and analyses in various 
tabulations, graphs, figures, and robust estimations. However, in this chapter, the results discussed in 
chapter six and seven will be matched with the theories and other subjective matters that may explain 
the disclosure differences between the two countries. These include those differences between 
Malaysia and Bahrain between ordinary and quality disclosure and between Performing Banks 23 and 
Non-performing banks24. 
Furthermore, the overall findings, rationale and reasoning are described and summarised by the 
illustration in section “8.2 Malaysia and Bahrain context”. However, the illustration needs to 
correspond to the explanation in the other sections (section 8.3 and section 8.4) in chapter 8. The 
illustration displays the values of the countries’ religious orientation, social construct and regulation 
and administration. Moreover, the illustration portrays the differences between the two countries 
that may clarify the differences in disclosure pattern, commitment and quality. Subsequently, this 
addresses the thesis’ research aims and research questions. 
                                                        
23 The Islamic banks that perform well in ordinary disclosure (index-checklist based) and also perform well in 
quality disclosure (3-level score-evidence based). 
24 The Islamic banks that perform well in ordinary disclosure (index-checklist based) BUT do not perform well in 
quality disclosure (3-level score-evidence based). 
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 Malaysian VS Bahrain Context 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Malaysia & Bahrain Context (Source: Author)
(1*) Central Bank of Malaysia [BNM], Islamic Banking and Finance Institute [IBFIM], Security Commission [SC], International Shariah Research Academy [ISRA], Islamic Financial Service Board [IFSB] 
(2*) Bahrain Central Bank, Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions [AAOIFI], Islamic International Rating Agency[IIRA],International Islamic Financial Market[IIFM] 
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The illustration in figure 8.1 (Malaysia vs Bahrain context) is an overview of the country (Malaysia & 
Bahrain) environment settings that may affect, and have an effect towards, social reporting as a whole. 
Moreover, from the understanding, practicing and implementation of social disclosure, each group, 
section or country has an important aspect that may have differences which lead to a difference of 
interpretation in what needs to be done and their willingness to commit in certain areas. 
Furthermore, in the context of Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic banks, social disclosure practices and 
differences are closely influenced by the values of each country, that is whether they are conservative 
or progressive as labelled in this thesis. These values that may affect and effect the social disclosure 
of Islamic banks will be determined by several key factors. First is the country’s religious orientation 
and doctrine, second is society’s social norms and social constructs, and lastly is the regulatory and 
administrative effectiveness. 
As Islamic banks are closely related with the religious orientation and label, the Islamic bank’s action 
and movement will depend on the country’s religious authority and norms orientation in shaping what 
and how the bank deals with its business administration. Moreover, the social norms and social 
constructs shape the people and the country authority’s behaviour towards Islamic banking policies, 
procedures, rules and guidelines. Religious stance, perceptions towards regulations, and the way the 
administration functions will affect how well a stand-alone or government-linked body manages, for 
instance, a regulatory body and training institute for the Islamic banking industry, thus affecting and 
effecting Islamic bank social disclosure in the country.  
In the next few sections, the discussion will elaborate more on the details of religious setting, social 
constructs and norms which relate closely with the history of each country. 
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8.2.1. Religious Direction & Orientation 
Previously, in chapter 6 and 7, the findings have shown that there are distinct differences between 
the two countries’ disclosures; therefore, it is vital to further present the investigation’s reasoning on 
these differences. In this section, the religious orientation of each of the countries will be explained in 
detail to determine the possibility of affiliation between the disclosure of the countries and their 
religious orientation.  
It is important to understand that countries’ decisions, policies and actions towards any issues 
(disclosure) will relate closely with their history that is in turn linked closely to their societal norms. 
This is because under societal norms, the accountability and governance practices within it are socially 
and continuously constructed by the society, as mentioned by Sinclair (1995) and Yakel (2001). 
Therefore, the history of societal belief and religious construct may influence the disclosure in both 
countries. 
Moreover, Rhodes (2007) and Skelcher et al. (2005) argue that the architecture of accountability and 
governance may be influenced by the societal belief of a group, the social norms of society and the 
values that the social order carries. In this thesis, Bahrain and Malaysia are certain to have different 
values, and one of the factors that determines the values which may shape Islamic banks in the 
disclosure of information of both countries is religious orientation. 
Referring to the illustration in figure 8.1: Malaysian and Bahrain context, there is a vast difference 
between the religious principles that each country holds. Even though both are generally classified 
into the “Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah” (Sunni), there remain big differences in how they practice their 
religious law. These will later be reasoned and justified through the statistical indicator from the world 
Value Survey25 (WVS) that may support and suggest that, in terms of religion orientation, there might 
be an effect that contributes to the differences of the disclosure practices in both countries. 
                                                        
25 An international network of social scientists studying changes of values that impact social and political life. 
The study was conducted by an international team of scholars that used the most rigorous and high-quality 
224 
 
Furthermore, in the Malaysia strategic plan 2009-2014, the Malaysia Islamic Development 
Department under the Prime Minister’s office reiterated their policy on the approach towards the 
Islamic concept and knowledge applied by the country (JAKIM, 2009). Moreover, that concept 
demonstrates Malaysia’s consistency in the Sunni framework where they make a full disclosure on 
how they organise Islamic thought within the country in three clear points.  
Firstly, Malaysia has made public the concept of Tauhid (Oneness of god) where they follow the 
Asha’ari and Maturidi school of thought26 in understanding the concept of god. Secondly, their Fiqh 
(Islamic Jurisprudence) is from the Shafie school of thought27 and recognises the other three schools 
of thought as the main schools of thought in Islamic law. Thirdly, is the concept of Tasawwuf (Ethics) 
which is following any school of thought that is ‘muktabar’ (prominent with a trusted chain of 
narration). Moreover, it is important to note, that it is made clear by Malaysia’s Islamic authority that 
all the three concepts must be validated by the trusted chain of knowledge passed through 
authoritative scholars from the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) to ensure the reliability and 
stability of the knowledge (JAKIM, 2009). 
However, a different approach is taken by Bahrain government where there is minimal official 
disclosure on how the authorities (Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs) manage the Islamic affairs 
within the country on the basic issues of Oneness of god, Islamic jurisprudence and Ethics. This might 
relate to the minimal disclosure of organisations in the Bahraini environment. Moreover, the statistical 
indicator from the World Value Survey (WVS) signals and suggests the religious orientation for both 
Malaysia and Bahrain are different, and thus this may contribute to the differences in their SEGE 
disclosure. 
                                                        
research design for each particular country. It is utilised by policy makers and scholars publishing in top 
journals. 
26 Sciences in understanding the oneness of god that are followed and recognised by the majority of Muslims 
in Malaysia. 
27 One of the four prominent sunni schools of thought in Islamic Jurisprudence/Sciences which deduce laws 
from Islamic primary sources. 
225 
 
One important point to note is that if the nature of the countries does not provide disclosure on how 
the Islamic affairs are being practiced in one country, it might signal that disclosure of any matters 
regarding Islamic business, for instance in Islamic banks, will also be minimal. In this case, the social 
disclosure by Bahrain Islamic banks is lower than Malaysia. In fact, Malaysia is more transparent on 
how they organise their Islamic affairs in a structured manner, an example being the strategic plan of 
the Malaysia Islamic Development Department for the country that is revised every five years. 
Furthermore, the proactive and transparent steps taken by the government on religious management 
may affect the score provided by the World Value Survey (WVS). 
Moving further, the statistics below will provide clearer differences on disclosure orientation. 
Furthermore, it will inform how important the society in both countries perceive religion, which may 
provide a suggestion and indicator on how religiosity is found to affect the quality of SEGE disclosure 
of Islamic banks. 
World Value Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014) Malaysia Bahrain 
Importance of Religion in Life (Very Important) 84.8% 40.6% 
Following Religious Norms ( Preference) 64.2% 42.8% 
Importance of Younger Generation’s Quality in 
Religion 
(Mentioned) 
63.8% 35.3% 
Table 8.1 : Religiosity Indicator for Malaysia & Bahrain 
Referring to table 8.1, it is obvious that Malaysian society perceives religion to be an important factor 
in life as compared to Bahrain. This may signal that Malaysian society, even though labelled as 
progressive and liberal in financial product innovation (Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous, 2013), nevertheless 
has religion play an important role in society. Furthermore, in examining the score for ‘following 
religious norms’ and the ‘importance of younger generation’s quality in religion’, Malaysia is well 
above 50% at 64.2% and 63.8%. However, Bahrain scored below 50% with each of these criteria at 
42.8% and 35.3%. This may support the findings that religiosity might significantly affect and effect 
disclosure quality. However, it is important to note that disclosure performance may also  be related 
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to the capabilities of the countries as well as their infrastructure. The differences between the two 
countries may also be due to a lack of capability and infrastructure in one of the countries. 
This thesis reiterates, from the results previously gathered in the analysis chapter 6 and from the 
whole sample, that it is clear  religion is highly significantly linked with the disclosure of Islamic banks. 
On the other hand, it may suggest that, between Malaysia and Bahrain, Malaysia is more likely to have 
better quality disclose since the score for its importance of religion from the world value survey wave 
6 (2010-2014) is 84.8 percent while Bahrain is only at 40.6 percent (WVS, 2015).  
It is important to recall several results from the investigation and analysis to support the argument 
above. First, in the result for the quality disclosure between Malaysia and Bahrain, Malaysia is 
consistently above Bahrain and increases yearly as compared to Bahrain’s fluctuating trend. Second, 
in ordinary disclosure, Malaysia consistently increases every year. However, they started slightly 
below Bahrain in 2010 but have superseded Bahrain in later years. This shows how consistent Malaysia 
is in its disclosure in both ordinary and quality disclosure. Third, Malaysian Islamic banks are much 
more consistent in disclosure where previously in chapter 6 section 6.4.4, in discussing the movement 
of the top 10 Islamic banks, the top three Islamic banks were consistent in their ranking in ordinary 
and quality disclosure while for Bahrain Islamic banks all banks moved with a significant gap from 
ordinary to quality disclosure. 
Overall, the religious orientation differences between these countries has made it clear why Malaysia 
is moderate and Bahrain is conservative in terms of religious values. This orientation may have an 
influence on the social disclosure of Islamic banks that operate in Malaysia and Bahrain as the 
foundation of Islamic banks is greatly influenced by the religious approach of a country. 
The next important issue to understand in the national context of Malaysia and Bahrain that may 
influence its Islamic banking social reporting is the social construct of society. This is explained in the 
next sub-section.  
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8.2.2. Political and Governance Setting 
 
The political and governance structure in the countries may influence and explain some of the 
disclosure differences between the two countries. 
Moreover, the thesis refers to statistics by the World Governance Indicator (WGI) provided by the 
World Bank Group, World Values survey (WVS) and Transparency International as a supportive 
statistic parallel to the prior findings in order to help interpret the differences in the disclosure. These 
statistics also support the thesis’ statistical findings in chapter 6 and 7 while being backed by the 
‘subjective materials (pictures & specific phrases) and arguments from the annual report’ as discussed 
in the previous page. 
Indicator 
 
Values 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
Bahrain 
 
Government Effectiveness  
(WGI) Average 5 Years (2010-2014) 
Effectiveness 80.3% 69.8% 
Absolute Important of Democracy  
(WVS) Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
Democracy 45.8% 9.1% 
Regulatory Quality  
(WGI) Average 5 Years (2010-2014) 
Quality 72.2% 73% 
Corruption Perception Index 
Transparency International Average 5 Years (2010-2014) 
Corruption 47.6 49.6 
Table 8.2: Social Construct and Socio-Politic Environment Indicator Guidance 
Referring to table 8.2, in terms of the effectiveness of the government and democratic values, 
Malaysia is ahead compared to Bahrain. Meanwhile, regulatory quality and corruption indicators are 
at about the same value for both countries. Furthermore, government effectiveness and the level of 
democracy of a country depends on the societal values embedded within the majority group in the 
society (Sidney, 1988). Therefore, the better disclosure practiced by Malaysian Islamic banks as 
compared to Bahrain may be the result of the democracy level of the country. This is because the 
working culture usually mirrors the national values of a country (Hofstede, 2010, Hofstede, 1994, 
Hofstede, 2003, Hofstede, 1983). Even though the interaction of other environmental factors such as 
education and race also influence disclosure, as advocated by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), these two 
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factors also may be influenced by the work culture of a national and majority group in a particular 
geographical area (Hofstede, 2006, Sidney, 1988). 
In the next section, the organisational and regulatory administration elements will be discussed. 
8.2.3. Organisational & Regulatory Differences 
 
Having understood the religious orientation and social construct of the two countries in the previous 
sections, it is therefore important to understand the organisation and regulatory factors that may 
influence the disclosure of Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, the thesis classifies four key groups related to organisational and regulatory quality to 
identify the differences between Malaysian and Bahraini organisations and regulatory characteristics. 
Moreover, the four key groups explain the organisation that directly or indirectly influences Islamic 
bank operations and their disclosure. The four key groups are explained in the next paragraphs. 
The first key group is ‘Central Bank and the Standard Bodies’, the second key group is ‘Government 
Initiatives and Strong Legislative Body’, the third key group is ‘Market and Client’, and the fourth key 
group is ‘Training and Education’. All four key groups play an important role in shaping the social 
disclosure of the Islamic banks operating in each country. The differences of the outcomes of 
disclosure by Islamic banks will be based on the efficiency of each organisation in each group and this 
efficiency depends on the ‘social construct and political nature’ of the country and the ‘religious 
orientation’ of the nation which will determine the values of the country as a whole are moderate or 
conservative. 
As the thesis is investigating the differences in the quality of disclosure between Malaysian and 
Bahraini Islamic banks, the four key groups describe the information of both countries for comparison 
purposes. Referring to key group one (central bank and standard bodies), Bahrain supersedes 
Malaysia with the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) as 
a body setting the standard for Islamic banks in accounting issues. Meanwhile, Malaysia follows the 
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Malaysia Financial Reporting Standard (MFRS) and International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
as bases for financial reporting. However, even though the AAOIFI has a sub-section on corporate 
social responsibility, which is section 7 under the governance standard section, Malaysia is far better 
in overall disclosure score and has many important themes such as ‘nature, wild life & recycle’ and 
‘human resource & capital management & reward and benefits’ that relate to employees (which are 
one of the key stakeholders).  
Furthermore, in the accounting approach, Malaysia has taken the concept of adopting what is 
acceptable and changing what is conflicting with Islamic values. Meanwhile, Bahrain has engaged with 
the concept of establishing the accounting concept from the beginning. Lewis (2001) previously 
described this concept on the two approaches towards Islamic society developing accounting theory. 
However, this thesis argues that, even though the (AAOIFI, 2010) was developed by reference to 
conventional accounting, it has in essence tried to signal that Islamic Financial institutions should 
follow standards that are produced by Muslim authorities. On the other hand, the Malaysian 
government finds no harm in adopting the standards from IFRS and changing things that are vital to 
change without renaming any standard with a more Islamic name. In other words, they avoid 
reinventing the wheel. Moreover, the base of the Malaysian argument on this would be the same with 
the matter of halal and kosher food. That is to say, even though halal food and kosher food have 
similarities, for instance in the use of a sharp knife and the blessing being said during the slaughter 
process (Regenstein et al., 2003), the term sharp knife should not be changed to “Islamic sharp knife”. 
Moving further, under key group one, the central bank of Malaysia plays an important role in the 
development and support of the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia through many initiatives. For 
instance, the central bank has issued the ‘Guideline on Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic 
Financial Institutions’ updated on 29 October 2017 and previously the ‘Shariah Governance 
Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions’ on 26 October 2010. These guidelines trace their origin 
to the ‘Guideline on the Governance of Shariah Committee for the Islamic Financial Institution’ 
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released in 2004. The robust initiatives from the central bank of Malaysia show that the important 
stakeholders play a tremendous role in supporting the Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia, which 
influences social disclosure by Islamic banks in Malaysia. However, for Bahrain, less has been done for 
the development of the Islamic banking industry. Moreover, this signals that the stakeholders in 
Malaysia are much more sensitive towards Islamic banking issues. This, in part, explains why Malaysian 
disclosure on shariah governance is higher than Bahrain.  
The central bank is one of the influential stakeholders for Islamic banks. Therefore, if the more 
strategic stakeholders take an active part, it can be an indication that the less important stakeholders 
are also sensitive towards the development of Islamic banks in Malaysia. For instance, as members of 
society are the ones who fill positions (employees) in the central bank, Islamic banks and other 
institutions that relate to Islamic banks can put social pressure on industry practices including social 
reporting. Therefore, the stakeholders play an important role towards SEGE disclosure provided that 
the stakeholders are sensitive and influential in a particular situation. 
Moving further to key group two, under ‘Government Initiative and Strong Legislative Body’, it is 
clearly shown that Malaysia is ahead with their initiative of legislation through government 
intervention in passing the Islamic Banking Act 1983, Takaful Act 1984 and the latest Islamic Financial 
Services Act 2013. However, this is in contrast to the Bahraini government where there is no single act 
specific to Islamic banking and all the rules and regulations are written in ‘Rule Book 2’ governed by 
the central bank of Bahrain. This signals that Bahrain’s organisational and regulatory foundation and 
development is weak and this may explain why Bahrain’s social disclosure is not consistent and lower 
than Malaysia.  
Furthermore, it is an interesting fact that Malaysia and Bahrain are the two countries that are most 
populated with Islamic banks and other organisations that support the development of Islamic banks. 
However, there are distinct differences between these two countries’ models of Islamic banking. In 
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terms of organisational and regulatory bodies, the approach of the people that manage the 
organisation will determine its efficiency. 
For key group three, the ‘Market and Client’, it is important to recognise that Islamic banks can survive 
only when there is a business client and a market to trade. Thus, the establishment of a market is 
essential in order for a client to do any business transactions. In comparing these two countries, 
Malaysia is more proactive in creating a market for Islamic banks to comfortably operate in, even 
though there are critics on Malaysia’s approaches to Islamic banking (Warde, 2010). However, as time 
passes, Malaysia has developed and matured in its operation and become recognised for its model of 
Islamic banking (Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous, 2013). Malaysia is the first country to set up an Islamic 
capital market, the Islamic interbank money market for Islamic banks to trade between themselves, 
and it is well known for having the largest sukuk (Islamic bond) issuance. On the other hand, Bahrain’s 
disclosure of its Islamic capital market and money market has been minimal with the latest 
information being in the World Islamic Fund and Financial market Conference (2014). Overall, for key 
group three, it is important to note that the advancement of Malaysia in its market and client quadrant 
has helped clients, who are important stakeholders, to influence and shape the information that may 
be included in the annual report. With such a huge number of customers, as stakeholders range from 
individual customers to business entities, the social contract between stakeholders (customers) can 
be strong according to social and religious values. Thus, this may explain the high proportion of 
disclosure in Malaysian Islamic banks as compared to Bahrain. 
The last and one of the most important organisational groups is in key group four, ‘education and 
training’. Institutions which provide this help to supply a work force and provide professional training 
to the Islamic banking and finance industry. Looking at a comparison of Malaysia and Bahrain, it is 
clear that Malaysia has put more resources into establishing training and educational institutes across 
Malaysia.  
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Apart from the majority of universities in Malaysia offering Islamic banking and finance courses (from 
the undergraduate to postgraduate level), the central bank has also taken an initiative at the 
international level by establishing the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) in 
2005. INCEIF is a university under the Malaysian central bank that attracts renowned international 
professionals from all over the world to work under one roof.  
Other than university involvement, the research arm established by the central bank for shariah 
research and publication is the International Shariah Research Academy (ISRA) in 2008. Meanwhile, 
for professional training for bankers working in the Islamic banking industry, the Islamic Banking & 
Finance Institute (IBFIM) was created in 2001 under the initiative of the central bank of Malaysia. 
On the other hand, the Bahrain central bank became a patron of the General Council for Islamic Banks 
& Financial Institutions (CIBAFI) in 2001. Under CIBAFI, the education and research wing of Islamic 
finance and banking are utilised at the same time, supporting regulatory soundness. This is distinct 
from Malaysia that decentralises the functions of organisations for each purpose of education and 
research as Bahrain instead centralises the functions under one organisation. Overall, for education 
and training institutions, Malaysia shows a high commitment towards providing a platform to support 
the needs of the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia while Bahrain has not really been active in 
establishing a good training and education facility for the Islamic banking and finance industry in 
Bahrain. In having such a comprehensive coverage for education and training institutions in Malaysia, 
it is not surprising that Malaysia’s disclosure and transparency in its Social, Shariah, Environment, 
Governance & Ethic (SEGE) disclosure is better than Bahrain. 
Based on the above consideration and given the organisational and regulatory setting of Malaysia and 
Bahrain, the important relationship between the differences of environment that the Islamic banks 
operate in and the atmosphere of the organisational and regulatory body in a country or system make 
a difference in how Islamic banks are organised and react, for instance, in their social disclosure. 
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Overall, in the previous three sub-sections (8.2.1. Religious Direction & Orientation, 8.2.2. Political & 
Governance setting, and 8.2.3. Organisational & Regulatory Differences), the thesis discussed the 
importance of the religious orientation of a country in contributing to differences in its disclosure style. 
Furthermore, the thesis also discussed how the social construct shaped the disclosure information. 
Lastly, the thesis argued that the organisational and regulatory body and initiatives in a country make 
the overall Social, Shariah, Environment, Governance & Ethics (SEGE) disclosure better and more 
mature. Having discussed all the details in both countries, it can be concluded that Malaysian national 
values which are progressive with a modest religious orientation and social construct have made 
Malaysian Islamic banking disclosure improve annually from 2010 to 2014 and surpass Bahrain Islamic 
banks’ (SEGE) disclosure. 
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 Influential and Non-Influential Stakeholders in Malaysia and 
Bahrain 
 
Figure 8.2: Adapted and Reconstructed from Mendelow, A. (1986). "Stakeholder Mapping" 
In this sub-section, the influential and non-influential stakeholders will be critically discussed in the 
context of Malaysia and Bahrain. The figure above is the framework modified to suit the discussion 
from the general perspective in the Islamic banking industry. Nevertheless, given the complexity of 
the nature of disclosure that involves the organisation-society relationship (Sarah W and Carol A, 
2013), and taking into consideration that the social system in both countries are different, the country-
specific stakeholders need to be discussed in detail while taking the country into account. 
In general, in the banking sector, the central bank and financial regulator play an important role and 
are influential and important stakeholders to Islamic banks, thus making them fall into ‘Area 1’. In this 
regard, Malaysia’s central bank (BNM) and the Security Commission of Malaysia play an important 
role in shaping the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia. This has been proven and discussed in the 
organisational setting in the last section where the Malaysian central bank, for instance, initiated the 
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Shariah governance framework for the Islamic banking sector, anchoring the Shariah research arm 
(ISRA) and creating the Islamic finance education centre (INCEIF). All of these provide evidence of how 
influential the central bank of Malaysia is as a stakeholder in the development of the Islamic banking 
industry and its high interest in developing the industry.  
However, even though the Bahrain central bank is an important figure in the banking and Islamic 
banking sector in Bahrain, there is not much proof to indicate that the Bahrain central bank has a high 
interest in the Islamic banking industry as not many initiatives have been launched. In other words, 
the “high in interest & high in influence” stakeholder in Malaysia is strong in that it affects and effects 
Islamic banking in general and SEGE disclosure specifically. However, in Bahrain, the supposed “high 
in interest & high in influence” stakeholder is not as strong in Malaysia and the enthusiasm towards 
the Islamic banking industry is not as high as in Malaysia. Again, this relates to the social and societal 
setting in the specific country. Based on the findings in chapter 6 and 7, stakeholder theory may 
explain the disclosure in Malaysia where Islamic banks in Malaysia signal more responsible conduct 
themes in their annual reports to wider stakeholders in general. This may suggest that the influential 
stakeholders in Malaysia are more diligent and active compared to Bahrain. 
Moreover, for a country like Bahrain, the king may be the most influential stakeholder for Islamic 
banks that operate in Bahrain. This thesis projects that the king as a “highly influential” figure in the 
country can determine and shape the disclosure framework of Islamic banks in Bahrain. Namely, since 
the king plays a politically important role in the country (as discussed in the Social Construct & Political 
Stand section), the king’s order and suggestions have the full potential to be followed. Likewise, if the 
king plays his role in social reporting or has a passion for social responsibility issues, the majority of 
the organisations in the country will follow its stream of awareness. However, based on the findings 
in chapter 6 and 7, it seems that the disclosure by Bahraini Islamic banks may be just to signals and 
fulfil legitimacy from authority. This may suggest that the stakeholders in Bahrain are not sensitive 
towards disclosure. 
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Overall, for ‘Area 1’, the influential stakeholders in Malaysia are much more sensitive towards the 
Islamic banking industry and this has led to better social reporting. Meanwhile, Bahrain’s influential 
stakeholders in ‘Area 1’ are not very sensitive towards Islamic banking social reporting initiatives. 
Interestingly, in “Area 2” the government linked bodies like the Accounting and Auditing Organization 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) play an important role in shaping the social reporting in 
Bahrain with the requirement of having a section on social responsibility in the annual report. 
However, the majority of Islamic banks in Bahrain only have a section on social responsibility without 
comprehensive information and with the majority only achieving level 1 disclosure (phrases). Even 
though AAOIFI is an influential stakeholder to Islamic banks in Bahrain, the disclosure seems to only 
minimally satisfy the legitimacy from AAOIFI, as advocated by Belal et al. (2014), since the information 
in the disclosure is only at the phrases level. 
This is different to Malaysia as there is no specific organisation that requires any specific requirement 
for social responsibility. Nevertheless, the social responsibility disclosure by Malaysian Islamic banks 
is at a higher degree as compared to Bahrain with these banks achieving level 3 disclosure (statistical 
evidence) (see chapter 6). The disclosure with more statistical evidence signals that the Islamic banks 
in Malaysia disclose information to broader stakeholders using a wider stakeholder approach and 
portray accountability towards stakeholders. 
Moving further into ‘Area 3’ stakeholders, it is important to note that educational bodies offer courses 
when there is demand from society and/or there are initiatives by the government. In the Malaysian 
case, the demand from the society and government initiatives have driven the offering of Islamic 
finance and banking courses throughout the nation, thus filling the employment lacuna. This is 
because Islamic banking is one of programmes in the New Economic Plan (NEP) in Malaysia that 
involves education, operations and legislation for the Islamic banking agenda (Warde, 2010). 
Malaysian higher learning institutions can be classified into low influence but high interest 
stakeholders. As one of the stakeholder groups, the findings show that support of educational 
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institutions is a type of disclosure that Islamic banks in Malaysia report in the annual report, such as 
with the student programmes they have sponsored (e.g. seminars) and the internships they have 
provided to students. This may suggest that Islamic banks in Malaysia signal their responsibility and 
care towards educational institutions and consider them to be an important stakeholder group. 
However, Bahrain educational initiatives mostly come from a government-linked body. For instance, 
in the Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance (BIBF), most degrees come from a joint programme 
with British universities and the state-owned university, the University of Bahrain (UOB). The 
importance of educational institutions in the role of social reporting is that, as high interest 
stakeholders, academia plays an important role in educating and advocating for the importance of 
sustainability, ethical principles, and social and environmental issues for a better society (Adams, 
2017). This has been proven in western society with the main advocators for sustainability, social and 
environmental issues coming mainly from the realm of academia. Therefore, by having a mature 
educational organisation as a stakeholder, it may influence and promote a sound social reporting 
environment. Malaysia’s higher performance in social reporting by Islamic banks compared to Bahrain 
might signal that its educational system for Islamic finance and banking is beginning to mature. 
Lastly, is the ‘Area 4’ stakeholder that has neither high influence nor high interest. It may seem that 
‘Area 4’ has no potential in affecting stakeholder principle. However, in reality, such as in the case of 
Malaysia, it has. For instance, the Non-Muslim community, mainly Chinese in theory, would not usually 
have interest in Islamic finance and banking issues. However, they have become interested in Islamic 
pawn shops because of the fairer system that do not oppress pledgees, the non-compound interest, 
and its cheapness compared to conventional pawn shops (Ghafar Ismail and Zakiah Ahmad, 1997). 
The communication that advocates for a better system of Islamic pawnshops can be clearly seen in 
the annual report disclosure in Bank Rakyat Malaysia Limited’s (B-Rakyat) 2016 annual report, page 
16 where the bank discloses its receipt of the respected industry-led award given by the Global Islamic 
Finance Awards for “The Best Pawnbroking Services 2016”. This type of disclosure is important to 
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discuss as, obviously, ‘Area 4’ stakeholders in Malaysia have benefited from the services and the 
information disclosed accordingly. However, in contrast with Bahrain, ‘Area 4’ stakeholders there 
currently have no motivation to increase their interest in Islamic banking as currently there are no 
pure innovations in Islamic finance products that really make a difference like in Islamic pawn broking 
in Malaysia. 
In conclusion, the influential and non-influential stakeholders section provides an understanding on 
the importance of the sensitivity of stakeholders in each area, which may influence the social 
disclosure. As discussed previously, even though ‘Area 1’ is the most influential and has high interest 
stakeholders in principle, it nevertheless depends on the sensitivity of the organisation or body to act 
and react in favour of the Islamic banking industry or vice versa. Furthermore, the sensitivity28 of all 
stakeholders may influence the level and quality of the disclosure of Islamic banks in each country.  
The type and example of the sensitivity of stakeholders or society (organisational or individual) and 
their response (positive or negative) has been discussed previously in chapter 3 theoretical 
foundations in the disclosure framework where these kinds of stakeholder may signal positive and/or 
negative feedback towards Islamic banks in the form of complaint, response and critique. These 
responses (positive/negative information) will later be processed by the internal stakeholders, which 
are the frontline of the Islamic banks, and be passed on to the higher management to be processed 
and taken into consideration. The above discussion in this section fulfils the research objectives and 
answers the research question on why there is a difference between the two countries in disclosure, 
where the type (influence/sensitivity) of stakeholders in both countries influence Islamic bank 
disclosure. 
                                                        
28 The degree of the stakeholder’s concerned/care/attention towards Islamic banks specific disclosure, action 
and management in general. 
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The next section will discuss how the level of quality and ordinary disclosure predicts the spectrum of 
stakeholders and legitimacy in theory for the two countries based on quality and ordinary disclosure 
while taking into consideration the role of accountability and social norms theory. 
 Stakeholder and Legitimacy Theory Spectrum Mapping within 
Accountability and Social Norms Theory Parameter for Malaysia and 
Bahrain Islamic banks 
 
Figure 8.3: Mapping the Stakeholder and Legitimacy Spectrum within the Parameter of Accountability and Social Norms 
The objective of this section is to reiterate the differences between the two models of Islamic banking 
in Malaysia and Bahrain through the lenses of stakeholder and legitimacy theory while at the same 
time considering the factors that may involve the accountability and social norms theory parameter. 
Based on the findings, a majority of the Islamic banks fall under the lower spectrum of legitimacy as 
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the quality and ordinary disclosure is low. The reason for this might be due to two circumstances: first, 
the Islamic banks do not care and choose to not be responsible to wider stakeholders, and, second, 
the Islamic banks already enjoy legitimacy from the regulator while the social contract environment 
they operate in does not provide enough pressure (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, Deegan et al., 2002). 
Moreover, in terms of legitimacy, the Islamic banks only provide basic information in the annual report 
which only satisfies the minimal requirement for signalling legitimacy. Whether the stakeholders read 
the annual report or not is of no concern since the information has been signalled in the annual report. 
On another argument, it is assumed that if the ordinary disclosure (index) is higher but the quality 
disclosure (three level score-evidence based) is lower, the banks may perform false signalling to its 
stakeholders.
 
In contrast, only some Islamic banks fall under ‘high spectrum of stakeholder’ with only one Islamic 
bank from Bahrain being under this stage. The Islamic banks in this cluster can be grouped as having 
the highest responses to stakeholders. They are linked to the ethical branch of stakeholder theory and 
are accountable to a wider society. This is because their disclosure responds to a majority of the 
themes and dimensions according to stakeholder expectations, as advocated by Huang and Kung 
(2010), while disclosing at the evidence-based 29 level in the annual report. Disclosure from Islamic 
banks in this group may signal their commitment and accountability towards wider stakeholders and 
this can be explained by stakeholder theory.  
Furthermore, since the majority of Islamic banks under this cluster are from Malaysia, this thesis would 
like to reiterate that the differences of the two countries might also be explained by the social norms, 
particularly in both countries. This is because the society that forms the stakeholders in a particular 
environment is nurtured by the values that are rooted in the society such as in their work norms, 
norms of cooperation and norms of reciprocity (Elster, 2000). In this case, the working norms and 
                                                        
29 Statistical evidence of the related themes of disclosure in the annual report. E.g., “1500 USD has been 
donated to environmental causes in 2014”. 
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moral norms of Malaysia in disclosing information might affect the disclosure in the Islamic banks’ 
annual reports. 
Moving further, the majority of Islamic banks in Bahrain fall under the ‘lower spectrum of legitimacy’ 
cluster in their role in disclosing information because, for Bahrain, the king is the sole source of power 
and legitimacy. It is also noted that Islamic banks in Bahrain also satisfy legitimacy from AAOIFI with 
the requirement of the social responsibility section under governance standard number 7, where the 
majority of Islamic banks in Bahrain only provide level 1 30 disclosure as discussed in the findings 
chapter. Moreover, the king of Bahrain does not play a significant role in social, sustainability, ethical 
and environmental initiatives, and Islamic banks in Bahrain do not take these kinds of disclosure 
dimensions and themes seriously in the annual report. 
On the other hand, the number of Islamic banks in Malaysia under the high spectrum of stakeholders 
is higher than Bahrain. This information denotes that, in Malaysia, there are Islamic banks that take 
stakeholders seriously and embrace the value of accountability to stakeholders. Furthermore, to be 
on this position takes a combination of complex and mature organisational and societal awareness to 
commit to high quality and high ordinary disclosure. The high density towards the wider stakeholder-
type disclosure may signal that the Islamic banks that operate in a country with progressive values and 
religious-orientation tend to address SEGE disclosure better in their annual report (Walker et al., 2012, 
Brammer et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, Malaysian Islamic banks are more responsive and sensitive towards stakeholder affairs 
by performing well in their SEGE disclosure as compared to Islamic banks that operate in Bahrain. The 
findings are in line with Hassan and Harahap (2010) where only Islamic bank in Malaysia perform 
above average in corporate social disclosure, leaving others, including Islamic banks from Bahrain, 
behind score. Moreover, based on this it can be concluded that Malaysian Islamic banks’ disclosure is 
                                                        
30 Phrases level disclosure of related themes in the annual report. E.g., “The bank is committed to 
environmental efforts by having a bank-level recycling centre in each branch to gather recycleable material 
from office use”. 
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more useful to a broader stakeholder as advocated by Belal et al. (2014) in what is known as the “wider 
stakeholder approach” suggested by scholars in Islamic finance. 
Overall, in general, the majority of Islamic banks need to work on their SEGE31 disclosure. However, 
the Islamic banks that perform well in SEGE disclosure are normally located in countries that are more 
progressive in terms of regulations, values and religious orientation. This can be seen in Malaysia, 
where the external and internal stakeholders (society) are much more mature in nature. This is 
because majority of the Malaysian Islamic banks fall under the high spectrum and lower spectrum of 
the stakeholder’s cluster, which at least signals its accountability of information in disclosure towards 
stakeholders.  
However, for Bahrain, it seems that the majority of Islamic banks signal their legitimacy information 
in the annual report at a minimal level. This may be explained by the conservative social norms values 
embedded in their society (internal and external stakeholders) related to their religious orientations 
and organisational culture that make Islamic banks comfortable with the status quo of their operations 
and reputation. 
In the later sections (8.5. Basic Differences between Malaysia & Bahrain and 8.6. Country’s Direction 
in Disclosure), the thesis tries to prove and support the differences between the two countries’ SEGE 
disclosures by providing a bird’s eye view of the overall disclosure. This weaves the previous discussion 
and argument together with regard to the variances of the disclosure and the country’s social settings. 
  
                                                        
31 SEGE refers to Shariah, Social, Environmental, Governance, and Ethics which are the 7 main dimensions for 
disclosure which consist of 20 themes (Shariah Compliance on Banking Transaction, Shariah Awareness, Zakat, 
Benevolent Loan/Qard Hassan, Islamic Commitment, Community Involvement, Charity, Sponsorship, Human 
Resources and Capital Reward and Benefit, Nature, Wild Life, Recycling, Institutional Ethics, Business Ethics, 
Shariah Governance  Framework, Shariah Supervisory Board, Board of Directors, Top Management, Guiding 
Principles of Governance) 
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 Basic Differences between Malaysia & Bahrain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 above is a bird‘s eye view and serves as a summary of all the disclosure score comparisons 
between Bahrain and Malaysia from 2010 until 2014 and the details of the discussion on the findings 
and results discussed in chapter 6. The objective is to show the plain differences of the country’s 
commitment to disclosure where Malaysia is always above Bahrain. Furthermore and importantly, the 
gap or lacuna between Malaysia and Bahrain is comparably huge from 2012 to 2014. 
 As discussed in chapter 6, Malaysia is always above Bahrain and the reason has been discussed in 
detail previously in section “8.2 Malaysia vs Bahrain Context”. However, it is important to reiterate 
that the differences in religious orientation, social construct, and organisational and regulatory 
behaviour has led to the above differences. The figure above also may explain the sensitivity of 
stakeholders in Malaysia and the less sensitive nature of stakeholders in Bahrain as discussed before 
in section “8.3. Sensitive and Insensitive stakeholders in Malaysia and Bahrain”. Even though Malaysia 
and Bahrain are the two leading countries in the Islamic banking industry in the world, their disclosure 
differences are obviously distinct to each other because of the complexity of the countries’ 
characteristics. The next section will disclose the countries’ orientations in the disclosure themes. 
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 Country Direction in Disclosure 
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Figure 8.5 provides a summary of the themes’ differences and directions weighted to each country. 
There are several key points that are important to discuss from several distinct themes in each country. 
Firstly, Malaysia obviously surpasses Bahrain in zakat, benevolent loans, shariah governance 
framework and shariah supervisory board themes, where all of these themes are related to the shariah 
dimension. Supposedly, a conservative country like Bahrain is expected to disclose more on shariah 
issues. However, Malaysia provides better disclosure (ordinary and quality) than Bahrain with regard 
to Shariah issues. The common reason that may explain this is that Malaysia’s Islamic banks want 
religious legitimacy. However, looking back at the history and the construction of religious orientation 
in Malaysia, the reason is more because of the sensitivity of the stakeholders (organisational and 
individual stakeholders). For instance, zakat (Islamic levy) collection institutions (State Zakat 
Departments) might influence and encourage Islamic banks to pay zakat, thus increasing the 
disclosure of zakat. 
Looking at the themes related to governance issues like the board of directors and top management, 
Bahrain discloses more on these themes compared to Malaysia. Again, looking at Bahrain which is 
culturally linked and geographically closer to the birthplace of Islam, it is illogical that Bahrain does 
not provide more information on shariah related issues. However, this might signal that religious 
legitimacy is easily obtained from society and/or the regulators. On the other hand, the relevant 
stakeholders are not sensitive towards shariah-related issues. The lower direction might be explained 
by the religious orientation of Bahrain as explained before in the Malaysian and Bahraini context. 
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Moreover, table 8.3 below may further support the discussion:- 
 
 
Table 8.3 provides an indicator that religion is a more important factor to Malaysian society as 
compared with Bahrain. 
Since Malaysian society considers religion as an important matter, this further explains why Malaysian 
Islamic banks disclose more on shariah-related themes compared to Bahrain. Other religious, 
historical values such as the discipline in one school of thought might make them much more 
concerned with practicing certain standards in the sphere of the Islamic parameter. Moreover, as 
discussed in section “8.2 Malaysia and Bahrain context”, Malaysia and Bahrain are very distinct in 
nature. Even though they embrace the same Islamic banking concept, both of them advocate a 
different way of practicing social disclosure. In conclusion, Malaysia and Bahrain’s disclosures are 
different to each other, and this is because of the differences in values they embrace in religious 
orientation, social construct and historical values. 
Furthermore, another feature that distinguishes Malaysia from Bahrain is that Malaysia concentrates 
more on a type of disclosure known as Social Internal Affairs (Reward & Benefits) while Bahrain 
focuses more on social external matters (Charity). 
  
  NATIONAL RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION & SETTING 
 
Importance of 
Religion 
Following Religious 
Norms 
Younger Generations’ Quality of 
Religious Faith 
Malaysia 84.8% 64.2 63.8% 
Bahrain 40.6% 42.8 35.3% 
Table 8.3: Importance of Religion in Malaysia & Bahrain (World Value Survey) 
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On another note, it is important to highlight that the environment dimension (Nature, Wild Life & 
Animal Rights, Recycling) has the lowest dimension in the disclosure. Even though Malaysian Islamic 
banks provide better quality disclosure as compared to Bahrain in environmental themes, the majority 
of the banks still need to put greater effort on this. This is in line with the Rizk (2014) argument that 
Islamic banks should embrace environmental issues as if they were guardians of it.  
As explained earlier in ‘Chapter 2:  Background of Malaysia & Bahrain Environment and Framework’, 
the countries’ differences in their institutional and regulatory approach might affect their disclosure 
commitment. Moreover, the history and background of a country’s development in Islamic banking 
plays an important role towards how Islamic banks that operate inside the country react towards 
social reporting. The reason for this is that the external and internal stakeholders of Islamic banks may 
hold the country’s values, ranging from religious orientation to administrative culture, that are 
embedded inside a particular geographical area and which shape how Islamic banks respond to SEGE 
disclosure. 
As informed earlier, the stakeholders (society) that possess the country’s values, whether progressive 
or conservative, will fill in the position in the Islamic banks itself and other institutional bodies that 
will naturalise the values that may affect the disclosure from the internal (Islamic banks) or the 
external (other organisations related to Islamic banks) side. 
Next, the thesis will discuss the possible implications towards the administrative and professional field 
to complement the contribution towards the body of knowledge (literature).  
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 Managerial & Policy Implication of the Study 
A number of potential managerial implications may be derived from this study. First, specific insights 
gained from this study will help managers, board of directors, shariah supervisory boards and the 
managers that are in charge of the preparation of annual reports have a greater view on their role in 
Islamic bank social reporting initiatives. Second, regulators and non-governmental organisations that 
have a relationship with Islamic banks in the two countries might want to create a specific social 
reporting standard for the Islamic banking industry in each country. Third, given the turbulence of 
sustainability issues recently, Islamic banks can take part in worldwide initiatives, for instance in the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), United Nation Environment programme (UNEP), or by creating a 
worldwide Islamic banking social and environmental initiative via the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC). Fourth, the suggested SEGE disclosure framework in chapter three can be utilised 
for the training and awareness programmes of professional bankers and chief operating officers of 
Islamic banks. Therefore, the Islamic banking industries will be equipped with the human resources 
and leaders that are aware of the practice and importance of the disclosure of social, shariah, 
environment, ethics and governance issues. 
Fifth, this study also points out the importance of recognising a country’s differences in planning and 
implementing the awareness of social reporting. For instance, the target stakeholders in a country 
that are conservative and with a moderate society may have a different approach. Malaysia might be 
satisfied with the pressure or awareness being signalled to regulators, institutions that relate to the 
Islamic finance industry, and the Islamic banks itself. However, in Bahrain the king and the royal family 
might need to be convinced on the importance of social reporting and sustainability in social, 
environmental and ethical aspects to get Islamic banks to produce better quality and more honest 
information in their social disclosure provided in the annual report. Sixth, this study also signals an 
important implication to policy and programme strategy. The result provides preliminary evidence 
that local societal behaviour might affect Islamic banks’ behaviour and influence disclosure 
commitment and design. Next, the study constraints and future ideas will be elaborated. 
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 Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
 
The study has some constraints and prospects that could be addressed in future research. There are 
six points that will be elaborated in the later paragraph. First is the period of the study. Second is the 
extension and harmonisation of the checklist, with the literature in Islamic accounting and ethical 
business literature, into a more rigorous checklist. Third is the analysis of individual banks in a much 
longer period. Fourth is the integration of the sources of social reporting, for instance annual reports, 
websites, Facebook accounts, twitter, and newspapers. Fifth is comparing the universal disclosure 
checklist with conventional banks in both countries. Lastly is constructing a special checklist for 
graphics disclosure. 
Firstly, the period of study will be elaborated upon. Since the time given to complete this study is 
limited, this imposed a limitation on the potential that the study could have achieved in a longer time. 
However, the period or time frame can be an opportunity for future research. The current study 
involved the years 2010 to 2014, which is a five-year period. Future research might analyse the 
disclosure of Islamic bank social reporting over a decade (ten years) as things usually move or change 
within 10 years. Moreover, the comparison of ten years of Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic banks’ social 
reporting patterns would be beneficial to be understand. 
Secondly, the extension and harmonisation of the checklists for social disclosure for Islamic banks. 
With more time, the checklists could be further improved and modified with previous Islamic 
accounting and business ethics literature. Furthermore, the checklists could also be constructed in a 
more extensive way by having more Global Reporting Initiative elements and United Nations 
environmental programme components. Even though this thesis employs some from the standard, 
with more time a more comprehensive and meaningful checklist could be produced with a 
combination of the literature and global and respected standards and initiatives. 
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Thirdly, future research can consider analysing a single bank or a number of banks which have been 
operating for a long time and comparing their results. For instance, with banks that have been 
operating for 20 years and above in each country. This might give some possibly valuable findings and 
interpretations. 
Fourthly, it would be beneficial if a study could give comprehensive analysis and findings using data 
from annual reports, official websites, newspaper events, and the official corporate Facebook and 
twitter account. This would be challenging but rewarding as it would be time consuming and the 
model and checklist would need to be revised and tested against the above mediums of disclosure. 
Fifth, it would be useful to have the universal checklist be compatible with conventional banks as 
studies can compare Islamic and conventional bank universal disclosure for both countries to get more 
insight into the differences between the countries. 
Lastly, a limitation and potential opportunity for exploration is a specific graphics checklist for 
disclosure. Moreover, graphics can be further classified into unique and universal graphics disclosure 
as well. However, in this thesis, time has limited the innovation and creativity to develop such tools in 
measuring disclosure in graphics. Nevertheless, the graphics disclosure has been adequately 
measured in this thesis as discussed in section “6.4.4 Graphic Utilisation by the Countries”. 
In the next section, which is the last section of the chapter and the thesis, the supposition of the thesis 
will be presented and explained, thus concluding the thesis. 
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 Thesis Conclusion 
 
In this main conclusion section, the judgement is based on the collective evidence from the content 
analysis result in chapter 6 and the analysis estimation in chapter 7. This evidence is later weaved with 
and reasoned through the theoretical lenses of stakeholder and legitimacy theory as the main theory 
while signalling, social norms and accountability theory act as the supporting theories to explain the 
research findings as discussed in chapter 4. Moreover, chapter 8 which discusses the Malaysian and 
Bahraini context in terms of religious orientation, social construct, and organisational and regulatory 
setting also helps in reasoning and understanding the social disclosure differences between these two 
countries.  
Chapter 6 provides statistical and narrative information on country differences in ordinary32 and 
quality 33  disclosure while chapter 7 provides an estimation and investigates the religious and 
regulatory quality relationship with disclosure. Furthermore, the literature review and the theoretical 
foundation chapter also play an important role in understanding the evidence provided in chapter 6 
and 7. Moreover, these chapters provide insight into how the stakeholder, legitimacy, accountability 
and social norms theory explain the disclosure of Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. 
Studies which include Malaysia and Bahrain solely and have separate statistics for each of these 
countries is scarce in the literature. Moreover, only Mallin et al. (2014) and Hassan and Harahap (2010) 
find that Malaysian Islamic bank disclosure is superior to Bahraini Islamic banks. However, the 
theoretical underpinning of the differences in disclosure has never been explored with regards to 
these two countries even though these they can be described as the two main hubs for Islamic banking 
and finance as advocate by Mohd. Yusof and Bahlous (2013).  
                                                        
32 Disclosure Index measured by the compliance to the checklist. 
33 Disclosure score measured by the degree of disclosure (3 Level- L1=Phrases, L2=Policy, Graphics, 
L3=Statistical Evidence) Further information can be found in chapter 5. 
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Figure 8.6 provides universal information on how the thesis views the theories overlapping and 
complementing each other as advocated by Gray et al. (1995b). Having applied the theories in context, 
this thesis argues that, in explaining the disclosure of Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain, the 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories are the most suitable. For instance, Islamic banks with quality 
disclosure move the disclosure forward to be accountable to a wider set of stakeholders while 
complying with the checklist in ordinary disclosure to signal their legitimacy in the annual report. 
However, there are additional theories that can complement the stakeholder and legitimacy theories 
and help explain the differences in disclosure, for instance the social norms and accountability theories.  
The thesis argues that whether the Islamic banks disclose information for a wider set of stakeholders 
or just as a means of legitimacy depends on the orientation, values and norms of the particular country 
or geographical area. This has been indicated and discussed in section 8.2 Malaysia vs Bahrain context. 
This is because the values of the culture embedded in society will influence the disclosure. Moreover, 
Figure 8.6: Thesis's Theories Perceptions & Application 
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the thesis also provides further supporting figures from the World Values Survey, World Governance 
Indicator and Transparency International to provide further assistance in understanding the 
differences of disclosure in Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic banks, and this has been discussed earlier. 
In the context of Malaysia and Bahrain, this thesis argues that a country with progressive values and 
norms will provide better disclosure for wider stakeholders while a country that embraces 
conservative values and norms will only provide disclosure that satisfies the minimal requirement for 
legitimacy from influential stakeholders. This is proven where the majority of Bahraini Islamic banks 
provide a standard disclosure and use more or less the same wording in the corporate responsibility 
section in the annual report each year, which signals that the legitimacy from the stakeholders is easily 
obtained. However, in the Malaysian context, Islamic banks disclosur is much more diversified as they 
disclose information beyond expectations in the annual report, which signals the banks commitment 
towards wider stakeholders. 
In the literature Islamic bank disclosure usually relates to the need to be legitimate, for instance in 
Maali et al. (2006) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). However, concentrating and narrowing the scope 
to Malaysia and Bahrain has given a different perspective that supports that there are Islamic banks 
that disclose information which can be related to wider stakeholder accountability. This has been 
successful through the application of the 3 level approach influenced by and modified from Beck et al. 
(2010) and Botosan (1997). Through this, the quality measurement may help in identifying the Islamic 
banks that disclose information through the lenses of stakeholder theory. On top of this, this thesis 
also introduces the social norms theory to the literature, particularly to Islamic bank social reporting, 
as one of the complementary theories in explaining why Islamic banks disclose information to gain 
legitimacy or are accountable to wider stakeholders. Since social norms can be described as part of 
cultural extension, it is important to acknowledge its role in social reporting as this is a factor that does 
not change in a short period of time, as mentioned by Minkov and Hofstede (2012), Hofstede (2010), 
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Hofstede (2003), Hofstede (1983), and has influence on how the society of a particular country acts 
and responds towards worldly activity in general and disclosure specifically. 
Moving further, one of the important materials to be displayed in this section is the minimalist 
approach 34 of Islamic banks in the disclosure as advocated by Belal et al. (2014). This thesis argues 
that Islamic banks have disclosed minimal information on environmental issues, for instance in the 
nature, wild life and recycling themes. Even though the top three Islamic banks in Malaysia disclose 
quality disclosure on these themes while this theme is not present for Islamic banks in Bahrain, the 
disclosure is still at a minimum level of less than 10%. These findings are in line with Rizk (2014) and 
Maali et al. (2006) where they argue that the environmental themes in disclosure have usually been 
neglected. 
Overall, there are several points that this thesis advocates. First, based on the findings and evidence, 
Malaysia has better quality and ordinary disclosure compared to Bahraini Islamic banks. Second, 
Islamic banks in Malaysia are more stable and reliable in their social disclosure, as the movement in 
the ordinary to quality rank does not move with a huge gap. Moreover and most importantly, the top 
three ranked Islamic banks in Malaysia maintain the same position in quality and ordinary disclosure 
rank. Third, religiosity has a strong positive relationship with disclosure quality in the overall sample 
combining Malaysia and Bahrain. However, looking at the religious orientation differences, social 
construct and organisational differences based on the country’s government’s official documents and 
the world value survey, it is likely that Malaysian social disclosure is influenced positively by the 
importance of religion as compared to Bahrain. Fourth, this thesis found that regulatory quality 
influences quality disclosure positively for overall Islamic banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. However, in 
a separate estimation, only Malaysia is positively influenced by regulatory quality. This indicates that 
regulatory bodies, as stakeholders, have influence in Islamic bank disclosure in Malaysia while Bahrain 
                                                        
34 Disclosure concentrating on Shariah themes as compared to more universal themes applied to conventional 
banks. 
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is not affected. Fifth, is the summary of the disclosure interpretation that links the findings in chapter 
6 and 7 with the external variable and theories (see Appendix 9). 
Moreover, the information in Appendix 9 provide complex summaries of the thesis’ findings and 
discussion that leads to the theoretical assumption as the result of the comparison of the two 
disclosure results by Malaysia and Bahrain Islamic banks. At a glance, these differences may have 
materialised due the disparity between the two countries’ cultures via societal values, ecological 
influence, institutional consequences, external influence and the reinforcement of the accounting 
values and systems (Sidney, 1988). These differences have made Malaysia and Bahrain Islamic banks 
accomplishments towards disclosure distinct to one other. In the case of this thesis’ investigation, 
Malaysia provides more evidence-based disclosure as compared to Bahraini Islamic banks, and this 
signals that Malaysian Islamic banks may respond to a wider stakeholder group. However, Bahrain 
Islamic banks seem to provide disclosure for symbolic purposes at the phrases (mentioning) level in 
the annual report (Soobaroyen and Ntim, 2013, Day and Woodward, 2004, Brendan, 2002). The 
symbolic disclosure in Bahraini Islamic banks is strengthened by the findings in chapter 6 where 
majority of the top 10 Islamic banks’ rankings dropped in ordinary disclosure when compared to the 
ranking of quality disclosure. Meanwhile, the top 3 Malaysian Islamic banks maintain the same place 
in ordinary and quality disclosure and there is some small movement by the other 7 Islamic banks.  
Furthermore, as discussed before, the thesis reiterates that better disclosure is provided when Islamic 
banks operate in a more religious country or geographical area, and this is in line with the argument 
of Walker et al. (2012) and the findings of Brammer et al. (2007). This is once again supported by the 
high score of the importance of religion in Malaysia and the low score in Bahrain. Moreover, it is 
important to note that Islamic banks that operate within the religious banner  are inevitably influenced 
by how important the local society perceives religion in the country. The results and findings in both 
countries are in agreement with the theories and other supportive instruments provided (Refer to 
Appendix 9). This may suggest that the existing literature and theories are applicable and parallel with 
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the cultural setting, societal values, institutional-ecological influences and accounting system-value 
(Sidney, 1988) in the Malaysian and Bahraini Islamic bank context. 
Above all, this thesis highlights and advocates the importance of the individual and societal (small 
stakeholder) role in shaping organisational stakeholders. This is because the individuals and society 
will be the ones that fill the work force in the organisational stakeholder, for instance from central 
banks, financial service authorities, non-governmental organisations, and watchdog groups. 
Furthermore, the values that are embedded in the individuals that work in the organisations are 
shaped from the values they learn and are exposed to (normally the country’s values whether they be 
in social or religious affairs). Moreover, this will affect (in the case of this thesis) Islamic bank social 
disclosure. Likewise, if society is exposed to ethical and moral standards, good environmental values 
and (in the case of this thesis) a progressive religious orientation, it will ideally bring sustainability, not 
just from the shareholders’ business perspective but also from the ethical stakeholder business 
perspective. 
Also important to note is that, in this thesis, the concept of influential and non-influential 
stakeholders plays an important role in shaping disclosure in a particular country. The stakeholders 
will respond in positive (Feedback/Response/Advice) or negative (Complaints/Criticism/Whistle 
Blowing) ways towards information they receive. In this thesis, it is identified or presumed that the 
stakeholders in Malaysia are more sensitive towards Islamic bank disclosure as compared to Bahrain 
based on the findings and the country’s social and religious environment. 
Finally, this thesis reveals that the complexity of the social reporting of Islamic banks has its roots in 
matters ranging from religious orientation differences to multifarious social constructs and this will 
determine the type of stakeholders that shape how Islamic banks disclose information. Thus, this 
makes these two models of Islamic bank social reporting distinct from each other. It is hoped that this 
study’s argument on theoretical foundations and the empirical results from both countries have 
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provided an insight into embarking on future research. Therefore, this thesis serves as a valuable 
foundation for debate for both academics and practitioners in extending the literature and practices 
of social reporting by Islamic banks. 
 
End of Thesis 
  
258 
 
REFERENCES 
 
AAOIFI 2010. Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards for Islamic 
Financial Institutions: 1431H - 2010, AAOIFI. 
 
ABBOTT, W. F. & MONSEN, R. J. 1979. On the Measurement of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Self-Reported Disclosures as a Method of Measuring 
Corporate Social Involvement. The Academy of Management Journal, 22, 
501-515. 
 
ABDELSALAM, O., DIMITROPOULOS, P., ELNAHASS, M. & LEVENTIS, S. 2016. 
Earnings management behaviors under different monitoring mechanisms: 
The case of Islamic and conventional banks. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 132, 155-173. 
 
ADAMS, C. 2017. Editorial: Losses, tributes and carrying on. Sustainability 
Accounting, Management and Policy Journal. 
 
ADAMS, C. & ZUTSHI, A. 2004. Corporate social responsibility: why business 
should act responsibly and be accountable. Australian accounting review, 
14, 31-39. 
 
ADAMS, C. A., HILL, W.-Y. & ROBERTS, C. B. 1998. CORPORATE SOCIAL 
REPORTING PRACTICES IN WESTERN EUROPE: LEGITIMATING 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR? The British Accounting Review, 30, 1-21. 
 
ADAMS, C. A., POTTER, B., SINGH, P. J. & YORK, J. 2016. Exploring the implications 
of integrated reporting for social investment (disclosures). The British 
Accounting Review, 48, 283-296. 
 
ADAMS CAROL & WHELAN GLEN 2009. Conceptualising future change in 
corporate sustainability reporting. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 22, 118-143. 
 
ADHIKARI, B. 2014. Does Local Religiosity Matter for Bank Risk-Taking? 
Available: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Binay_Adhikari2/publication/264
417920_Does_Local_Religiosity_Matter_for_Bank_Risk-
Taking/links/53dc54c30cf2a76fb667b6ca/Does-Local-Religiosity-Matter-
for-Bank-Risk-Taking.pdf [Accessed 5 Dec 2017]. 
 
AHMED HAJI, A. & ANUM MOHD GHAZALI, N. 2013. The quality and determinants 
of voluntary disclosures in annual reports of Shari'ah compliant 
companies in Malaysia. Humanomics, 29, 24-42. 
259 
 
AL-TUWAIJRI, S. A., CHRISTENSEN, T. E. & HUGHES, K. E. 2004. The relations 
among environmental disclosure, environmental performance, and 
economic performance: a simultaneous equations approach. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 29, 447-471. 
 
ALI, A. J., AL-AALI, A. & AL-OWAIHAN, A. 2013. Islamic perspectives on profit 
maximization. Journal of business ethics, 117, 467-475. 
 
ALI ARIBI, Z. & ARUN, T. 2015. Corporate Social Responsibility and Islamic 
Financial Institutions (IFIs): Management Perceptions from IFIs in 
Bahrain. Journal of Business Ethics, 129, 785-794. 
 
ALI, A. Y. 2009. The Holy Qur'an: Text and Translation, Islamic Book Trust. 
 
AMALINA WAN ABDULLAH, W., PERCY, M. & STEWART, J. 2013. Shari'ah 
disclosures in Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic banks. Journal of Islamic 
Accounting and Business Research, 4, 100-131. 
 
ANDERSON, J. W. 1989. Corporate social responsibility: Guidelines for top 
management, Connecticut, Quorum Books. 
 
ANGELIDIS, J. & IBRAHIM, N. 2004. An Exploratory Study of the Impact of Degree 
of Religiousness Upon an Individual's Corporate Social Responsiveness 
Orientation. Journal of Business Ethics, 51, 119-128. 
 
ARCHEL, P., HUSILLOS, J., LARRINAGA, C. & SPENCE, C. 2009. Social disclosure, 
legitimacy theory and the role of the state. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 22, 1284-1307. 
 
ARENAS, D., LOZANO, J. M. & ALBAREDA, L. 2009. The role of NGOs in CSR: 
Mutual perceptions among stakeholders. Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 
175-197. 
 
ARIBI & GAO 2010. Corporate social responsibility disclosure : A comparison 
between Islamic and conventional financial institutions. Journal of 
Financial Reporting and Accounting, 8, 72-91. 
 
ARJALIÈS, D.-L. 2013. The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions 
in Organizations. Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, 33, 186-
188. 
 
AZMAT, F. & COGHILL, K. 2005. Good governance and market-based reforms: a 
study of Bangladesh. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 71, 
625-638. 
260 
 
AZMAT, F. & SAMARATUNGE, R. 2009. Responsible entrepreneurship in 
developing countries: Understanding the realities and complexities. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 90, 437-452. 
 
BARNETT, T., BASS, K. & BROWN, G. 1996. Religiosity, ethical ideology, and 
intentions to report a peer's wrongdoing. Journal of Business Ethics, 15, 
1161-1174. 
 
BAYDOUN, N. & WILLETT, R. 2000. Islamic Corporate Reports. Abacus, 36, 71-90. 
 
BEATTIE, V. & JONES, M. 1994. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF GRAPHICAL FORMAT 
CHOICES IN CHARITY ANNUAL REPORTS. Financial Accountability & 
Management, 10, 215. 
 
BEATTIE, V. & JONES, M. J. 1992. The Use and Abuse of Graphs in Annual Reports: 
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Study. Accounting & Business 
Research (Wolters Kluwer UK), 22, 291-303. 
 
BEATTIE, V. & JONES, M. J. 1997. A Comparative Study of the Use of Financial 
Graphs in the Corporate Annual Reports of Major U.S. and U.K. Companies. 
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 8, 33-68. 
 
BEATTIE, V. & JONES, M. J. 2002. The impact of graph slope on rate of change 
judgments in corporate reports. Abacus, 38, 177-199. 
 
BEATTIE, V., MCINNES, B. & FEARNLEY, S. 2004. A methodology for analysing 
and evaluating narratives in annual reports: a comprehensive descriptive 
profile and metrics for disclosure quality attributes. Accounting Forum, 28, 
205-236. 
 
BECK, A. C., CAMPBELL, D. & SHRIVES, P. J. 2010. Content analysis in 
environmental reporting research: Enrichment and rehearsal of the 
method in a British–German context. The British Accounting Review, 42, 
207-222. 
 
BELAL, A., ABDELSALAM, O. & NIZAMEE, S. 2014. Ethical Reporting in Islami 
Bank Bangladesh Limited (1983–2010). Journal of Business Ethics, 1-16. 
 
BELAL, A. R. & ROBERTS, R. W. 2010. Stakeholders' Perceptions of Corporate 
Social Reporting in Bangladesh. Journal of Business Ethics, 97, 311-324. 
 
BERNARDI, R. A., BEAN, D. F. & WEIPPERT, K. M. 2002. Signaling gender diversity 
through annual report pictures. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 15, 609-616. 
 
261 
 
BLAIKIE, N. 2007. Approaches to social enquiry: Advancing knowledge, Polity. 
 
BOTOSAN, C. A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. Accounting 
review, 323-349. 
 
BOULOUTA, I. & PITELIS, C. N. 2014. Who Needs CSR? The Impact of Corporate 
Social Responsibility on National Competitiveness. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 119, 349-364. 
 
BRAMMER, S., WILLIAMS, G. & ZINKIN, J. 2007. Religion and Attitudes to 
Corporate Social Responsibility in a Large Cross-Country Sample. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 71, 229-243. 
 
BRENDAN, O. D. 2002. Managerial perceptions of corporate social disclosure: An 
Irish story. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15, 406-436. 
 
BRUNSSON, N. 1989. The organization of hypocrisy: talk, decisions, and actions in 
organizations, Wiley. 
 
BURRELL, G. & MORGAN, G. 1979. Sociological paradigms and organisational 
analysis : elements of the sociology of corporate life, Farnham, Surrey, 
England; Burlington, Vt., U.S.A., Ashgate. 
 
BURRELL, G. & MORGAN, G. 1992. Sociological paradigms and organisational 
analysis: elements of the sociology of corporate life / Gibson Burrell, Gareth 
Morgan, Aldershot, Ashgate. 
 
CAMPBELL, D. & SLACK, R. 2011. Environmental disclosure and environmental 
risk: Sceptical attitudes of UK sell-side bank analysts. The British 
Accounting Review, 43, 54-64. 
 
CAMPBELL, D. J. 2000. Legitimacy theory or managerial reality construction? 
Corporate social disclosure in Marks and Spencer Plc corporate reports, 
1969-1997. Accounting Forum, 24, 80-100. 
 
CAPRIOTTI, P. & MORENO, Á. 2007. Corporate citizenship and public relations: 
The importance and interactivity of social responsibility issues on 
corporate websites. Public Relations Review, 33, 84-91. 
 
CENTRAL BANK OF MALAYSIA 2013. Financial Services Act 2013 and Islamic 
Financial Services Act 2013 Come Into Force. Islamic Financial Services Act 
2013 Come Into Force. Kuala Lumpur Malaysia: Central Bank of Malaysia. 
 
CHAN, M., WATSON, J. & WOODLIFF, D. 2014. Corporate Governance Quality and 
CSR Disclosures. Journal of Business Ethics, 125, 59-73. 
262 
 
CHATJUTHAMARD-KITSABUNNARAT, P., JIRAPORN, P. & TONG, S. 2014. Does 
religious piety inspire corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Evidence 
from historical religious identification. Applied Economics Letters, 21, 
1128-1133. 
 
CHAU, G. K. & GRAY, S. J. 2002. Ownership structure and corporate voluntary 
disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 37, 247-265. 
 
CHIRCOP, J., FABRIZI, M., IPINO, E. & PARBONETTI, A. 2017. Does Branch 
Religiosity Influence Bank Risk‐Taking? Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 44, 271-294. 
 
CHIU, T.-K. & WANG, Y.-H. 2015. Determinants of Social Disclosure Quality in 
Taiwan: An Application of Stakeholder Theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 
129, 379-398. 
 
CHO, C. H., LAINE, M., ROBERTS, R. W. & RODRIGUE, M. 2015. Organized 
hypocrisy, organizational façades, and sustainability reporting. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 40, 78-94. 
 
CHO, C. H. & PATTEN, D. M. 2007. The role of environmental disclosures as tools 
of legitimacy: A research note. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32, 
639-647. 
 
CHUA, W. F. 1988. Interpretive Sociology and Management Accounting Research: 
A Critical Review. Accounting, Auditing &amp; Accountability Journal, 1, 59-
79. 
 
CIBAFI. 2017. Professional Development [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cibafi.org/Programs.aspx?id=fFKvw9AJko8= [Accessed 19 
Oct 2017]. 
 
CLARKE, J. & GIBSON-SWEET, M. 1999. The use of corporate social disclosures in 
the management of reputation and legitimacy: a cross sectoral analysis of 
UK Top 100 Companies. Business Ethics: A European Review, 8, 5-13. 
 
CLARKE, T. 2005. Accounting for Enron: shareholder value and stakeholder 
interests. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13, 598-612. 
 
COOPER, S. M. & OWEN, D. L. 2007. Corporate social reporting and stakeholder 
accountability: The missing link. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32, 
649-667. 
 
263 
 
COWTON, C. J. 2002. Integrity, responsibility and affinity: three aspects of ethics 
in banking. Business Ethics: A European Review, 11, 393-400. 
 
COWTON, C. J. & THOMPSON, P. 2000. Do codes make a difference? The case of 
bank lending and the environment. Journal of Business Ethics, 24, 165-178. 
 
CRAIG DEEGAN 2002. Introduction :The legitimising effect of social and 
environmental disclosure. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
15, 282-311. 
 
DAM, L. & SCHOLTENS, B. 2008. Environmental regulation and MNEs location: 
Does CSR matter? Ecological Economics, 67, 55-65. 
 
DAS, S., DIXON, R. & MICHAEL, A. 2015. Corporate social responsibility reporting: 
a longitudinal study of listed banking companies in Bangladesh. 
 
DAWKINS, J. & LEWIS, S. 2003. CSR in Stakeholde Expectations: And Their 
Implication for Company Strategy. Journal of Business Ethics, 44, 185-193. 
 
DAY, R. & WOODWARD, T. 2004. Disclosure of information about employees in 
the Directors’ report of UK published financial statements: substantive or 
symbolic? Accounting Forum, 28, 43-59. 
 
DE VILLIERS, C. & MARQUES, A. 2016. Corporate social responsibility, country-
level predispositions, and the consequences of choosing a level of 
disclosure. Accounting and Business Research, 46, 167-195. 
 
DEEGAN, C., RANKIN, M. & TOBIN, J. 2002. An examination of the corporate social 
and environmental disclosures of BHP from 1983‐1997. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15, 312-343. 
 
DEEGAN, C. & SHELLY, M. 2014. Corporate Social Responsibilities: Alternative 
Perspectives About the Need to Legislate. Journal of Business Ethics, 121, 
499-526. 
 
DEEGAN, C. & UNERMAN, J. 2011. Financial Accounting Theory, McGraw-Hill. 
 
DEEGAN, C., UNERMAN, J. & BAUWHEDE, H. 2007. Financial accounting theory. 
In: DEEGAN, C., UNERMAN, J. & BAUWHEDE, H. (eds.). 
 
DEMETRIADES, C. R. & TYSER, C. R. 1980. The Mejelle: Being an English 
Translation of Majallahel-Ahkam-I-Adliya and a Complete Code on Islamic 
Civil Law, Law Publishing. 
 
DIVANNA, J. 2013. ISLAMIC FINANCE ENTERS NEW PHASE. Banker, 2-6. 
264 
 
DJALILOV, K. & HOLSCHER, J. Antecedents of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
the Banks of Central Eastern Europe and in the Countries of the Former 
Soviet Union.  Financial Institutions and Financial Regulation – New 
Developments in the European Union and Ukraine, 2017 Gottingen, 
Germany. pp. 39-58. 
 
DONALDSON, T. & PRESTON, L. E. 1995. The stakeholder theory of the 
corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of 
management Review, 20, 65-91. 
 
DOWLING, J. & PFEFFER, J. 1975. Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and 
Organizational Behavior. The Pacific Sociological Review, 18, 122-136. 
 
DU, X. 2013. Does Religion Matter to Owner-Manager Agency Costs? Evidence 
from China. Journal of Business Ethics, 118, 319-347. 
 
DUFF, A. 2017. Corporate social responsibility as a legitimacy maintenance 
strategy in the professional accountancy firm. The British Accounting 
Review, 49, 513-531. 
 
DYRENG, S. D., MAYEW, W. J. & WILLIAMS, C. D. 2012. Religious social norms and 
corporate financial reporting. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 39, 
845-875. 
 
ELSTER, J. 2000. Social norms and economic theory. Culture and Politics. 
Springer. 
 
ERIC, W. K. T. 1998. A longitudinal study of corporate social reporting in 
Singapore: The case of the banking, food and beverages and hotel 
industries. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 11, 624-635. 
 
FAROOK, S., HASSAN, M. K. & ROMAN, L. 2011. Determinants of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure: the case of Islamic banks. Journal of Islamic 
Accounting and Business Research, 2, 114. 
 
FASSIN, Y. & GOSSELIN, D. 2011. The collapse of a European bank in the financial 
crisis: an analysis from stakeholder and ethical perspectives. Journal of 
business ethics, 102, 169-191. 
 
GAMBLING, T. E. & KARIM, R. A. A. 1986. ISLAM AND 'SOCIAL ACCOUNTING'. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 13, 39-50. 
 
GAO, L., WANG, Y. & ZHAO, J. 2017. Does local religiosity affect organizational 
risk-taking? Evidence from the hedge fund industry. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 47, 1-22. 
265 
 
GHAFAR ISMAIL, A. & ZAKIAH AHMAD, N. 1997. Pawnshop as an instrument of 
microenterprise credit in Malaysia. International Journal of Social 
Economics, 24, 1343-1352. 
 
GRAY, R. 2001. Thirty years of social accounting, reporting and auditing: what (if 
anything) have we learnt? Business Ethics: A European Review, 10, 9-15. 
 
GRAY, R. 2006. Social, environmental and sustainability reporting and 
organisational value creation? Whose value? Whose creation? Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19, 793-819. 
 
GRAY, R., JAVAD, M., POWER, D. M. & SINCLAIR, C. D. 2001. Social and 
Environmental Disclosure and Corporate Characteristics: A Research Note 
and Extension. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 28, 327-356. 
 
GRAY, R., KOUHY, R. & LAVERS, S. 1995a. Constructing a research database of 
social and environmental reporting by UK companies. Accounting, Auditing 
& Accountability Journal, 8, 78-101. 
 
GRAY, R., KOUHY, R. & LAVERS, S. 1995b. Corporate social and environmental 
reporting. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 8, 47-77. 
 
GRAY, R., OWEN, D. & ADAMS, C. 1996a. Accounting & Accountability: Changes 
and Challenges in Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting, Prentice 
Hall. 
 
GRAY, R. H., OWEN, D. & ADAMS, C. A. 1996b. Accounting and accountability: 
changes and challenges in corporate social and environmental reporting / 
Rob Gray, Dave Owen, Carol Adams, Harlow, Financial Times/Prentice Hall. 
 
GREEN, F. 2001. It’s Been A Hard Day’s Night: The Concentration and 
Intensification of Work in Late Twentieth‐Century Britain. British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 39, 53-80. 
 
GREENWOOD, M. 2007. Stakeholder engagement: Beyond the myth of corporate 
responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 74, 315-327. 
 
GROSSMAN, S. J. 1981. An introduction to the theory of rational expectations 
under asymmetric information. The Review of Economic Studies, 48, 541-
559. 
 
GUJARATI, D. N. & PORTER, D. C. 2003. Basic Econometrics. 4th, New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
266 
 
GUTHRIE, J. & PARKER, L. D. 1989. Corporate Social Reporting: A Rebuttal of 
Legitimacy Theory. Accounting and Business Research, 19, 343-352. 
 
HANIFFA, R. & HUDAIB, M. 2007. Exploring the Ethical Identity of Islamic Banks 
via Communication in Annual Reports. Journal of Business Ethics, 76, 97-
116. 
 
HANIFFA, R. M. & COOKE, T. E. 2002. Culture, Corporate Governance and 
Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations. Abacus, 38, 317-349. 
 
HARIDAN, N. M., HASSAN, A. F. S. & KARBHARI, Y. 2018. Governance, religious 
assurance and Islamic banks: Do Shariah boards effectively serve? Journal 
of Management and Governance. 
 
HARRIS, D. V. 1982. Maximizing athletic potential: Integrating mind and body. 
Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance, 53, 31-33. 
 
HARVEY, B. 1995. Ethical banking: The case of the Co-operative bank. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 14, 1005-1013. 
 
HASSAN, A. & HARAHAP, S. S. 2010. Exploring corporate social responsibility 
disclosure: the case of Islamic banks. International Journal of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 3, 203-227. 
 
HASSAN, K. & LEWIS, M. 2007. Handbook of Islamic Banking, Edward Elgar 
Publishing,Incorporated 2007. 
 
HIGGINS, C., MILNE, M. & VAN GRAMBERG, B. 2015. The Uptake of Sustainability 
Reporting in Australia. Journal of Business Ethics, 129, 445-468. 
 
HILARY, G. & HUI, K. W. 2009. Does religion matter in corporate decision making 
in America? Journal of Financial Economics, 93, 455-473. 
 
HOFSTEDE, G. 1983. NATIONAL CULTURES IN FOUR DIMENSIONS. International 
Studies of Management & Organization, 13, 46-74. 
 
HOFSTEDE, G. 1994. The business of international business is culture. 
International Business Review, 3, 1-14. 
 
HOFSTEDE, G. 2003. What is culture? A reply to Baskerville. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 28, 811-813. 
 
HOFSTEDE, G. 2006. What Did GLOBE Really Measure? Researchers' Minds 
versus Respondents' Minds. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 
882-896. 
267 
 
HOFSTEDE, G. 2010. The GLOBE debate: Back to relevance. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41, 1339-1346. 
 
HUANG, C.-L. & KUNG, F.-H. 2010. Drivers of environmental disclosure and 
stakeholder expectation: Evidence from Taiwan. Journal of Business Ethics, 
96, 435-451. 
 
HUMPHREYS, M. & BROWN, A. 2008. An Analysis of Corporate Social 
Responsibility at Credit Line: A Narrative Approach. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 80, 403-418. 
 
IBFIM. 2013. Certified Qualification in Islamic Finance (CQIF) [Online]. Kuala 
Lumpur: IBFIM. Available: http://www.ibfim.com/?t=tpd&p=cqif&c=index 
[Accessed 5 May 2016 2016]. 
 
IFSB. 2010. The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) [Online]. Kuala Lumpur: 
IFSB. Available: http://www.ifsb.org/background.php [Accessed 5 May 
2016 2016]. 
 
IQBAL, M. & MOLYNEUX, P. 2016. Thirty Years of Islamic Banking: History, 
Performance and Prospects, Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
 
ISLAM, M. A. & DEEGAN, C. 2008. Motivations for an organisation within a 
developing country to report social responsibility information: Evidence 
from Bangladesh. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 21, 850-
874. 
 
ISRA. 2016. Backgroud-Research Affair Department [Online]. Kuala Lumpur. 
Available: http://www.isra.my/background.html [Accessed 5 May 2016 
2016]. 
 
JAKIM 2009. JAKIM Strategic Plan 2009-2014: Encouraging Islamic Affairs 
Management Transformation. In: DEPARTMENT, M. I. D. (ed.). Kuala 
Lumpur: Putrajaya: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia. 
 
JAMALI, D. 2008. A Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Fresh Perspective into Theory and Practice. Journal of Business Ethics, 82, 
213-231. 
 
JAMALI, D. & SDIANI, Y. 2013. Does religiosity determine affinities to CSR? 
Journal of Management, Spirituality & Religion, 10, 309-323. 
 
JENSEN, M. C. 2001. Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate 
objective function. Journal of applied corporate finance, 14, 8-21. 
268 
 
JOHNSON, R. A. & GREENING, D. W. 1999. The effects of corporate governance 
and institutional ownership types on corporate social performance. 
Academy of management journal, 42, 564-576. 
 
KALER, J. 2009. An optimally viable version of stakeholder theory. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 86, 297-312. 
 
KAMLA, R. 2007. Critically Appreciating Social Accounting and Reporting in the 
Arab MiddleEast: A Postcolonial Perspective. Advances in International 
Accounting, 20, 105-177. 
 
KAMLA, R. 2009. Critical insights into contemporary Islamic accounting. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 20, 921-932. 
 
KAMLA, R., GALLHOFER, S. & HASLAM, J. 2006. Islam, nature and accounting: 
Islamic principles and the notion of accounting for the environment. 
Accounting Forum, 30, 245-265. 
 
KAMLA, R. & RAMMAL, H. G. 2013. Social reporting by Islamic banks: does social 
justice matter? Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 26, 911-945. 
 
KAMLA, R. & ROBERTS, C. 2010. The global and the local: Arabian Gulf States and 
imagery in annual reports. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
23, 449-481. 
 
KANAGARETNAM, K., LOBO, G. J. & WANG, C. 2015. Religiosity and earnings 
management: International evidence from the banking industry. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 132, 277-296. 
 
KARBHARI, Y., NASER, K. & SHAHIN, Z. 2004. Problems and challenges facing the 
islamic banking system in the west: The case of the UK. Thunderbird 
International Business Review, 46, 521-543. 
 
KAUFMANN, D., KRAAY, A. & MASTRUZZI, M. 2010. Response to ‘What do the 
worldwide governance indicators measure?’. The European Journal of 
Development Research, 22, 55-58. 
 
KHAN, F. 2010. How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic Banking? Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 76, 805-820. 
 
KIM, D., NAM, Y. & KANG, S. 2010. An analysis of corporate environmental 
responsibility on the global corporate Web sites and their dialogic 
principles. Public Relations Review, 36, 285-288. 
269 
 
KNOX, S., MAKLAN, S. & FRENCH, P. 2005. Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Exploring Stakeholder Relationships and Programme Reporting across 
Leading FTSE Companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 61, 7-28. 
 
KOHLBERG, L. 1984. The psychology of moral development: The nature and 
validity of moral stages. San Francisco: Harper & Row. 
 
KRIPPENDORFF, K. 2012. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, 
SAGE Publications, 2012. 
 
LAUFER, W. S. 2003. Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 43, 253-261. 
 
LEVIAN, G. M. 1980. How to communicate financial data more efficiently. 
Management Accounting (USA), 12, 31-34. 
 
LEWIS, M. K. 2001. Islam and accounting. Accounting Forum, 25, 103. 
 
LIANG, H. & RENNEBOOG, L. 2017. On the foundations of corporate social 
responsibility. The Journal of Finance, 72, 853-910. 
 
LINDBLOM, C. K. 1993. The Implication of Organisational Legitimacy for 
corporate social performance and disclosure. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting Conference. New York. 
 
LINSLEY, P. 2008. Restoring Reputation and Repairing Legitimacy: A Case Study 
of Impression Management in Response to a Major Risk Event at Allied 
Irish Banks plc. International Journal of Financial Services Management, 3, 
65-83. 
 
LINSLEY, P. & SLACK, R. 2013. Crisis Management and an Ethic of Care: The Case 
of Northern Rock Bank. Journal of Business Ethics, 113, 285-295. 
 
LINSLEY, P. M. & SHRIVES, P. J. 2006. Risk reporting: A study of risk disclosures 
in the annual reports of UK companies. The British Accounting Review, 38, 
387-404. 
 
LOCKE, J. & LOWE, A. 2008. Evidence and implications of multiple paradigms in 
accounting knowledge production. European Accounting Review, 17, 161-
191. 
 
LUKKA, K. 2010. The roles and effects of paradigms in accounting research. 
Management Accounting Research, 21, 110-115. 
 
270 
 
MAALI, B., CASSON, P. & NAPIER, C. 2006. Social reporting by islamic banks. 
Abacus, 42, 266-289. 
 
MAHADEO, J. D., OOGARAH-HANUMAN, V. & SOOBAROYEN, T. 2011. Changes in 
social and environmental reporting practices in an emerging economy 
(2004–2007): Exploring the relevance of stakeholder and legitimacy 
theories. Accounting Forum, 35, 158-175. 
 
MAHONEY, L. S., THORNE, L., CECIL, L. & LAGORE, W. 2013. A research note on 
standalone corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling or 
greenwashing? Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 24, 350-359. 
 
MALLIN, C., FARAG, H. & OW-YONG, K. 2014. Corporate social responsibility and 
financial performance in Islamic banks. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 103, Supplement, S21-S38. 
 
MANUEL CASTELO, B. & LÚCIA LIMA, R. 2006. Communication of corporate 
social responsibility by Portuguese banks: A legitimacy theory perspective. 
Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 11, 232-248. 
 
MARSH, D. & STOKER, G. 2002. Theory and Methods in Political Science, Second 
Edition, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
MARSTON, C. L. & SHRIVES, P. J. 1991. The use of disclosure indices in accounting 
research: A review article. The British Accounting Review, 23, 195-210. 
 
MCGUIRE, S. T., NEWTON, N. J., OMER, T. C. & SHARP, N. Y. 2012a. Does Local 
Religiosity Impact Corporate Social Responsibility? Available: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1926387&rec=1&s
rcabs=2041017&alg=1&pos=5 [Accessed 4 Dec 2017]. 
 
MCGUIRE, S. T., OMER, T. C. & SHARP, N. Y. 2011. The impact of religion on 
financial reporting irregularities. The Accounting Review, 87, 645-673. 
 
MCGUIRE, S. T., OMER, T. C. & SHARP, N. Y. 2012b. The Impact of Religion on 
Financial Reporting Irregularities. The Accounting Review, 87, 645-673. 
 
MERKL-DAVIES, D. M. 2007. Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate 
Narratives: Incremental Information or Impression Management? Journal 
of Accounting Literature, 26, 116-195. 
 
MILNE, M. J. & ADLER, R. W. 1999. Exploring the reliability of social and 
environmental disclosures content analysis. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 12, 237-256. 
271 
 
MINKOV, M. & HOFSTEDE, G. 2012. Hofstede's Fifth Dimension: New Evidence 
From the World Values Survey. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43, 3-
14. 
 
MOHD. YUSOF, R. & BAHLOUS, M. 2013. Islamic banking and economic growth in 
GCC & East Asia countries. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business 
Research, 4, 151-172. 
 
MORGAN, G. & SMIRCICH, L. 1980. The Case for Qualitative Research. The 
Academy of Management Review, 5, 491-500. 
 
NAKAGAWA, R. 2009. The Evolution Of Islamic Finance In Southeast Asia: The 
Case Of Malaysia. Journal of Applied Business Research, 25, 111-126. 
 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 2010. Business Cycle Dating 
Committee, National Bureau of Economic Research. Recession End After 18 
Months june 2009. 20 September 2010: NBER. 
 
O’DONOVAN, G. 2002. Environmental disclosures in the annual report: Extending 
the applicability and predictive power of legitimacy theory. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15, 344-371. 
 
ORIJ, R. 2010. Corporate social disclosures in the context of national cultures and 
stakeholder theory. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 23, 868-
889. 
 
OTHMAN, R. 2009. Determinants of Islamic social reporting among top shariah- 
approved companies in Bursa Malaysia. Research Journal of International 
Studies, 12, 4-21. 
 
OWEN, D., PARKER, L., GUTHRIE, J. & MILNE, M. 2008. Chronicles of wasted time? 
A personal reflection on the current state of, and future prospects for, 
social and environmental accounting research. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 21, 240-267. 
 
PATTEN, D. M. 1992. Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the 
Alaskan oil spill: A note on legitimacy theory. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 17, 471-475. 
 
PATTEN, D. M. 2002. The relation between environmental performance and 
environmental disclosure: a research note. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 27, 763-773. 
 
272 
 
PFEFFER, J. 1973. Size, Composition, and Function of Hospital Boards of 
Directors: A Study of Organization-Environment Linkage. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 18, 349-364. 
 
PRESTON, A. M., WRIGHT, C. & YOUNG, J. J. 1996. IMag[in]ing annual reports. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 21, 113-137. 
 
RAHMAN BELAL, A. 2001. A study of corporate social disclosures in Bangladesh. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 16, 274-289. 
 
RAMANATHAN, K. V. 1976. Toward a theory of corporate social accounting. 
Accounting Review, 516-528. 
 
RANIA, K. & CLARE, R. 2010. The global and the local: Arabian Gulf States and 
imagery in annual reports. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
23, 449-481. 
 
REGENSTEIN, J., CHAUDRY, M. & REGENSTEIN, C. 2003. The kosher and halal 
food laws. Comprehensive reviews in food science and food safety, 2, 111-
127. 
 
RENO, R. R., CIALDINI, R. B. & KALLGREN, C. A. 1993. The transsituational 
influence of social norms. Journal of personality and social psychology, 64, 
104. 
 
RHODES, R. A. W. 2007. Understanding governance: Ten years on. Organization 
studies, 28, 1243-1264. 
 
RIZK, R. 2014. Islamic environmental ethics. Journal of Islamic accounting and 
business research., 5, 194-204. 
 
ROBERTS, R. W. 1992. Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure: 
An application of stakeholder theory. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 17, 595-612. 
 
ROBERTS, R. W. & WALLACE, D. M. 2015. Sustaining diversity in social and 
environmental accounting research. Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 
 
ROSS, S. A. 1979. Disclosure regulation in financial markets: Implications of 
modern finance theory and signaling theory. Issues in financial regulation, 
5, 177-202. 
 
SARAH W & CAROL A 2013. Moral accounting? Employee disclosures from a 
stakeholder accountability perspective. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 26, 449-495. 
273 
 
SAUNDERS & TOSEY 2012. The Layers of Research Design. Rapport, 30. 
 
SAUNDERS MARK, PHILIPS LEWIS & ANDRIAN THORNHILL 2011. Research 
methods for business students, Pearson Education India. 
 
SCHOLTENS, B. 2009. Corporate Social Responsibility in the International 
Banking Industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 86, 159-175. 
 
SETHI, S. P. 1979. A conceptual framework for environmental analysis of social 
issues and evaluation of business response patterns. Academy of 
Management Review, 4, 63-74. 
 
SIDNEY, G. 1988. Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence on the Development of 
Accounting Systems Internationally. Abacus, 24, 1-15. 
 
SIMPSON, W. G. & KOHERS, T. 2002. The Link Between Corporate Social and 
Financial Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 35, 97-109. 
 
SINCLAIR, A. 1995. The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses. 
Accounting, organizations and Society, 20, 219-237. 
 
SINGHVI, S. S. & DESAI, H. B. 1971. An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of 
Corporate Financial Disclosure. The Accounting Review, 46, 129-138. 
 
SKELCHER, C., MATHUR, N. & SMITH, M. 2005. The public governance of 
collaborative spaces: Discourse, design and democracy. Public 
administration, 83, 573-596. 
 
SKINNER, D. J. 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of 
accounting research, 32, 38-60. 
 
SLACK, R. & SHRIVES, P. 2008. Social disclosure and legitimacy in Premier League 
football clubs: the first ten years. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 9, 
17-28. 
 
SLACK, R. & SHRIVES, P. 2010. Voluntary disclosure narratives: more research or 
time to reflect? Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 11, 84-89. 
 
SMITH, H. J. 2003. The Shareholders vs. Stakeholders Debate. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 44, 85-90. 
 
SOOBAROYEN, T. & NTIM, C. G. 2013. Social and environmental accounting as 
symbolic and substantive means of legitimation: The case of HIV/AIDS 
reporting in South Africa. Accounting Forum, 37, 92-109. 
274 
 
SPENCE, M. 1973. Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 
355-374. 
 
STATA JOURNAL. 2017. Linear fixed- and random-effects models [Online]. Sata 
Journal. Available: https://www.stata.com/features/overview/linear-
fixed-and-random-effects-models/ [Accessed 20 Dec 2017 2017]. 
 
SUCHMAN, M. C. 1995. Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches. The Academy of Management Review, 20, 571-610. 
 
THOMAS, M. A. 2010. What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure? 
The European Journal of Development Research, 22, 31-54. 
 
THOMPSON, P. & COWTON, C. J. 2004. Bringing the environment into bank 
lending: implications for environmental reporting. The British Accounting 
Review, 36, 197-218. 
 
THORNE, L., MAHONEY, L. S., GREGORY, K. & CONVERY, S. 2017. A comparison of 
Canadian and US CSR strategic alliances, CSR reporting, and CSR 
performance: Insights into implicit–explicit CSR. Journal of Business Ethics, 
143, 85-98. 
 
TOMS, J. S. 2002. FIRM RESOURCES, QUALITY SIGNALS AND THE 
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL REPUTATION: SOME 
UK EVIDENCE. The British Accounting Review, 34, 257-282. 
 
TORRES-REYNA, O. 2007. Panel Data Analysis Fixed and Random Effects using 
Stata. Available: https://www.princeton.edu/~otorres/Panel101.pdf 
[Accessed 20 Dec 2017]. 
 
ULLMANN, A. A. 1985. Data in Search of a Theory: A Critical Examination of the 
Relationships among Social Performance, Social Disclosure, and Economic 
Performance of U. S. Firms. The Academy of Management Review, 10, 540-
557. 
 
UNERMAN, J. 2000. Methodological issues ‐ Reflections on quantification in 
corporate social reporting content analysis. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 13, 667-681. 
 
UTUSAN, M. 2001. Latar belakang perbankan Islam (Islamic bank Background). 
Utusan, 1 September 2001. 
 
UYAR, A. 2009. An analysis of graphic disclosure in annual reports: the case of 
Turkey. Managerial Auditing Journal, 24, 423-444. 
275 
 
VENTURA, E. C. F. 2007. Social responsibility as displacement of capitalism: 
Evidences from banks in Brazil. Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and 
Organization Studies, 12, 35-48. 
 
WALKER, A. G., SMITHER, J. W. & DEBODE, J. 2012. The effects of religiosity on 
ethical judgments. Journal of Business Ethics, 106, 437-452. 
 
WARDE, I. 2010. Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, Edinburgh University 
Press. 
 
WILLIAMS, S. & ADAMS, C. 2013. Moral accounting? Employee disclosures from a 
stakeholder accountability perspective. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 26, 449-495. 
 
WISEMAN, J. 1982. An evaluation of environmental disclosures made in 
corporate annual reports. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 7, 53-63. 
 
WVS. 2015. World Values Survey wave 6 (2010-2014) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp 
[Accessed 21 July 2016]. 
 
YAKEL, E. 2001. The social construction of accountability: Radiologists and their 
record-keeping practices. The Information Society, 17, 233-245. 
 
YIN, X. 2005. THE EFFECT OF GRAPHIC DISCLOSURES ON USERS' PERCEPTIONS: 
AN EXPERIMENT. Journal of Accounting & Finance Research, 13, 39-50. 
 
 
  
276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
  
 
277 
 
 
Appendix.1. SEGE Disclosure Framework for Islamic Bank 
 
 
 
278 
 
Appendix.2. Content_Analysis_3_Level Scoring Sheet 
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Appendix.3. 3 Level Coding Procedure 
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Appendix.4. SEGE Excel Scoring Checklist 
Shariah Dimension Checklist 
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Shariah Governance Dimension Checklist 
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Social External Dimension Checklist 
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Social Internal Dimension Checklist 
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Environment Dimension Checklist 
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Ethics Dimension Checklist 
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Governance Dimension Checklist 
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Appendix.5. Example of 3 Level Coding Sheet 
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Appendix.6. Example of Checklist Coding in Excel  
 
 
  
290 
 
 
Appendix.7. Nodes Coding in Nvivo 
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Appendix.8. Social Internal Dimension disclosure example picture 
 
 
 
Disabled benefits in annual report, Bank Rakyat 2013 pg.109 
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Appendix.9. Summaries of the Instrumental Values Degree for Malaysia and 
Bahrain Affecting Disclosure  
 
Instrument 
 
Values 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
Bahrain 
 
Evidence Based Disclosure (Level 3) 
Wider Accountability to 
Stakeholder Group 
High Low 
Phrases Disclosure (Level 1)  
Surface Legitimacy Lead 
to Symbolic Disclosure 
Moderate High 
Graphic Utilisation 
Signalling to Wider 
Stakeholder 
High Low 
Important of Religion in Life 
(WVS) Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
Religiosity High Low 
Government Effectiveness  
(WGI) Average 5 Years (2010-2014) 
Effectiveness High Moderate 
Absolute Important of Democracy  
(WVS) Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
Democracy Low Very low 
Regulatory Quality  
(WGI) Average 5 Years (2010-2014) 
Quality Moderate Moderate 
Corruption Perception Index 
Transparency International 
Average 5 Years (2010-2014) 
Corruption 
Ranked 47 
out of 100 
Ranked 49 
out of 100 
Stakeholder Theory Perspective 
Stakeholder  
Exposure 
Wider Narrow 
Legitimacy Theory Perspective 
Legitimacy 
 Vitality 
Deep Surface 
Signalling Theory Perspective 
Signalling 
 Coverage 
Strong Weak 
Accountability Theory 
Accountability  
Attitude 
High Low 
Social Norms Theory 
Social 
 Behaviour 
Progressive Conservative 
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Appendix.10. Heptagon Dimension 
 
 
Seven Layer of Dimensions 
 
  
RULE & VALUE 
TWO LAYER 
GOVERNANCE 
RULE & VALUE 
MORAL & SOCIAL MORAL & SOCIAL 
DIVISION 1 
DIVISION 2 
DIVISION 3 
TWO LAYER 
GOVERNANCE 
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Appendix.11. Icosagonal Themes 
 
 
  
0
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20
1. SHARIAH COMPLIANCE
2. SHARIAH AWARENESS
3. ZAKAT
4. BENEVOLENT LOAN
5. ISLAMIC VALUE
6. SHARIAH
GOV.FRAMEWORK
7. SHARIAH SUPERVISORY
BOARD
8. COMMUNITY
INVOLVEMENT
9. CHARITY
10. SPONSORSHIP
11. HUMAN RESOURCE &
CAPITAL MGTN
12. REWARD &BENEFIT
13. NATURE
14. WILD LIFE & ANIMAL
RIGHT
15. RECYCLE
16. INSTITUTIONAL ETHIC
17. BUSINESS ETHIC
18. BOARD OF DIRECTOR
19. TOP MANAGEMENT
20. GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF
GOV.
ICOSAGON THEMES
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Appendix.12. Physical Sample of Coding Level 1-3 
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2nd Spectrum= Narrative Phrases and Graphic (Which Do Not hold information-Number, Value, 
Figure, Indicator, Measurement, Fact) 
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Appendix.13. Hausman Test 
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Appendix.14. Breush and Pagan Langrangian Multiplier test for Random Effect 
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Appendix.15. Main Model Estimation (Pooled-Malaysia & Bahrain) 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs     = 170 
Group variable: id   Number of groups  = 34 
  
 
    
R-sq:    Obs per group:  
within  = 0.1779   min = 5  
between = 0.5387   avg = 5  
overall = 0.4921   max = 5  
   
 
   
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)  Wald chi2(11)     = 99.23 
    Prob > chi2   = 0  
 
 
 
 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 34 clusters in id) 
SEGE Disclosure Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>z [95% Conf.Interval] 
Regulatory Quality .742264 .271258 2.74 0.006 .210609 1.273919 
Religiosity .267507 .082295 3.25 0.001 .1062121 .4288014 
Listed .096629 .040221 2.4 0.016 .0177968 .1754619 
Bank Age .006424 .001157 5.56 0.000 .0041577 .0086909 
BOD Size .006729 .005386 1.25 0.212 -.0038271 .0172857 
SSB Size .0000735 .004758 0.02 0.988 -.0092527 .0093996 
NED -.01019 .023954 -0.43 0.671 -.0571354 .0367618 
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.0046 .006813 -0.68 0.499 -.017958 .0087489 
Profitability (ln Net 
income) 
.001652 .002056 0.80 0.422 -.0023776 .0056808 
ROA -.05645 .058216 -0.97 0.332 -.1705504 .0576516 
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -.14224 .577582 -0.25 0.805 -1.274279 .9898006 
_cons -.43072 .214994 -2.00 0.045 -.8521013 -.0093424 
       
sigma_u 0.089917      
sigma_e 0.05094      
rho 0.757034 (fraction of variance due to u_i)  
  SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
This table reports the main model random effect estimation. SEGE Score: The score derived from the quality 
disclosure score of the annual report. Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance indicator. 
Religiosity: The data gathered from the world values survey based on the percentage of respondents indicating that 
religion is important to them. Listed: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange 
of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: Number of board 
members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors 
inside the board. Size: natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of net income. ROA: Ratio 
of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a 
country as a proxy for macroeconomic factors. Standard error is robust and adjusted for 34 clusters in ID. 
 
 
 
This estimation has taken into 
consideration of heteroscedastic 
& auto-correlation (The standard 
error is robust) 
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Appendix.16. High Religious Country 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs     = 170 
Group variable: id   Number of groups  = 34 
       
R-sq:    Obs per group:  
within  = 0.1779   min = 5  
between = 0.5387   avg = 5  
overall = 0.4921   max = 5  
       
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)  Wald chi2(11)     = 99.23 
    Prob > chi2   = 0  
    (Std. Err. adjusted for 34 clusters in id) 
SEGE Disclosure Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>z [95% Conf.Interval] 
High Religious Country .118238 .0363743 3.25 0.001 .0469457 .1895302 
Regulatory Quality .7422641 .2712575 2.74 0.006 .2106093 1.273919 
Listed .0966293 .0402214 2.40 0.016 .0177968 .1754619 
Bank Age .0064243 .0011565 5.56 0.000 .0041577 .0086909 
BOD Size .0067293 .005386 1.25 0.212 -.0038271 .0172857 
SSB Size .0000735 .0047583 0.02 0.988 -.0092527 .0093996 
NED -.01019 .023954 -0.43 0.671 -.0571354 .0367618 
Size(Ln Total Asset) -0.0046 .006813 -0.68 0.499 -.017958 .0087489 
Profitability (ln Net 
income) 
.001652 .002056 0.80 0.422 -.0023776 .0056808 
ROA -.05645 .058216 -0.97 0.332 -.1705504 .0576516 
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -.14224 .577582 -0.25 0.805 -1.274279 .9898006 
_cons .3221141 .2223325 -1.45 0.147 -.7578777 .1136495 
       
sigma_u 0.0899171      
sigma_e 0.05093983      
rho 0.75703389 (fraction of variance due to u_i)  
  SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
This table reports the differential statistical model random effect estimation. SEGE Score: The score derived from the 
quality disclosure score of the annual report. Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance 
indicator. High Religious Country: Value of 1 for highly religious countries and 0 for less religious countries. Listed: 
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise.  
Bank Age: The bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: Number of board members. SSB size: Number of shariah 
supervisory board members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of 
the total assets. Profitability: Natural logarithm of the net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets. GDP: Growth rate of the gross domestic product of a country as a proxy for macroeconomic 
factors. Standard error is robust and adjusted for 34 clusters in ID. 
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Appendix.17. Interactive Regulatory Quality 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs     = 170 
Group variable: id   Number of groups  = 34 
       
R-sq:    Obs per group:  
within  = 0.1803   min = 5  
between = 0.5399   avg = 5.0  
overall = 0.4934   max = 5  
       
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)  Wald chi2(11)     = 100.11 
    Prob > chi2   = 0.0000  
    (Std. Err. adjusted for 34 clusters in id) 
SEGE Disclosure Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>z [95% Conf.Interval] 
Regulatory Quality .6093331 .2902896 2.10 0.036 .0403759 1.17829 
Interact_Reg_Quality .1664968 .0497431 3.35 0.001 .0690022 .2639915 
Listed .0986872 .0402034 2.45 0.014 .01989 .1774844 
Bank Age .0063443 .0011157 5.69 0.000 .0041576 .008531 
BOD Size .0067965 .0053607 1.27 0.205 -.0037103 .0173033 
SSB Size .0005571 .0047171 -0.12 0.906 -.0098024 .0086882 
NED .0110447 .0238039 -0.46 0.643 -.0576995 .0356101 
Size(Ln Total Asset) -.0044784 .0068344 -0.66 0.512 -.0178735 .0089168 
Profitability (ln Net 
income) 
.0016469 .0020434 0.81 0.420 -.0023582 .0056519 
ROA -.0599767 .0583766 -1.03 0.304 -.1743929 .0544394 
GDP(GDP Growth Rate) -.2366069 .5901074 -0.40 0.688 -1.393196 .9199822 
_cons -.2192581 .2341829 -0.94 0.349 -.6782481 .239732 
       
sigma_u .08989619      
sigma_e .05112401      
rho .75561788 (fraction of variance due to u_i)  
  SEGE  : Shariah , Social , Environmental , Governance & Ethics Score 
This table reports the differential statistical model random effect estimation. SEGE Score: The score derived from the 
quality disclosure score of the annual report. Regulatory Quality: The score gathered from the world governance 
indicator. Interactive regulatory Quality: Country value times regulatory quality score. Listed: Dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if the bank is listed on the stock exchange of the respective country and 0 otherwise. Bank Age: The 
bank’s age since its foundation. BOD size: Number of board members. SSB size: Number of shariah supervisory board 
members. NED: Percentage of non-executive directors inside the board. Size: Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Profitability: Natural logarithm of the net income. ROA: Ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. 
GDP: growth rate of the gross domestic product of country as a proxy for macroeconomic factors. Standard error is 
robust and adjusted for 34 clusters in ID. 
 
 
 
